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2021-06-30

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The Lost Decade: Lessons From Japan's Real Estate Crisis<blockquote>失去的十年：日本房地产危机的教训</blockquote>

What Was Japan's "Lost Decade" Real Estate Crisis? Free markets economies are subject tocycles.Econo

The Lost Decade: Lessons From Japan's Real Estate Crisis<blockquote>失去的十年：日本房地产危机的教训</blockquote>

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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"data":{"magic":2,"id":153637612,"tweetId":"153637612","gmtCreate":1625020828136,"gmtModify":1631894050984,"author":{"id":3563007583951606,"idStr":"3563007583951606","authorId":3563007583951606,"authorIdStr":"3563007583951606","name":"jezza","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ee8927fb8d533f31310ae9ce418e859c","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":5,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>Good read</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>Good read</body></html>","text":"Good read","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/153637612","repostId":1160246970,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1160246970","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1625016621,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1160246970?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-30 09:30","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The Lost Decade: Lessons From Japan's Real Estate Crisis<blockquote>失去的十年：日本房地产危机的教训</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1160246970","media":"investopedia","summary":"What Was Japan's \"Lost Decade\" Real Estate Crisis?\nFree markets economies are subject tocycles.Econo","content":"What Was Japan's \"Lost Decade\" Real Estate Crisis?<blockquote>日本“失去的十年”房地产危机是什么？</blockquote> Free markets economies are subject tocycles.Economic cyclesconsist of fluctuating periods of economic expansion andcontractionas measured by a nation'sgross domestic product(GDP).<blockquote>自由市场经济受到周期的影响。经济周期由以一个国家的国内生产总值（GDP）衡量的经济扩张和收缩的波动时期组成。</blockquote> The length of economic cycles (periods of expansion vs. contraction) can vary greatly. The traditional measure of an economicrecessionis two or more consecutive quarters of falling gross domestic product. There are also economic depressions, which are extended periods of economic contraction such as theGreat Depressionof the 1930s.<blockquote>经济周期的长度（扩张期与收缩期）可能会有很大差异。经济衰退的传统衡量标准是国内生产总值连续两个或两个以上季度下降。还有经济萧条，即长期的经济收缩，例如20世纪30年代的大萧条。</blockquote> From 1991 through 2001, Japan experienced a period of economicstagnationand price deflation known as \"Japan'sLost Decade.\" While the Japanese economy outgrew this period, it did so at a much slower pace than other industrialized nations. During this period, the Japanese economy suffered from both acredit crunchand aliquidity trap.<blockquote>从1991年到2001年，日本经历了一段被称为“日本失去的十年”的经济停滞和物价通缩时期。虽然日本经济增长超过了这一时期，但其增长速度比其他工业化国家慢得多。在此期间，日本经济遭受了信贷紧缩和流动性陷阱。</blockquote> Understanding Japan's \"Lost Decade\" Real Estate CrisisJapan's Lost Decade<blockquote>了解日本“失去的十年”房地产危机日本失去的十年</blockquote> Japan's economy was the envy of the world in the 1980s—it grew at an average annual rate (as measured by GDP) of 3.89% in the 1980s, compared to 3.07% in the United States.1But Japan's economy ran into troubles in the 1990s.<blockquote>日本经济在20世纪80年代令世界羡慕——20世纪80年代的年均增长率（以GDP衡量）为3.89%，而美国为3.07%。1但日本经济在20世纪90年代陷入了困境。</blockquote> From 1991 to 2003, the Japanese economy, as measured by GDP, grew only 1.14% annually, well below that of other industrialized nations.1<blockquote>从1991年到2003年，以GDP衡量的日本经济年增长率仅为1.14%，远低于其他工业化国家。</blockquote> KEY TAKEAWAYS<blockquote>关键要点</blockquote> <ul> <li>Japan's \"Lost Decade\" was a period that lasted from about 1991 to 2001 that saw a great slowdown in Japan's previously bustling economy.</li> <li>The main causes of this economic slowdown were raising interest rates that set a liquidity trap at the same time that a credit crunch was unfolding.</li> <li>The major lessons economies can take from Japan's \"Lost Decade\" include using available public funds to restructure banks' balance sheets and that sometimes the fear of inflation can cause stagnation.</li> </ul> Japan's equity andreal estatebubbles burst starting in the fall of 1989. Equity values plunged 60% from late 1989 to August 1992,2whileland valuesdropped throughout the 1990s, falling an incredible 70% by 2001.3<blockquote><ul><li>日本“失去的十年”是从1991年左右持续到2001年的一段时间，日本以前繁荣的经济大幅放缓。</li><li>经济放缓的主要原因是加息，在信贷紧缩展开的同时，加息造成了流动性陷阱。</li><li>各经济体可以从日本“失去的十年”中吸取的主要教训包括利用可用的公共资金重组银行资产负债表，以及有时对通胀的担忧会导致经济停滞。