One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks_老虎社区_美港股上老虎

One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks

zerohedge2021-06-22

Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their "facts" into context is another. Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market ...

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infi
·2021-06-22
Noted
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Orangejus
·2021-06-22
You do not take into account the economic expansion enabled by the rapid development of technology. The novel markets and industries generated by technology with provide the support structure for the increased money supply/inflation. Counterintuitively, increased inflation has actually madethe establishment and development of these newmarkets cheaper than it would have been without.
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IchiGo
·2021-06-22
[惊讶]
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2
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- JHx:
  wow
  2021-06-22
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Forward21
·2021-06-22
🤔😥
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3
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- JHx:
  hmm
  2021-06-22
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JoachimV
·2021-06-22
Like and share
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Bossman
·2021-06-22
Nice
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YS_ZENG
·2021-06-22
Pls like n comment
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- vSup_puSv:
  Done
  2021-06-22
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Owlnayl
·2021-06-22
Not bad
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1
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tct294
·2021-06-22
Pls like
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- Jaslen:
  Reply please
  2021-06-22
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tearach
·2021-06-22
Pls like
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Royce333
·2021-06-22
U know it when jt happens
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FrankPang
·2021-06-22
Reply
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- tearach:
  pls like
  2021-06-22
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Hrms
·2021-06-22
Comment
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- Kim01:
  Comment back pls
  2021-06-22
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Dsownz
·2021-06-22
LUL like comment
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- Hrms:
  Comment
  2021-06-22
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- Jkrapido:
  K
  2021-06-22
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AndyQuak
·2021-06-22
666
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- Jkrapido:
  K
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href=https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29>zerohedge</a>\n\n\n</h4>\n\n</header>\n<article>\n<div>\nFact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market ...\n\n<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">网页链接</a>\n\n</div>\n\n\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","isBrief":false,"type":0,"news_type":1,"symbol":".DJI","symbol_name":"道琼斯","start_time":0,"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","article_id":"1145563175","we_media_id":null,"thumbnails":[],"rights":null,"url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"columns":[],"sourceInfo":null,"weMediaInfo":null,"summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","collect":0,"end_time":0,"defaultTopTitle":"zerohedge.com","property":[],"viewcount":null,"language":"en","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"translate_title":"一个疯狂的市场&六个冷酷的现实--检查","themeId":null,"isJumpTheme":false,"ttsUrl":null,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9},"content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","kind":"news","is_publish_news":true,"is_publish_highlight":true,"is_publish_live":false,"is_publish_wemedia":null,"editions":null,"column":"","sentiment":"0","news_tag":"","news_rank":0,"symbols":[],"gpt_button":0,"need_auth":false,"code":"91000000","status":"200"},"commentList":[{"id":129680065,"gmtCreate":1624370871857,"gmtModify":1634007125528,"author":{"id":"3579822603072333","authorId":"3579822603072333","name":"infi","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9c04f0bbe1a72cc3e39c64fc309119c6","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3579822603072333","idStr":"3579822603072333"},"htmlText":"Noted","listText":"Noted","text":"Noted","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129680065","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129637354,"gmtCreate":1624370655978,"gmtModify":1634007132684,"author":{"id":"3586565070413371","authorId":"3586565070413371","name":"Orangejus","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3586565070413371","idStr":"3586565070413371"},"htmlText":"You do not take into account the economic expansion enabled by the rapid development of technology. The novel markets&nbsp;and industries generated by technology with provide the support structure for the increased money supply/inflation. Counterintuitively, increased inflation has actually madethe establishment and development of these newmarkets cheaper than it would have been without.","listText":"You do not take into account the economic expansion enabled by the rapid development of technology. The novel markets&nbsp;and industries generated by technology with provide the support structure for the increased money supply/inflation. Counterintuitively, increased inflation has actually madethe establishment and development of these newmarkets cheaper than it would have been without.","text":"You do not take into account the economic expansion enabled by the rapid development of technology. The novel markets and industries generated by technology with provide the support structure for the increased money supply/inflation. Counterintuitively, increased inflation has actually madethe establishment and development of these newmarkets cheaper than it would have been without.