$阿莱技术公司(ALGN)$ Just as the inadequacy of investors’ risk aversion allows them to push prices up and buy at the top—egged on by the vision of easy money in a world in which they can’t discern any risk—in less positive times they push prices down and sell at the bottom. Their unpleasant experience convinces them—contrary to what they had thought when everything was going well—that investing is a risky field in which they shouldn’t engage. And, as a consequence, their risk aversion goes all the way from inadequate to excessive. They become worrywarts. Just as risk tolerance had positioned them to become buyers of overpriced assets at the highs, now their screaming risk aversion makes them sellers—certainly not buyers—at the bottom. (pages 114–115) ∾ During panics, people spend 100% of their
$苹果(AAPL)$ It all seems so obvious: investors rarely maintain objective, rational, neutral and stable positions. First they exhibit high levels of optimism, greed, risk tolerance and credulousness, and their resulting behavior causes asset prices to rise, potential returns to fall,and risk to increase. But then, for some reason—perhaps the arrival of a tipping point—they switch to pessimism, fear, risk aversion and skepticism, and this causes asset prices to fall, prospective returns to rise, and risk to decrease. Notably,each group of phenomena tends to happen in unison, and the swing from one to the other often goes far beyond what reason might call for. That’s one of the crazy things: in the real world, things generally fluctuate between “pretty good” and “not so hot.” But in the world
$阿里巴巴(BABA)$ The details vary, but the underlying dynamics are usually similar.The themes that provide warning signals in every boom/bust are the general ones: that excessive optimism is a dangerous thing; that risk aversion is an essential ingredient for the market to be safe; and that overly generous capital markets ultimately lead to unwise financing, and thus to danger for participants. In short, the details are unimportant and can be irrelevant. But the themes are essential, and they absolutely do tend to recur. Understanding that tendency—and being able to spot the recurrences—is one of the most important elements in dealing with cycles. (page 36) ∾ Cycles have more potential to wreak havoc the further they progress from the midpoint—i.e., the greater the aberrations or excesses. If
$特斯拉(TSLA)$ The Essence of Cycles I’m going to conclude by pulling together some of the book’s paragraphs that I think hold the keys to understanding cycles, their genesis, and how they should be dealt with. I’ll alter them only as necessary to allow them to stand alone here, out of context. This won’t be a summary of the book, but rather a recap of some of its key observations. (And for those who wish, reading just the bolded sentences will provide a good synopsis of the recap.) Investment success is like the choosing of a lottery winner. Both are determined by one ticket (the outcome) being pulled from a bowlful of tickets (the full range of possible outcomes). In each case, one outcome is chosen from among the many possibilities. Superior investors are people who have a better sense fo
$苹果(AAPL)$ 我下周将出版一本新书，书名为《把握市场周期：把握机会》(Mastering the Market Cycle: Get The Odds on Your Side)。这不是一本关于金融史或者经济学的书，技术性也不高，里面也没有太多的数字。相反，与我的备忘录一样，这本书的目的是分享我对周期的看法。正如你所知道的那样，我强烈的认为，尽管投资者可能不知道未来会发生什么，但如果他们的行动基于市场在周期中所处位置的判断上，他们就能提高成功的可能性。 这本书所贯穿的思想可以用马可吐温的一句话来概括“历史不会重演，但会惊人的相似”（History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme）。虽然在具体细节上（比如时间、振幅、波动速度），每次市场周期都不同；引发周期的特定原因和最终的影响也不一样，但有一些主题在一个又一个市场周期中被证明是相关的。本书的以下段落用于说明： 每一次繁荣/萧条中提供警告信号的主题都是一般性的：过度乐观是一件危险的事情;风险规避是市场安全的重要因素;而过度慷慨的资本市场最终将导致不明智的融资，从而给参与者带来危险。 投资成功的一个重要因素是，要认识到上述因素在什么时候会导致市场参与者的不明智行为、资产价格上涨和高风险，以及什么时候是相反的情况。当这些事情的趋势使得市场变得不稳定时，我们应当降低风险，而当情况正好相反时，我们应当更加激进。 我最喜欢的一篇备忘录是2007年2月写“趋底竞赛”（The Race to the Bottom）。首先，我认为资本市场是一家拍卖行，拍卖会上的拍卖品会被卖给出价最高的人。在投资中，购买资产或者贷款的机会通常交给那个愿意支付最高价格的人，这意味着接受