</li></ul>日本的股票和房地产泡沫从1989年秋天开始破裂。从1989年末到1992年8月，股票价值暴跌了60%，2而土地价值在整个20世纪90年代都在下跌，到2001年更是惊人地下跌了70%。</blockquote> The Bank of Japan's Interest Rate Mistakes<blockquote>日本央行的利率失误</blockquote> It is generally acknowledged that theBank of Japan(BoJ), Japan'scentral bank, made several mistakes that may have added to and prolonged the negative effects of the bursting of the equity and real estate bubbles.<blockquote>人们普遍认为，日本央行（BoJ）犯了几个错误，这些错误可能加剧并延长了股票和房地产泡沫破裂的负面影响。</blockquote> For example, monetary policy was stop-and-go; concerned aboutinflationand asset prices, the Bank of Japan put the brakes on themoney supplyin the late 1980s, which may have contributed to the bursting of the equity bubble. Then, as equity values fell, the BoJ continued to raise interest rates because it remained concerned with still-appreciating real estate values.4<blockquote>例如，货币政策走走停停；出于对通货膨胀和资产价格的担忧，日本央行在20世纪80年代末抑制了货币供应，这可能导致了股票泡沫的破裂。然后，随着股票价值的下跌，日本央行继续提高利率，因为它仍然担心仍在升值的房地产价值。</blockquote> Higher interest rates contributed to the end of rising land prices, but they also helped the overall economy slide into a downward spiral. In 1991, as equity and land prices fell, the Bank of Japan dramatically reversed course and began to cut interest rates.5But it was too late, aliquiditytrap had already been set, and a credit crunch was setting in.<blockquote>较高的利率有助于结束土地价格上涨，但也帮助整体经济陷入螺旋式下降。1991年，随着股票和土地价格下跌，日本银行戏剧性地改变了方针，开始降息。5但为时已晚，流动性陷阱已经设置，信贷紧缩正在发生。</blockquote> A Liquidity Trap<blockquote>流动性陷阱</blockquote> A liquidity trap is an economic scenario in which households and investors sit on cash; either in short-term accounts or literally as cash on hand.<blockquote>流动性陷阱是指家庭和投资者坐拥现金的经济情景；要么是短期账户，要么是手头现金。</blockquote> They might do this for a few reasons: they have no confidence that they can earn a higherrate of returnby investing, they believedeflationis on the horizon (cash will increase in value relative to fixed assets), or deflation already exists. All three reasons are highly correlated, and under such circumstances, household and investor beliefs become reality.<blockquote>他们这样做可能有几个原因：他们没有信心通过投资获得更高的回报率，他们相信通货紧缩即将到来（现金相对于固定资产的价值会增加），或者通货紧缩已经存在。这三个原因都是高度相关的，在这种情况下，家庭和投资者的信念成为现实。</blockquote> In a liquidity trap, low interest rates, as a matter ofmonetary policy, become ineffective. People and investors simply don't spend or invest. They believe goods and services will be cheaper tomorrow, so they wait to consume, and they believe they can earn a better return by simply sitting on their money than by investing it. The Bank of Japan'sdiscount ratewas 0.5% for much of the 1990s, but it failed to stimulate the Japanese economy, and deflation persisted.6<blockquote>在流动性陷阱中，低利率作为货币政策变得无效。人们和投资者根本不消费或投资。他们相信明天商品和服务会更便宜，所以他们等待消费，他们相信简单地坐拥资金比投资更能获得更好的回报。在20世纪90年代的大部分时间里，日本央行的贴现率为0.5%，但这未能刺激日本经济，通货紧缩持续存在。</blockquote> Breaking Out of a Liquidity Trap<blockquote>突破流动性陷阱</blockquote> To break out of a liquidity trap, households and businesses have to be willing to spend and invest. One way of getting them to do so is throughfiscal policy. Governments can give money directly to consumers through reductions intax rates, issuances of tax rebates, and public spending.<blockquote>为了摆脱流动性陷阱，家庭和企业必须愿意支出和投资。让他们这样做的一种方法是通过财政政策。政府可以通过降低税率、发放退税和公共支出直接向消费者提供资金。</blockquote> Japan tried several fiscal policy measures to break out of its liquidity trap, but it is generally believed that these measures were not executed well—money was wasted on inefficient public works projects and given to failing businesses. Most economists agree that for fiscal stimulus policy to be effective, money must be allocated efficiently. In other words, let the market decide where to spend and invest by placing money directly in the hands of consumers. (For related reading, check outWhat Is Fiscal Policy?)<blockquote>日本尝试了几项财政政策措施以突破其流动性陷阱，但人们普遍认为这些措施执行得并不好——钱被浪费在效率低下的公共工程项目上，并被给予了失败的企业。大多数经济学家都认为，为了使财政刺激政策有效，必须有效地分配资金。换句话说，通过将钱直接放在消费者手中，让市场决定在哪里消费和投资。（相关阅读，请查看什么是财政政策？)</blockquote> Another way to break out of the liquidity trap is to \"re-inflate\" the economy by increasing the actual supply of money as opposed to targetingnominal interest rates. A central bank can inject money into an economy without regard for an established target interest rate (such as thefed funds ratein the U.S.) through the purchase ofgovernment bondsinopen-market operations.<blockquote>打破流动性陷阱的另一种方法是通过增加实际货币供应量来“重新膨胀”经济，而不是以名义利率为目标。央行可以通过在公开市场操作中购买政府债券，向经济注入资金，而无需考虑既定的目标利率（例如美国的联邦基金利率）。