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129637354","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129802451,"gmtCreate":1624368115873,"gmtModify":1631894043651,"author":{"id":"3571108991612603","authorId":"3571108991612603","name":"IchiGo","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c7799d84b640de8d882c175fa85737b5","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3571108991612603","idStr":"3571108991612603"},"htmlText":"[惊讶]&nbsp;","listText":"[惊讶]&nbsp;","text":"[惊讶]","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129802451","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4955853,"gmtCreate":1624368481508,"gmtModify":1631894043654,"authorId":3573821515865359,"author":{"id":3573821515865359,"idStr":"3573821515865359","authorId":3573821515865359,"name":"JHx","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54eb39bebd911124a59d7bf934977d25","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129802451,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"wow","text":"wow","html":"wow"}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":129137019,"gmtCreate":1624364415731,"gmtModify":1634007266224,"author":{"id":"3575183068551268","authorId":"3575183068551268","name":"Forward21","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9f618eccc8e951f14d4145316ae235bc","vip":1,"crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3575183068551268","idStr":"3575183068551268"},"htmlText":"🤔😥","listText":"🤔😥","text":"🤔😥","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":3,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129137019","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4955858,"gmtCreate":1624368487824,"gmtModify":1635251877558,"authorId":3573821515865359,"author":{"id":3573821515865359,"idStr":"3573821515865359","authorId":3573821515865359,"name":"JHx","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54eb39bebd911124a59d7bf934977d25","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129137019,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"hmm","text":"hmm","html":"hmm"}],"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129196688,"gmtCreate":1624363525044,"gmtModify":1631891250802,"author":{"id":"3561278731864298","authorId":"3561278731864298","name":"JoachimV","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1f981155e808b551a0d6e8cac37c36a2","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3561278731864298","idStr":"3561278731864298"},"htmlText":"Like and share&nbsp;","listText":"Like and share&nbsp;","text":"Like and share","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129196688","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129352176,"gmtCreate":1624361238895,"gmtModify":1634007308137,"author":{"id":"3575284954426905","authorId":"3575284954426905","name":"Bossman","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8a9a688341be7e4586cefc976cf56647","vip":1,"crmLevel":2,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3575284954426905","idStr":"3575284954426905"},"htmlText":"Nice","listText":"Nice","text":"Nice","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129352176","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129353838,"gmtCreate":1624361094424,"gmtModify":1634007311720,"author":{"id":"3561416218644754","authorId":"3561416218644754","name":"YS_ZENG","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/80872255ccfe73879d5d778410465550","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3561416218644754","idStr":"3561416218644754"},"htmlText":"Pls like n comment","listText":"Pls like n comment","text":"Pls like n comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129353838","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4957693,"gmtCreate":1624372785416,"gmtModify":1635251737000,"authorId":3581550492242446,"author":{"id":3581550492242446,"idStr":"3581550492242446","authorId":3581550492242446,"name":"vSup_puSv","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/a1150421a148787160d999c5a94bed8e","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129353838,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Done","text":"Done","html":"Done"}],"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129353305,"gmtCreate":1624361085907,"gmtModify":1634007311943,"author":{"id":"3580126069984063","authorId":"3580126069984063","name":"Owlnayl","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3580126069984063","idStr":"3580126069984063"},"htmlText":"Not bad","listText":"Not bad","text":"Not bad","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129353305","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129367694,"gmtCreate":1624360353718,"gmtModify":1634007322668,"author":{"id":"3576141071913977","authorId":"3576141071913977","name":"tct294","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/e4094c304ab7ecbf9698888ea7d82161","vip":1,"crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3576141071913977","idStr":"3576141071913977"},"htmlText":"Pls