</blockquote> This is when a central bank purchases a bond, in which case it effectively exchanges it for cash, which increases the money supply. This is known as themonetizationof debt. (It should be noted that open-market operations are also used to attain and maintain target interest rates, but when a central bank monetizes the debt, it does so without regard for a target interest rate.) (To learn more, readHow do central banks inject money into the economy?)<blockquote>这是指中央银行购买债券，在这种情况下，它实际上将其兑换成现金，从而增加货币供应量。这就是所谓的债务货币化。（应该注意的是，公开市场操作也用于实现和维持目标利率，但当央行将债务货币化时，它是在不考虑目标利率的情况下这样做的。）（要了解更多信息，请阅读央行如何向经济注入资金？)</blockquote> In 2001, the Bank of Japan began to target the money supply instead of interest rates, which helped to moderate deflation and stimulateeconomic growth.5 However, when a central bank injects money into thefinancial system, banks are left with more money on hand, but also must be willing to lend that money out. This brings us to the next problem Japan faced: a credit crunch.<blockquote>2001年，日本央行开始以货币供应量而不是利率为目标，这有助于缓解通货紧缩并刺激经济增长。5然而，当央行向金融体系注入资金时，银行手头会有更多的资金，但也必须愿意将这些钱借出去。这给我们带来了日本面临的下一个问题：信贷紧缩。</blockquote> Credit Crunch<blockquote>信贷紧缩</blockquote> A credit crunch is an economic scenario in which banks have tightened lending requirements and for the most part, do not lend.<blockquote>信贷紧缩是一种经济情况，在这种情况下，银行收紧了贷款要求，并且在大多数情况下不放贷。</blockquote> They may not lend for several reasons, including: 1) the need to hold onto reserves in order repair theirbalance sheetsafter suffering loses, which happened to Japanese banks that had invested heavily in real estate, and 2) there might be a generalpullbackin risk-taking, which happened in the United States in 2007 and 2008 asfinancial institutionsthat initially suffered losses related tosubprime mortgagelending pulled back in all types of lending, deleveraged their balance sheets, and generally sought to reduce their levels of risk in all areas.<blockquote>他们可能出于几个原因不放贷，包括：1）在遭受损失后需要持有准备金以修复资产负债表，这发生在大量投资房地产的日本银行身上；2）风险承担可能会普遍回落，2007年和2008年美国就发生了这种情况，最初遭受次级抵押贷款相关损失的金融机构减少了所有类型的贷款，去杠杆化了资产负债表，并普遍寻求降低所有领域的风险水平。</blockquote> Calculated risk-taking and lending is the life-blood of afree marketeconomy. When capital is put to work, jobs are created, spending increases, efficiencies are discovered (productivity increases), and the economy grows. On the other hand, when banks are reluctant to lend, it is difficult for the economy to grow.<blockquote>谨慎的冒险和借贷是自由市场经济的命脉。当资本投入工作时，就业机会被创造出来，支出增加，效率被发现（生产率提高），经济增长。另一方面，当银行惜贷时，经济就难以增长。</blockquote> In the same manner that a liquidity trap leads to deflation, a credit crunch is also conducive to deflation as banks are unwilling to lend, and therefore consumers and businesses are unable to spend, causing prices to fall.<blockquote>正如流动性陷阱导致通货紧缩一样，信贷紧缩也有利于通货紧缩，因为银行不愿意放贷，因此消费者和企业无法消费，导致价格下跌。</blockquote> Solutions to a Credit Crunch<blockquote>信贷紧缩的解决方案</blockquote> Japan also suffered from a credit crunch in the 1990s and Japanese banks were slow to take losses. Even though public funds were made available to banks to restructure their balance sheets, they failed to do so because of the fear of stigma associated with revealing long-concealed losses and the fear of losing control to foreign investors.7 To break out of a credit crunch, bank losses must be recognized, the banking system must be transparent, and banks must gain confidence in their ability to assess and manage risk.<blockquote>日本在20世纪90年代也遭受了信贷紧缩，日本银行承担损失的速度很慢。尽管向银行提供了公共资金来重组其资产负债表，但它们未能这样做，因为担心披露长期隐瞒的损失会带来耻辱，担心失去对外国投资者的控制权。7为了摆脱信贷紧缩，必须承认银行损失，银行系统必须透明，银行必须对其评估和管理风险的能力充满信心。</blockquote> Clearly, deflation causes a lot of problems. When asset prices are falling, households and investors hoard cash because cash will be worth more tomorrow than it is today. This creates a liquidity trap. When asset prices fall, the value ofcollateralbacking loans falls, which in turn leads to bank losses. When banks suffer losses, they stop lending, creating a credit crunch.<blockquote>显然，通货紧缩会导致很多问题。当资产价格下跌时，家庭和投资者会囤积现金，因为现金明天会比今天更值钱。这就造成了流动性陷阱。当资产价格下跌时，抵押品支持贷款的价值就会下降，进而导致银行损失。当银行遭受损失时，它们会停止放贷，从而造成信贷紧缩。</blockquote> Most of the time, we think ofinflationas a very bad economic problem, which it can be, but re-inflating an economy might be precisely what is needed to avoid prolonged periods of slow growth such as what Japan experienced in the 1990s.<blockquote>大多数时候，我们认为通货膨胀是一个非常严重的经济问题，事实也确实如此，但经济重新通胀可能正是避免日本在20世纪90年代经历的长期缓慢增长所需要的。</blockquote> The problem is that re-inflating an economy isn't easy, especially when banks are unwilling to lend. Notable American economistMilton Friedmansuggested that the way to avoid a liquidity trap is by bypassingfinancial intermediariesand giving money directly to individuals to spend. This is known as \"helicopter money,\" because the theory is that a central bank could literally drop money from a helicopter.8 This also suggests that regardless of which country you live in, life is all about being in the right place at the right time.<blockquote>问题是让经济重新膨胀并不容易，尤其是在银行不愿意放贷的情况下。美国著名经济学家米尔顿·弗里德曼提出，避免流动性陷阱的方法是绕过金融中介，直接将钱交给个人消费。这被称为“直升机撒钱”，因为该理论认为中央银行可以从直升机上投放资金。8这也表明，无论你生活在哪个国家，生活就是在正确的时间出现在正确的地点。</blockquote>","source":"lsy1606203311635","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The Lost Decade: Lessons From Japan's Real Estate Crisis<blockquote>失去的十年：日本房地产危机的教训</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe Lost Decade: Lessons From Japan's Real Estate Crisis<blockquote>失去的十年：日本房地产危机的教训</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\ninvestopedia2021-06-30 09:30\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nWhat Was Japan's \"Lost Decade\" Real Estate Crisis?<blockquote>日本“失去的十年”房地产危机是什么？</blockquote> Free markets economies are subject tocycles.Economic cyclesconsist of fluctuating periods of economic expansion andcontractionas measured by a nation'sgross domestic product(GDP).<blockquote>自由市场经济受到周期的影响。经济周期由以一个国家的国内生产总值（GDP）衡量的经济扩张和收缩的波动时期组成。</blockquote> The length of economic cycles (periods of expansion vs. contraction) can vary greatly. The traditional measure of an economicrecessionis two or more consecutive quarters of falling gross domestic product. There are also economic depressions, which are extended periods of economic contraction such as theGreat Depressionof the 1930s.<blockquote>经济周期的长度（扩张期与收缩期）可能会有很大差异。经济衰退的传统衡量标准是国内生产总值连续两个或两个以上季度下降。还有经济萧条，即长期的经济收缩，例如20世纪30年代的大萧条。</blockquote> From 1991 through 2001, Japan experienced a period of economicstagnationand price deflation known as \"Japan'sLost Decade.\" While the Japanese economy outgrew this period, it did so at a much slower pace than other industrialized nations. During this period, the Japanese economy suffered from both acredit crunchand aliquidity trap.<blockquote>从1991年到2001年，日本经历了一段被称为“日本失去的十年”的经济停滞和物价通缩时期。虽然日本经济增长超过了这一时期，但其增长速度比其他工业化国家慢得多。在此期间，日本经济遭受了信贷紧缩和流动性陷阱。</blockquote> Understanding Japan's \"Lost Decade\" Real Estate CrisisJapan's Lost Decade<blockquote>了解日本“失去的十年”房地产危机日本失去的十年</blockquote> Japan's economy was the envy of the world in the 1980s—it grew at an average annual rate (as measured by GDP) of 3.89% in the 1980s, compared to 3.07% in the United States.1But Japan's economy ran into troubles in the 1990s.<blockquote>日本经济在20世纪80年代令世界羡慕——20世纪80年代的年均增长率（以GDP衡量）为3.89%，而美国为3.07%。1但日本经济在20世纪90年代陷入了困境。</blockquote> From 1991 to 2003, the Japanese economy, as measured by GDP, grew only 1.14% annually, well below that of other industrialized nations.1<blockquote>从1991年到2003年，以GDP衡量的日本经济年增长率仅为1.14%，远低于其他工业化国家。</blockquote> KEY TAKEAWAYS<blockquote>关键要点</blockquote> <ul> <li>Japan's \"Lost Decade\" was a period that lasted from about 1991 to 2001 that saw a great slowdown in Japan's previously bustling economy.</li> <li>The main causes of this economic slowdown were raising interest rates that set a liquidity trap at the same time that a credit crunch was unfolding.</li> <li>The major lessons economies can take from Japan's \"Lost Decade\" include using available public funds to restructure banks' balance sheets and that sometimes the fear of inflation can cause stagnation.</li> </ul> Japan's equity andreal estatebubbles burst starting in the fall of 1989. Equity values plunged 60% from late 1989 to August 1992,2whileland valuesdropped throughout the 1990s, falling an incredible 70% by 2001.3<blockquote><ul><li>日本“失去的十年”是从1991年左右持续到2001年的一段时间，日本以前繁荣的经济大幅放缓。</li><li>经济放缓的主要原因是加息，在信贷紧缩展开的同时，加息造成了流动性陷阱。</li><li>各经济体可以从日本“失去的十年”中吸取的主要教训包括利用可用的公共资金重组银行资产负债表，以及有时对通胀的担忧会导致经济停滞。</li></ul>日本的股票和房地产泡沫从1989年秋天开始破裂。从1989年末到1992年8月，股票价值暴跌了60%，2而土地价值在整个20世纪90年代都在下跌，到2001年更是惊人地下跌了70%。</blockquote> The Bank of Japan's Interest Rate Mistakes<blockquote>日本央行的利率失误</blockquote> It is generally acknowledged that theBank of Japan(BoJ), Japan'scentral bank, made several mistakes that may have added to and prolonged the negative effects of the bursting of the equity and real estate bubbles.<blockquote>人们普遍认为，日本央行（BoJ）犯了几个错误，这些错误可能加剧并延长了股票和房地产泡沫破裂的负面影响。</blockquote> For example, monetary policy was stop-and-go; concerned aboutinflationand asset prices, the Bank of Japan put the brakes on themoney supplyin the late 1980s, which may have contributed to the bursting of the equity bubble. Then, as equity values fell, the BoJ continued to raise interest rates because it remained concerned with still-appreciating real estate values.4<blockquote>例如，货币政策走走停停；出于对通货膨胀和资产价格的担忧，日本央行在20世纪80年代末抑制了货币供应，这可能导致了股票泡沫的破裂。