like","listText":"Pls like","text":"Pls like","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129367694","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4954323,"gmtCreate":1624361040331,"gmtModify":1635252026382,"authorId":3579319144921544,"author":{"id":3579319144921544,"idStr":"3579319144921544","authorId":3579319144921544,"name":"Jaslen","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/597ef08fd8f2bd857b8021d7044cd65a","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129367694,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Reply please ","text":"Reply please ","html":"Reply please "}],"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129367393,"gmtCreate":1624360343512,"gmtModify":1634007322991,"author":{"id":"3575256032463698","authorId":"3575256032463698","name":"tearach","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/861adeae93387d8335f9550889bafb00","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3575256032463698","idStr":"3575256032463698"},"htmlText":"Pls like","listText":"Pls like","text":"Pls like","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129367393","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129364172,"gmtCreate":1624360289796,"gmtModify":1631893548696,"author":{"id":"3582012803278187","authorId":"3582012803278187","name":"Royce333","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8e8f380d16068c756ab6408555011ec4","vip":1,"crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3582012803278187","idStr":"3582012803278187"},"htmlText":"U know it when jt happens","listText":"U know it when jt happens","text":"U know it when jt happens","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129364172","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nOne Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nzerohedge2021-06-22 19:00\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nFact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129366886,"gmtCreate":1624360080245,"gmtModify":1634007325588,"author":{"id":"3562581813714490","authorId":"3562581813714490","name":"FrankPang","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/aaa6febe46886634e58dd4a543aafe96","vip":1,"crmLevel":2,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3562581813714490","idStr":"3562581813714490"},"htmlText":"Reply","listText":"Reply","text":"Reply","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129366886","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4954177,"gmtCreate":1624360353429,"gmtModify":1635252041881,"authorId":3575256032463698,"author":{"id":3575256032463698,"idStr":"3575256032463698","authorId":3575256032463698,"name":"tearach","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/861adeae93387d8335f9550889bafb00","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129366886,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"pls like","text":"pls like","html":"pls like"}],"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129366170,"gmtCreate":1624360075490,"gmtModify":1634007325709,"author":{"id":"3573173473688350","authorId":"3573173473688350","name":"Hrms","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fdf3ca26e4c4cbd1584bfa93a5d32859","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3573173473688350","idStr":"3573173473688350"},"htmlText":"Comment","listText":"Comment","text":"Comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":4,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129366170","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nOne Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nzerohedge2021-06-22 19:00\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nFact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4954155,"gmtCreate":1624360218555,"gmtModify":1631894201796,"authorId":3575031902606623,"author":{"id":3575031902606623,"idStr":"3575031902606623","authorId":3575031902606623,"name":"Kim01","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7f81ff0a6483d707f33cca45ec355a58","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129366170,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Comment back pls","text":"Comment back pls","html":"Comment back pls"}],"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129361865,"gmtCreate":1624359940257,"gmtModify":1631892149958,"author":{"id":"3576600703570094","authorId":"3576600703570094","name":"Dsownz","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ae0edb0030955b916cb435f78b7fdd83","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3576600703570094","idStr":"3576600703570094"},"htmlText":"LUL like comment","listText":"LUL like comment","text":"LUL like