然后，随着股票价值的下跌，日本央行继续提高利率，因为它仍然担心仍在升值的房地产价值。</blockquote> Higher interest rates contributed to the end of rising land prices, but they also helped the overall economy slide into a downward spiral. In 1991, as equity and land prices fell, the Bank of Japan dramatically reversed course and began to cut interest rates.5But it was too late, aliquiditytrap had already been set, and a credit crunch was setting in.<blockquote>较高的利率有助于结束土地价格上涨，但也帮助整体经济陷入螺旋式下降。1991年，随着股票和土地价格下跌，日本银行戏剧性地改变了方针，开始降息。5但为时已晚，流动性陷阱已经设置，信贷紧缩正在发生。</blockquote> A Liquidity Trap<blockquote>流动性陷阱</blockquote> A liquidity trap is an economic scenario in which households and investors sit on cash; either in short-term accounts or literally as cash on hand.<blockquote>流动性陷阱是指家庭和投资者坐拥现金的经济情景；要么是短期账户，要么是手头现金。</blockquote> They might do this for a few reasons: they have no confidence that they can earn a higherrate of returnby investing, they believedeflationis on the horizon (cash will increase in value relative to fixed assets), or deflation already exists. All three reasons are highly correlated, and under such circumstances, household and investor beliefs become reality.<blockquote>他们这样做可能有几个原因：他们没有信心通过投资获得更高的回报率，他们相信通货紧缩即将到来（现金相对于固定资产的价值会增加），或者通货紧缩已经存在。这三个原因都是高度相关的，在这种情况下，家庭和投资者的信念成为现实。</blockquote> In a liquidity trap, low interest rates, as a matter ofmonetary policy, become ineffective. People and investors simply don't spend or invest. They believe goods and services will be cheaper tomorrow, so they wait to consume, and they believe they can earn a better return by simply sitting on their money than by investing it. The Bank of Japan'sdiscount ratewas 0.5% for much of the 1990s, but it failed to stimulate the Japanese economy, and deflation persisted.6<blockquote>在流动性陷阱中，低利率作为货币政策变得无效。人们和投资者根本不消费或投资。他们相信明天商品和服务会更便宜，所以他们等待消费，他们相信简单地坐拥资金比投资更能获得更好的回报。在20世纪90年代的大部分时间里，日本央行的贴现率为0.5%，但这未能刺激日本经济，通货紧缩持续存在。</blockquote> Breaking Out of a Liquidity Trap<blockquote>突破流动性陷阱</blockquote> To break out of a liquidity trap, households and businesses have to be willing to spend and invest. One way of getting them to do so is throughfiscal policy. Governments can give money directly to consumers through reductions intax rates, issuances of tax rebates, and public spending.<blockquote>为了摆脱流动性陷阱，家庭和企业必须愿意支出和投资。让他们这样做的一种方法是通过财政政策。政府可以通过降低税率、发放退税和公共支出直接向消费者提供资金。</blockquote> Japan tried several fiscal policy measures to break out of its liquidity trap, but it is generally believed that these measures were not executed well—money was wasted on inefficient public works projects and given to failing businesses. Most economists agree that for fiscal stimulus policy to be effective, money must be allocated efficiently. In other words, let the market decide where to spend and invest by placing money directly in the hands of consumers. (For related reading, check outWhat Is Fiscal Policy?)<blockquote>日本尝试了几项财政政策措施以突破其流动性陷阱，但人们普遍认为这些措施执行得并不好——钱被浪费在效率低下的公共工程项目上，并被给予了失败的企业。大多数经济学家都认为，为了使财政刺激政策有效，必须有效地分配资金。换句话说，通过将钱直接放在消费者手中，让市场决定在哪里消费和投资。（相关阅读，请查看什么是财政政策？)</blockquote> Another way to break out of the liquidity trap is to \"re-inflate\" the economy by increasing the actual supply of money as opposed to targetingnominal interest rates. A central bank can inject money into an economy without regard for an established target interest rate (such as thefed funds ratein the U.S.) through the purchase ofgovernment bondsinopen-market operations.<blockquote>打破流动性陷阱的另一种方法是通过增加实际货币供应量来“重新膨胀”经济，而不是以名义利率为目标。央行可以通过在公开市场操作中购买政府债券，向经济注入资金，而无需考虑既定的目标利率（例如美国的联邦基金利率）。</blockquote> This is when a central bank purchases a bond, in which case it effectively exchanges it for cash, which increases the money supply. This is known as themonetizationof debt. (It should be noted that open-market operations are also used to attain and maintain target interest rates, but when a central bank monetizes the debt, it does so without regard for a target interest rate.) (To learn more, readHow do central banks inject money into the economy?)<blockquote>这是指中央银行购买债券，在这种情况下，它实际上将其兑换成现金，从而增加货币供应量。这就是所谓的债务货币化。（应该注意的是，公开市场操作也用于实现和维持目标利率，但当央行将债务货币化时，它是在不考虑目标利率的情况下这样做的。）（要了解更多信息，请阅读央行如何向经济注入资金？)</blockquote> In 2001, the Bank of Japan began to target the money supply instead of interest rates, which helped to moderate deflation and stimulateeconomic growth.5 However, when a central bank injects money into thefinancial system, banks are left with more money on hand, but also must be willing to lend that money out. This brings us to the next problem Japan faced: a credit crunch.<blockquote>2001年，日本央行开始以货币供应量而不是利率为目标，这有助于缓解通货紧缩并刺激经济增长。