comment","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":2,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129361865","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4954136,"gmtCreate":1624360086501,"gmtModify":1631892149974,"authorId":3573173473688350,"author":{"id":3573173473688350,"idStr":"3573173473688350","authorId":3573173473688350,"name":"Hrms","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fdf3ca26e4c4cbd1584bfa93a5d32859","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129361865,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Comment","text":"Comment","html":"Comment"},{"id":4954119,"gmtCreate":1624359994515,"gmtModify":1631892149958,"authorId":3576545773081754,"author":{"id":3576545773081754,"idStr":"3576545773081754","authorId":3576545773081754,"name":"Jkrapido","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/a99be107d174f7142bc212015c662c11","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129361865,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"K","text":"K","html":"K"}],"langContent":"EN"},{"id":129369291,"gmtCreate":1624359844413,"gmtModify":1634007329182,"author":{"id":"3576709266160370","authorId":"3576709266160370","name":"AndyQuak","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bd9f635e190b833549d9282c6e3e2f59","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"authorIdStr":"3576709266160370","idStr":"3576709266160370"},"htmlText":"666","listText":"666","text":"666","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/129369291","repostId":1145563175,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1145563175","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1624359605,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1145563175?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-22 19:00","market":"us","language":"en","title":"One Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1145563175","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into conte","content":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta 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display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nOne Mad Market & Six Cold Reality-Checks<blockquote>一个疯狂的市场和六个冷酷的现实检验</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nzerohedge2021-06-22 19:00\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nFact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.<blockquote>事实核查政客、头条新闻和央行行长是一回事。将他们的“事实”放在上下文中是另一回事。</blockquote> Toward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.<blockquote>为此，尽管疯狂的全球背景没有得到明确报道，但将所谓的“经济增长”、国债市场增长、股市增长、GDP增长，当然还有黄金价格增长置于更清晰的视角至关重要。</blockquote> Context 1: The Rising Growth Headline<blockquote>背景1：不断上升的增长标题</blockquote> Recently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.<blockquote>最近，拜登的经济顾问贾里德·伯恩斯坦（Jared Bernstein）用另一个头条吹嘘美国比他们的贸易伙伴“增长得快得多”来安抚大众。</blockquote> Fair enough.<blockquote>很公平。</blockquote> But given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…<blockquote>但鉴于美国正面临历史记录中最大的赤字……</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0ac5ed804cb5613af2890f604dac56be\" tg-width=\"575\" tg-height=\"405\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> …such “growth” is not surprising.<blockquote>……这样的“增长”并不令人意外。</blockquote> In other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.<blockquote>换句话说，在极端赤字支出的背景下吹嘘增长，就像一个被宠坏的孩子吹嘘用他父亲的信用卡秘密购买的新保时捷：只有在账单到达、汽车消失之前，它才看起来不错。</blockquote> In a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.<blockquote>在一个疯狂的金融世界中，审视所谓的增长或价格发现、债务水平或一般供需的基本原则至关重要。</blockquote> In short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.<blockquote>简而言之：由极端债务驱动的“增长”根本不是增长——它只是一辆买不起的跑车的头条表面。</blockquote> And yet&nbsp;the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.<blockquote>然而疯狂还在继续……以美国国债市场为例。</blockquote> Context 2: The Treasury “Market”?<blockquote>背景二：国债“市场”？</blockquote> How can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?<blockquote>当去年2月以来发行的4.5 T美元债券中有56%被美联储自己购买时，怎么会有人将美国国债市场看涨期权为“市场”呢？</blockquote> Sounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?<blockquote>听起来更像是内部价格操纵，而不是“市场”，不是吗？</blockquote> Such context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.<blockquote>这种背景赋予了“喝自己的库尔助手”的想法全新的含义，并且应该是一个很酷的提醒，即总体而言，国债，尤其是债券收益率，是伪装成信贷奥运选手的僵尸。</blockquote> The Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.<blockquote>当然，美联储会假装这种“支持”就像他们的“暂时性通胀”模因一样是暂时的，但大多数市场现实主义者很久以前就明白，更多、更疯狂的债券收益率“支持”是国债泡沫（和借据）像僵尸一样存活的唯一途径。</blockquote> In short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”<blockquote>简而言之，财政部的“支持”、“通融”或“刺激”更好的说法就是：“生命支持”。</blockquote> With central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.<blockquote>随着美联储等央行在遥远的未来继续创造法定货币，将其不可持续的债务货币化，我们可以有把握地预见美元将进一步走弱，金价、矿业股以及科技股和工业股等关键风险资产将进一步走强。</blockquote> Context 3: Deflation is back?<blockquote>背景三：通缩又回来了？</blockquote> Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote> Last week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.<blockquote>鲍威尔、费舍尔和布拉德上周的令人瞠目结舌的言论让市场怀疑美联储是否会在遥远的未来加息。</blockquote> The very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky&nbsp;rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.<blockquote>鲍威尔提出这个问题的事实是因为美联储意识到通胀将是粘性的而不是“暂时性”因此，他们已经在假装鹰派。</blockquote> But if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.<blockquote>但如果美联储加息是为了平息实际通胀而不是“暂时性”通胀，市场和山姆大叔就会大发脾气。故事结束。</blockquote> As I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.<blockquote>正如我在其他地方写过的：选择你的毒药——市场暴跌或通胀飙升。最终，我们预见到了两者。</blockquote> Meanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.<blockquote>与此同时，鲍威尔充分意识到通胀虽然有所下降，但只会呈上升趋势，他已经在游戏中期使用语义来改变规则，现在表示，他们不会“允许”2%的通胀，而是会满足于2%的“平均”。</blockquote> Translated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.<blockquote>翻译成诚实的英语，这只是意味着预计更多的通货膨胀即将到来。</blockquote> Context 4: Rising Stock Markets<blockquote>背景4：股市上涨</blockquote> Despite reaching nosebleed levels which defy&nbsp;every&nbsp;traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.<blockquote>尽管达到了流鼻血的程度每一传统的估值上限，从CAPE比率和托宾比率到账面价值和自由现金流数据，头条新闻提醒我们股票可以走得更高——而且确实可以。</blockquote> But context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.