5然而，当央行向金融体系注入资金时，银行手头会有更多的资金，但也必须愿意将这些钱借出去。这给我们带来了日本面临的下一个问题：信贷紧缩。</blockquote> Credit Crunch<blockquote>信贷紧缩</blockquote> A credit crunch is an economic scenario in which banks have tightened lending requirements and for the most part, do not lend.<blockquote>信贷紧缩是一种经济情况，在这种情况下，银行收紧了贷款要求，并且在大多数情况下不放贷。</blockquote> They may not lend for several reasons, including: 1) the need to hold onto reserves in order repair theirbalance sheetsafter suffering loses, which happened to Japanese banks that had invested heavily in real estate, and 2) there might be a generalpullbackin risk-taking, which happened in the United States in 2007 and 2008 asfinancial institutionsthat initially suffered losses related tosubprime mortgagelending pulled back in all types of lending, deleveraged their balance sheets, and generally sought to reduce their levels of risk in all areas.<blockquote>他们可能出于几个原因不放贷，包括：1）在遭受损失后需要持有准备金以修复资产负债表，这发生在大量投资房地产的日本银行身上；2）风险承担可能会普遍回落，2007年和2008年美国就发生了这种情况，最初遭受次级抵押贷款相关损失的金融机构减少了所有类型的贷款，去杠杆化了资产负债表，并普遍寻求降低所有领域的风险水平。</blockquote> Calculated risk-taking and lending is the life-blood of afree marketeconomy. When capital is put to work, jobs are created, spending increases, efficiencies are discovered (productivity increases), and the economy grows. On the other hand, when banks are reluctant to lend, it is difficult for the economy to grow.<blockquote>谨慎的冒险和借贷是自由市场经济的命脉。当资本投入工作时，就业机会被创造出来，支出增加，效率被发现（生产率提高），经济增长。另一方面，当银行惜贷时，经济就难以增长。</blockquote> In the same manner that a liquidity trap leads to deflation, a credit crunch is also conducive to deflation as banks are unwilling to lend, and therefore consumers and businesses are unable to spend, causing prices to fall.<blockquote>正如流动性陷阱导致通货紧缩一样，信贷紧缩也有利于通货紧缩，因为银行不愿意放贷，因此消费者和企业无法消费，导致价格下跌。</blockquote> Solutions to a Credit Crunch<blockquote>信贷紧缩的解决方案</blockquote> Japan also suffered from a credit crunch in the 1990s and Japanese banks were slow to take losses. Even though public funds were made available to banks to restructure their balance sheets, they failed to do so because of the fear of stigma associated with revealing long-concealed losses and the fear of losing control to foreign investors.7 To break out of a credit crunch, bank losses must be recognized, the banking system must be transparent, and banks must gain confidence in their ability to assess and manage risk.<blockquote>日本在20世纪90年代也遭受了信贷紧缩，日本银行承担损失的速度很慢。尽管向银行提供了公共资金来重组其资产负债表，但它们未能这样做，因为担心披露长期隐瞒的损失会带来耻辱，担心失去对外国投资者的控制权。7为了摆脱信贷紧缩，必须承认银行损失，银行系统必须透明，银行必须对其评估和管理风险的能力充满信心。</blockquote> Clearly, deflation causes a lot of problems. When asset prices are falling, households and investors hoard cash because cash will be worth more tomorrow than it is today. This creates a liquidity trap. When asset prices fall, the value ofcollateralbacking loans falls, which in turn leads to bank losses. When banks suffer losses, they stop lending, creating a credit crunch.<blockquote>显然，通货紧缩会导致很多问题。当资产价格下跌时，家庭和投资者会囤积现金，因为现金明天会比今天更值钱。这就造成了流动性陷阱。当资产价格下跌时，抵押品支持贷款的价值就会下降，进而导致银行损失。当银行遭受损失时，它们会停止放贷，从而造成信贷紧缩。</blockquote> Most of the time, we think ofinflationas a very bad economic problem, which it can be, but re-inflating an economy might be precisely what is needed to avoid prolonged periods of slow growth such as what Japan experienced in the 1990s.<blockquote>大多数时候，我们认为通货膨胀是一个非常严重的经济问题，事实也确实如此，但经济重新通胀可能正是避免日本在20世纪90年代经历的长期缓慢增长所需要的。</blockquote> The problem is that re-inflating an economy isn't easy, especially when banks are unwilling to lend. Notable American economistMilton Friedmansuggested that the way to avoid a liquidity trap is by bypassingfinancial intermediariesand giving money directly to individuals to spend. This is known as \"helicopter money,\" because the theory is that a central bank could literally drop money from a helicopter.8 This also suggests that regardless of which country you live in, life is all about being in the right place at the right time.<blockquote>问题是让经济重新膨胀并不容易，尤其是在银行不愿意放贷的情况下。美国著名经济学家米尔顿·弗里德曼提出，避免流动性陷阱的方法是绕过金融中介，直接将钱交给个人消费。这被称为“直升机撒钱”，因为该理论认为中央银行可以从直升机上投放资金。8这也表明，无论你生活在哪个国家，生活就是在正确的时间出现在正确的地点。</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/japan-1990s-credit-crunch-liquidity-trap.asp?utm_campaign=quote-yahoo&utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=referral\">investopedia</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{},"source_url":"https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/japan-1990s-credit-crunch-liquidity-trap.asp?utm_campaign=quote-yahoo&utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=referral","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1160246970","content_text":"What Was Japan's \"Lost Decade\" Real Estate Crisis?\nFree markets economies are subject tocycles.Economic cyclesconsist of fluctuating periods of economic expansion andcontractionas measured by a nation'sgross domestic product(GDP).\nThe length of economic cycles (periods of expansion vs. contraction) can vary greatly. The traditional measure of an economicrecessionis two or more consecutive quarters of falling gross domestic product. There are also economic depressions, which are extended periods of economic contraction such as theGreat Depressionof the 1930s.\nFrom 1991 through 2001, Japan experienced a period of economicstagnationand price deflation known as \"Japan'sLost Decade.\" While the Japanese economy outgrew this period, it did so at a much slower pace than other industrialized nations. During this period, the Japanese economy suffered from both acredit crunchand aliquidity trap.\nUnderstanding Japan's \"Lost Decade\" Real Estate CrisisJapan's Lost Decade\nJapan's economy was the envy of the world in the 1980s—it grew at an average annual rate (as measured by GDP) of 3.89% in the 1980s, compared to 3.07% in the United States.1But Japan's economy ran into troubles in the 1990s.\nFrom 1991 to 2003, the Japanese economy, as measured by GDP, grew only 1.14% annually, well below that of other industrialized nations.1\nKEY TAKEAWAYS\n\nJapan's \"Lost Decade\" was a period that lasted from about 1991 to 2001 that saw a great slowdown in Japan's previously bustling economy.\nThe main causes of this economic slowdown were raising interest rates that set a liquidity trap at the same time that a credit crunch was unfolding.\nThe major lessons economies can take from Japan's \"Lost Decade\" include using available public funds to restructure banks' balance sheets and that sometimes the fear of inflation can cause stagnation.\n\nJapan's equity andreal estatebubbles burst starting in the fall of 1989. Equity values plunged 60% from late 1989 to August 1992,2whileland valuesdropped throughout the 1990s, falling an incredible 70% by 2001.3\nThe Bank of Japan's Interest Rate Mistakes\nIt is generally acknowledged that theBank of Japan(BoJ), Japan'scentral bank, made several mistakes that may have added to and prolonged the negative effects of the bursting of the equity and real estate bubbles.\nFor example, monetary policy was stop-and-go; concerned aboutinflationand asset prices, the Bank of Japan put the brakes on themoney supplyin the late 1980s, which may have contributed to the bursting of the equity bubble. Then, as equity values fell, the BoJ continued to raise interest rates because it remained concerned with still-appreciating real estate values.4\nHigher interest rates contributed to the end of rising land prices, but they also helped the overall economy slide into a downward spiral. In 1991, as equity and land prices fell, the Bank of Japan dramatically reversed course and began to cut interest rates.5But it was too late, aliquiditytrap had already been set, and a credit crunch was setting in.\nA Liquidity Trap\nA liquidity trap is an economic scenario in which households and investors sit on cash; either in short-term accounts or literally as cash on hand.\nThey might do this for a few reasons: they have no confidence that they can earn a higherrate of returnby investing, they believedeflationis on the horizon (cash will increase in value relative to fixed assets), or deflation already exists. All three reasons are highly correlated, and under such circumstances, household and investor beliefs become reality.\nIn a liquidity trap, low interest rates, as a matter ofmonetary policy, become ineffective. People and investors simply don't spend or invest. They believe goods and services will be cheaper tomorrow, so they wait to consume, and they believe they can earn a better return by simply sitting on their money than by investing it. The Bank of Japan'sdiscount ratewas 0.5% for much of the 1990s, but it failed to stimulate the Japanese economy, and deflation persisted.6\nBreaking Out of a Liquidity Trap\nTo break out of a liquidity trap, households and businesses have to be willing to spend and invest. One way of getting them to do so is throughfiscal policy. Governments can give money directly to consumers through reductions intax rates, issuances of tax rebates, and public spending.