<blockquote>但背景和历史提醒我们，泡沫越大，均值回归下降就越大。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f1586e90684f7b8ae0525c04b1fa4bc7\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> No Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks<blockquote>国债中没有宝藏=股票中有很多空气</blockquote> Based upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.<blockquote>基于上述客观事实，我们现在知道，出现在美国国债拍卖中的唯一主要买家是美联储本身。</blockquote> This is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.<blockquote>这是因为世界其他地方（亚洲、欧洲等。）不想要他们。</blockquote> The next question is “why”?<blockquote>下一个问题是“为什么”？</blockquote> The answer is multiple yet simple.<blockquote>答案是多重而简单的。</blockquote> First, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.<blockquote>首先，尽管存在美国例外论的公开神话，但其他国家的投资者实际上可以自己思考、阅读和计算，这意味着他们不仅仅是盲目信任美联储或其借据。</blockquote> Stated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.<blockquote>换句话说，他们并不相信最近从FOMC喉舌中涌出的“暂时性通胀”或“强势美元”的故事。</blockquote> Inflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.<blockquote>通货膨胀不仅在美国上升，在其他地方也在攀升——甚至在日本，尤其是在中国。这主要是因为美国通过贸易和财政赤字将通货膨胀（和贬值的美元）输出到海外。</blockquote> Such deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the&nbsp;outflow&nbsp;of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.<blockquote>美国这种蓄意输出的通胀让那些借钱给山姆大叔的国家（债权人）陷入了两难境地：他们要么1）让本国货币与美元一起通胀（这一点都不好玩），要么2）试图平息流出出口（贬值）美元以避免本国货币进一步贬值。</blockquote> Option 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.<blockquote>当然，选项2是更好的选择，这意味着外国投资者需要购买比信誉不佳的美国国债更有吸引力的东西。</blockquote> Sadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than&nbsp;bogus&nbsp;US Treasuries are&nbsp;bloated&nbsp;U.S. stocks.<blockquote>可悲的是，讽刺的是，但事实上，唯一比假的美国国债是臃肿的美国。股票。</blockquote> In short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.<blockquote>简而言之，价格令人流鼻血的美国股票仍然是美国两害相权取其轻，因此外国人购买/将股票视为比主权债券更好的对冲美元贬值的工具。</blockquote> Don’t believe me?<blockquote>不相信我？</blockquote> See for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:<blockquote>亲眼看看——世界其他地区正在为美国股市泡沫增添大量空气：</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc5b73212bd7c3126d6a130e88169139\" tg-width=\"582\" tg-height=\"407\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">This is&nbsp;contextually&nbsp;troublesome for a number of reasons.<blockquote>这是上下文麻烦有很多原因。</blockquote> First, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).<blockquote>首先，这意味着衰落的美国已经从向世界其他地区典当其债券转向向世界其他地区（即中国……）典当其股票。</blockquote> Longer term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…<blockquote>从长远来看，这仅仅意味着通过直接持股，外国人将慢慢拥有比美国更多的企业股份……</blockquote> As for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.<blockquote>至于外国买家对曾经伟大的美国的缓慢侵蚀，不要责怪数据。指责你的美联储和其他政策制定者（包括劳动力离岸首席执行官的）出卖了美国，假装债务可以通过神奇的（假）货币创造神奇地解决。</blockquote> Of course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.<blockquote>当然，股市上涨超出理智、盈利和诚实的自由现金流数据的第二个讨厌的小问题是一种叫做波动性的东西，即市场晕船。</blockquote> Nothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.<blockquote>没有什么是直线前进的，包括美元或市场。会有秋千。</blockquote> Right now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.<blockquote>目前，美元空头达到四年来的最高水平。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c420ec0af0df42eabb7a3d248da4db10\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"507\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Yet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.<blockquote>然而，如果美联储碰巧试图缩减或加息，所有涌入美国股市的外国美元（见上图）就会产生一个泡沫，泡沫总是会破裂，上述美元空头也会受到挤压。</blockquote> That could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.<blockquote>这可能会导致美国股市大规模抛售，因为外国人抛售股票以购买更多美元。</blockquote> In short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.<blockquote>简而言之，当前的股市泡沫有很多不同的迹象，未来一个月左右很可能会出现回调。</blockquote> The sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage)&nbsp;not&nbsp;making the headlines yet&nbsp;now&nbsp;making all-time highs.<blockquote>顺便说一句，这些针中最尖锐的是美国保证金债务（即杠杆）的惊人滑稽水平不尚未成为头条新闻现在创下历史新高。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/021f71bd7e78a1c275a9c9d74691c525\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"531\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">As a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.<blockquote>提醒一下，每当保证金债务达到峰值（上图）时，市场很快就会暴跌，任何记得过去互联网和次贷市场惨败的人都可以证明这一点。</blockquote> Just saying…<blockquote>只是说……</blockquote> Context 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth<blockquote>背景五：GDP增长“激增”的阴暗面</blockquote> The World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.<blockquote>世界银行最近成为头条新闻，预测全球GDP增长5.6%，为80年来最快。</blockquote> Good stuff, right?<blockquote>好东西，对吧？</blockquote> Well, not when placed into&nbsp;context…<blockquote>嗯，不是放在上下文…</blockquote> The last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a&nbsp;global world war.<blockquote>我们上一次看到全球GDP增长5.6%是在全球世界大战.</blockquote> Obviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.<blockquote>显然，当世界处于全球军事废墟状态时，任何形式的增长都可能从这样一个历史（和可怕的）基线“激增”。</blockquote> Coming out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…<blockquote>二战结束后，包括美国在内的所有人都负债累累。毕竟世界大战可以做到这一点……</blockquote> As the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.<blockquote>随着取得胜利并拯救文明的美国从那场战争中走出来，通过印钞、抑制债券收益率和刺激GDP增长来降低这种崇高但极端的债务杠杆是有一定道理的。</blockquote> What followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.<blockquote>接下来的至少是一段可以防御的40年，在这段时间里，美国名义GDP比美国国债收益率高出500-800个基点。</blockquote> In short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.<blockquote>简而言之，债券持有人受到了猛烈抨击，但击败轴心国后的事业、危机和重建证明了牺牲的合理性。</blockquote> The same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.<blockquote>然而，今天就不一样了，因为债券持有者在一种新的异常中再次受到挤压，在这种异常中，GDP将大大（并且类似地）超过长期债券收益率。