\nJapan tried several fiscal policy measures to break out of its liquidity trap, but it is generally believed that these measures were not executed well—money was wasted on inefficient public works projects and given to failing businesses. Most economists agree that for fiscal stimulus policy to be effective, money must be allocated efficiently. In other words, let the market decide where to spend and invest by placing money directly in the hands of consumers. (For related reading, check outWhat Is Fiscal Policy?)\nAnother way to break out of the liquidity trap is to \"re-inflate\" the economy by increasing the actual supply of money as opposed to targetingnominal interest rates. A central bank can inject money into an economy without regard for an established target interest rate (such as thefed funds ratein the U.S.) through the purchase ofgovernment bondsinopen-market operations.\nThis is when a central bank purchases a bond, in which case it effectively exchanges it for cash, which increases the money supply. This is known as themonetizationof debt. (It should be noted that open-market operations are also used to attain and maintain target interest rates, but when a central bank monetizes the debt, it does so without regard for a target interest rate.) (To learn more, readHow do central banks inject money into the economy?)\nIn 2001, the Bank of Japan began to target the money supply instead of interest rates, which helped to moderate deflation and stimulateeconomic growth.5 However, when a central bank injects money into thefinancial system, banks are left with more money on hand, but also must be willing to lend that money out. This brings us to the next problem Japan faced: a credit crunch.\nCredit Crunch\nA credit crunch is an economic scenario in which banks have tightened lending requirements and for the most part, do not lend.\nThey may not lend for several reasons, including: 1) the need to hold onto reserves in order repair theirbalance sheetsafter suffering loses, which happened to Japanese banks that had invested heavily in real estate, and 2) there might be a generalpullbackin risk-taking, which happened in the United States in 2007 and 2008 asfinancial institutionsthat initially suffered losses related tosubprime mortgagelending pulled back in all types of lending, deleveraged their balance sheets, and generally sought to reduce their levels of risk in all areas.\nCalculated risk-taking and lending is the life-blood of afree marketeconomy. When capital is put to work, jobs are created, spending increases, efficiencies are discovered (productivity increases), and the economy grows. On the other hand, when banks are reluctant to lend, it is difficult for the economy to grow.\nIn the same manner that a liquidity trap leads to deflation, a credit crunch is also conducive to deflation as banks are unwilling to lend, and therefore consumers and businesses are unable to spend, causing prices to fall.\nSolutions to a Credit Crunch\nJapan also suffered from a credit crunch in the 1990s and Japanese banks were slow to take losses. Even though public funds were made available to banks to restructure their balance sheets, they failed to do so because of the fear of stigma associated with revealing long-concealed losses and the fear of losing control to foreign investors.7 To break out of a credit crunch, bank losses must be recognized, the banking system must be transparent, and banks must gain confidence in their ability to assess and manage risk.\nClearly, deflation causes a lot of problems. When asset prices are falling, households and investors hoard cash because cash will be worth more tomorrow than it is today. This creates a liquidity trap. When asset prices fall, the value ofcollateralbacking loans falls, which in turn leads to bank losses. When banks suffer losses, they stop lending, creating a credit crunch.\nMost of the time, we think ofinflationas a very bad economic problem, which it can be, but re-inflating an economy might be precisely what is needed to avoid prolonged periods of slow growth such as what Japan experienced in the 1990s.\nThe problem is that re-inflating an economy isn't easy, especially when banks are unwilling to lend. Notable American economistMilton Friedmansuggested that the way to avoid a liquidity trap is by bypassingfinancial intermediariesand giving money directly to individuals to spend. This is known as \"helicopter money,\" because the theory is that a central bank could literally drop money from a helicopter.8 This also suggests that regardless of which country you live in, life is all about being in the right place at the right time.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1254,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":8,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"hasMoreComment":false,"orderType":2}