</blockquote> Needless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.<blockquote>不用说，当前的政策制定者，正是那些将全球经济鸡舍置于当前债务废墟中的狐狸，喜欢将此归咎于COVID，而不是他们的浴室镜子。</blockquote> Ironically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the&nbsp;Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy&nbsp;today&nbsp;(with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s&nbsp;Blitzkrieg&nbsp;or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.<blockquote>然而，具有讽刺意味的是，中央银行家（相对于德国国防军日本帝国或意大利墨索里尼）成功地对全球经济造成了同样大的伤害当今（有赤字政策和扩大和假装印钞机）作为德国的闪电战或者裕仁在20世纪40年代的万岁袭击。</blockquote> When it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?<blockquote>说到背景，我们真的可以或应该将全球流感（死亡人数375万）与全球战争（死亡人数8500万）相提并论吗？</blockquote> The policy makers would like&nbsp;you&nbsp;to think so.<blockquote>政策制定者希望你这么想。</blockquote> Folks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real&nbsp;casus belli&nbsp;(reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.<blockquote>像姆努钦（去年）或耶伦、鲍威尔和国际货币基金组织（今年）这样的人实际上正试图说服自己和世界，抗击新冠病毒的战争是真实的开战理由（一场正当战争的理由）我们当前的债务困境——就其对金融界的巨大影响而言，其范围相当于第二次世界大战。</blockquote> But regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.<blockquote>但无论任何人对COVID“战争”的看法或其可疑的政策反应如何，将其经济影响与二战进行比较都是对历史和军事隐喻的侮辱。</blockquote> The simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was&nbsp;already&nbsp;in a debt crisis long&nbsp;before&nbsp;the first Corona headline of early 2020.<blockquote>简单、客观和数学上证实的事实是，全球经济已经长期陷入债务危机以前2020年初的第一个电晕头条。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/173b90a9931417cc655b6129fc7dc38c\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"466\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">Today, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.<blockquote>如今，美国债务占GDP的比例达到了自那场悲惨的第二次世界大战以来的最高水平，而且预计还会高得多。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/54e71ae4475b3449c8833ca918ddbd82\" tg-width=\"624\" tg-height=\"297\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"><blockquote></blockquote> So, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.<blockquote>因此，如果您仍然认为美联储能够并且将会像20世纪70年代或80年代那样有意义地加息来对抗明显的通胀，请三思。</blockquote> In the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.<blockquote>在20世纪70年代和80年代，美国债务/GDP为30%。今天是130%。</blockquote> Given this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.<blockquote>鉴于这一自我造成的（而不是新冠归咎的）现实，美联储根本无力加息。周期。句号。</blockquote> But as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.<blockquote>但正如我的同事埃贡·冯·格雷耶兹(Egon von Greyerz)提醒的那样，这绝不意味着利率不能也不会上升。</blockquote> The Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.<blockquote>美联储（和其他央行）可能很强大，但他们并不神圣。简而言之，他们通过点击鼠标简单地“控制”利率的能力是有限的。</blockquote> At some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.<blockquote>在某些时候，没有足够可信的假币来管理收益率曲线——尤其是在长期来看。</blockquote> As more printed and&nbsp;tanking currencies&nbsp;try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.<blockquote>随着更多的印刷和贬值货币试图购买较低的产量和利率，最终整个实验失败。</blockquote> At that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.<blockquote>在这个关键时刻，利率飙升，通货膨胀抬头，央行行长们寻找自己以外的东西来指责，而世界其他地区则盯着毫无价值的货币被滑稽的央行数字美元取代。</blockquote> Wonderful…<blockquote>精彩…</blockquote> Context 6: That Barbaric Relic?<blockquote>背景6：那个野蛮遗迹？</blockquote> What the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.<blockquote>上述通胀和利率背景意味着，在未来几年，通胀将走高，利率将走低（被迫/控制），直到利率和通胀一起飙升。</blockquote> This further means that&nbsp;real&nbsp;rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.<blockquote>这进一步意味着真的未来几年，利率（即经通胀调整的利率）可能高达-5%至-10%。</blockquote> Such negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.<blockquote>这种负实际利率水平很容易超过70年代和80年代的水平，这意味着黄金（和白银）都喜欢负实际利率，在这种完全债务扭曲的背景下，除了上涨、上涨和离开之外，无处可去。</blockquote> How’s that for context?<blockquote>背景怎么样？</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯","SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/one-mad-market-six-cold-reality-checks?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1145563175","content_text":"Fact checking politicos, headlines and central bankers is one thing.Putting their \"facts\" into context is another.\nToward that end, it’s critical to place so-called “economic growth,” Treasury market growth, stock market growth, GDP growth and, of course, gold price growth into clearer perspective despite an insane global backdrop that is anything but clearly reported.\nContext 1: The Rising Growth Headline\nRecently, Biden’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, calmed the masses with yet another headline-making boast that the U.S. is “growing considerably faster” than their trading partners.\nFair enough.\nBut given that the U.S. is running the largest deficits on historical record…\n\n…such “growth” is not surprising.\nIn other words, bragging about growth on the back of extreme deficit spending is like a spoiled kid bragging about a new Porsche secretly purchased with his father’s credit card: It only looks good until the bill arrives and the car vanishes.\nIn a financial world gone mad, it’s critical to look under the hood of what passes for growth in particular or basic principles of price discovery, debt levels or supply and demand in general.\nIn short: “Growth” driven by extreme debt is not growth at all–it’s just the headline surface shine on a sports car one can’t afford.\nAnd yet the madness continues…Take the U.S. Treasury market, for example.\nContext 2: The Treasury “Market”?\nHow can anyone call the U.S. Treasury market a “market” when 56% of the $4.5T of bonds issued since last February have been bought by the Fed itself?\nSounds more like an insider price-fix than a “market,” no?\nSuch context gives an entirely new meaning to the idea of “drinking your own Kool-aide” and ought to be a cool reminder that Treasury bonds in general, and bond yields in particular, are zombies masquerading as credit Olympians.\nThe Fed, of course, will pretend that such “support” is as temporary as their “transitory inflation” meme, but most market realists understood long ago that more and crazier bond yield “support” is the only way for national debt bubbles (and IOU’s) to stay zombie-like alive.\nIn short, the better phrase for Treasury “support,” “accommodation,” or “stimulus” is simply: “Life Support.”\nWith central banks like the Fed continuing to create fiat currencies to monetize their unsustainable debt well into the distant future, we can safely foresee a further weakening of the USD and further strengthening of gold prices, mining stocks and key risk assets like tech and industrial stocks.\nContext 3: Deflation is back?\nHardly.\nLast week’s jaw-boning from Powell, Fisher and Bullard had the markets wondering if the Fed will be raising rates in the distant future.\nThe very fact that Powell raised the issue is because the Fed is realizing that inflation is going to be sticky rather than “transitory”and thus they are already pretending to pose as Hawkish.\nBut if the Fed raises rates to quell real rather than “transitory” inflation, the markets and Uncle Sam will go into a tantrum. End of story.\nAs I’ve written elsewhere: Pick your Fed poison—tanking markets or surging inflation.Eventually, we foresee both.\nMeanwhile, and fully aware that inflation, with some dips, is only going to trend higher, Powell is already using semantics to change the rules mid-game, now saying that rather than “allow” 2% inflation, they’ll settle for an “average” of 2%.\nTranslated into honest English, this just means expect more inflation around the corner.\nContext 4: Rising Stock Markets\nDespite reaching nosebleed levels which defy every traditional valuation ceiling, from CAPE ratios and Tobin ratios to book values and FCF data, the headlines remind us that stocks can go even higher—and they can indeed.\nBut context, as well as history, reminds us that the bigger the bubble the bigger the mean-reverting fall.\n\nNo Treasure in Treasuries = Lot’s of Air in Stocks\nBased upon the objective facts above, we now know that the only primary buyers showing up at U.S. Treasury auctions is the Fed itself.\nThis is because the rest of the world (Asia, Europe etc.) doesn’t want them.\nThe next question is “why”?\nThe answer is multiple yet simple.\nFirst, and despite the open myth of American Exceptionalism, investors in other countries can actually think, read and count for themselves, which means they’re not simply trusting the Fed—or its IOU’s– blindly.\nStated otherwise, they are not buying the “transitory inflation” or “strong USD” story pouring recently out of the FOMC mouthpieces.\nInflation is not only rising in the U.S., it’s also creeping up elsewhere—even in Japan, but especially in China. This is largely because the U.S. exports its inflation (and debased dollars) offshore via trade and fiscal deficits.\nSuch deliberate inflation exporting by the U.S. places those countries (creditors) that lent money to Uncle Sam into a dilemma: They can either 1) let their currencies inflate alongside the dollar (hardly fun), or 2) try to quell the outflow of exported (debased) US dollars to save their own currencies from further debasement.\nOption 2, of course, is the better option, which means foreign investors need to buy something more appealing than discredited U.S. Treasuries.\nSadly, ironically, and yet factually, the only assets better than bogus US Treasuries are bloated U.S. stocks.\nIn short, nosebleed-priced US stocks are still the lesser of the two US evils, and foreigners are therefore buying/seeing stocks as a better hedge against the debased USD than sovereign bonds.\nDon’t believe me?\nSee for yourself—the rest of the world is adding lots of air to the U.S. equity bubble:\nThis is contextually troublesome for a number of reasons.\nFirst, it means the declining US of A has gone from hocking its bonds to the rest of the world to hocking it stocks to the rest of the world (i.e., China…).\nLonger term, this simply means that via direct stock ownership, foreigners will slowly own more of corporate America than, well America…\nAs for this slow gutting of the once-great America to foreign buyers, don’t blame the data. Blame your Fed and other policy makers (including labor off-shoring CEO’s) for selling-out America and pretending debt can be magically solved with magical (fake) money creation.\nOf course, the second pesky little problem with stocks rising beyond the pale of sanity, earnings and honest FCF data is a thing called volatility—i.e., market seasickness.\nNothing goes in a straight line, including the dollar or the market. There will be swings.\nRight now, the short on the USD is the highest it has been in four years.\nYet if, by some chance, the Fed ever attempts to taper or raise rates, all those foreign dollars piling into U.S. stocks (above) create a bubble that always pops, as do the foregoing dollar shorts, which get squeezed.\nThat could cause a massive sell-off in U.S. equity markets as foreigners sell their stocks to buy more dollars.\nIn short, there’s a lot of different needles pointing at the current equity bubble, and a correction within the next month or so is more than likely.\nThe sharpest of those needles, by the way, is the appallingly comical level of U.S. margin debt (i.e. leverage) not making the headlines yet now making all-time highs.\nAs a reminder, whenever margin debt peaks (above), markets tank soon thereafter, as anyone who remembers the dot.com and sub-prime market fiascos of yore can attest.\nJust saying…\nContext 5: The Dark Side of “Surging” GDP Growth\nThe World Bank recently made its own headlines projecting 5.6% global GDP growth, the fastest seen in 80 years.\nGood stuff, right?\nWell, not when placed into context…\nThe last time we saw 5.6% global GDP growth was during a global world war.\nObviously, when the world is in a state of global military rubble, growth of any kind is likely to “surge” from such an historical (and horrific) baseline.\nComing out of World War II, everyone, including the U.S. was in debt. World wars, after all, can do that…\nAs the victorious and civilization-saving U.S. came out of that war, it made some justifiable sense to de-lever that noble yet extreme debt by printing money, repressing bond yields and stimulating GDP growth.\nWhat followed was at least a defendable 40-year stretch in which US nominal GDP ran 500-800 bps above US Treasury yields.\nIn short, bond-holders got slammed, but the cause, crisis and re-building after defeating the Axis powers justified the sacrifice.\nThe same, however, can not be said today as bond-holders get crushed yet again in a new-abnormal in which GDP will greatly (and similarly) outpace long-term bond yields.\nNeedless to say, current policy makers, the very foxes who put the global economic henhouse into the current pile of debt of rubble, like to blame this on COVID rather their bathroom mirrors.\nIronically, however, central bankers (as opposed to the Wehrmacht, the Japanese Empire or Italy’s Mussolini) managed to do as much harm to the global economy today (with deficit policies and extend-and-pretend money printers) as Germany’s Blitzkrieg or Hirohito’s Banzai raids did in the 1940’s.\nWhen it comes to context, can or should we really be comparing a global flu (death toll 3.75M) to a global war (death toll 85 million)?\nThe policy makers would like you to think so.\nFolks like Mnuchin (last year) or Yellen, Powell and the IMF (this year), are in fact trying to convince themselves and the world that the war against COVID was the real casus belli (reason for a justifiable war) of our current debt distress—equal in scope to World War II in its drastic impact on the financial world.\nBut regardless of anyone’s views on the COVID “War” or its questionable policy reactions, comparing its economic impact to that of World War II is an insult to both history and military metaphors.\nThe simple, objective and mathematically-confirmed fact is that the global economy was already in a debt crisis long before the first Corona headline of early 2020.\nToday, US debt to GDP is at levels it has not seen since that tragic and Second World War, and it’s projected to go much, much higher.\n\nSo, just in case you still think the Fed can and will meaningfully raise rates to fight obvious inflation, as it did in the 1970’s or 1980’s, think again.\nIn the 1970’s and 1980’s US debt/GDP was 30%. Today it’s 130%.\nGiven this self-inflicted (rather than COVID-blamed) reality, the Fed simply can’t afford to raise rates. Period. Full stop.\nBut as my colleague, Egon von Greyerz reminds, that by no means suggests that rates can’t and won’t rise.\nThe Fed (and other central banks) may be powerful, but they are not divine. In short, there’s a limit to their powers to simply “control” rates with a mouse-click.\nAt some point, there’s not enough credible fake money to manage the yield curve—especially on the long end.\nAs more printed and tanking currencies try to purchase lower yields and rates, eventually the entire experiment fails.\nAt that critical point, rates spike, inflation raises its ugly head and the central bankers look for something other than themselves to blame as the rest of the world stares at worthless currencies being replaced by comical central bank digital dollars.\nWonderful…\nContext 6: That Barbaric Relic?\nWhat the foregoing inflation and rate contexts means is that in the years ahead, inflation will run higher and rates will run (be forced/controlled) lower until both rates and inflation spike together.\nThis further means that real rates (i.e., those adjusted for inflation) could run as deep as -5% to -10% in the years ahead.\nSuch negative real rate levels could easily surpass those seen in the 70’s and 80’s, which means gold (and silver), both of whom love negative real rates, has nowhere to go but up, up and away in this totally debt-distorted backdrop.\nHow’s that for context?","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":4954120,"gmtCreate":1624360001660,"gmtModify":1635252048065,"authorId":3576545773081754,"author":{"id":3576545773081754,"idStr":"3576545773081754","authorId":3576545773081754,"name":"Jkrapido","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/a99be107d174f7142bc212015c662c11","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":129369291,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"K","text":"K","html":"K"}],"langContent":"EN"}],"hasMoreComments":true,"newsSizeData":{"likeSize":31,"commentSize":15,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false},"isCrawlerRequest":true}