The next financial crisis is fast approaching_老虎社区_美港股上老虎

The next financial crisis is fast approaching

MarketWatch2021-10-06

Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project ...

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187

CCCH
·2021-10-06
Yes if China Evergrande is not supported by the Government
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- 74rk:
  Yup
  2021-10-08
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Slowdownpok
·2021-10-06
I just know today 1 dollar is always 3 times biggerthan tomorrow
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Qwinbie
·2021-10-06
“Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.”It was utterly detached from reality for such a long time. But it just keep going up.It is a matter of time. That is why blue chips should be choice for long term. Not that blue chip won’t crashed but we know over time even if it crashed and after corrections. The growth trend is still gradual upward trends over long term time horizon!Good or bad time. When we need to go to market to trade we need to trade. But always buy at a good value.Good luck!
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JcJc
·2021-10-06
Don’t buy in first … the hard time coming soon
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- Qwinbie:
  Soon is when? When is soon? 😆
  2021-10-06
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- 滚股怪:
  Ok good
  2021-10-06
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Universe宇宙
·2021-10-06
@koolgalit's coming soon [疑问]
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- Qwinbie:
  Hope it never! Up Up Up!
  Forever?
  2021-10-06
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- Universe宇宙:
  nobody knows 😉👍
  2021-10-06
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- Universe宇宙:
  😉👍 may also go the other way?
  2021-10-06
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查看更多 2 条评论
Val準凖
·2021-10-06
So be careful… Don’t buy buy buy now
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henglaw
·2021-10-06
Anyone keeps track these ‘predictions’?
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Daveliang
·2021-10-06
Central banks and politicians are trying to manipulate to stay on course smooth sailing.. however there are some waiting for black swan to rock the boat.
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6
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37687d3f
·2021-10-06
Oh no!
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JeremyChuax
·2021-10-06
Like pls
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- zhen130:
  Sure
  2021-10-06
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- JeremyKok:
  hi. please like and comment back. thank you.
  2021-10-07
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Dad123
·2021-10-06
Like and comment please
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- JeremyKok:
  hi. please like and comment back. thank you.
  2021-10-07
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DQ6
·2021-10-06
Yea yea. Maybe we should take all our money out from Tiger Broker?
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Onlyme
·2021-10-06
Like plz
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- Mama123:
  Done
  2021-10-06
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- JeremyKok:
  hi. please like and comment back. thank you.
  2021-10-07
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Pixiestars
·2021-10-06
One day it will really happen. But how fast is fast? 1 year, 2 years or 5years later? [思考]
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- Qwinbie:
  Maybe 10 years later, we will still be saying the same. but prudent traders had already collected another buck of their gold. Some will still be waiting with zero gain.
  2021-10-06
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- Pixiestars:
  Hahaha so true. Those waiting will forever be waiting.
  2021-10-07
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BokWoon
·2021-10-06
[Thinking]
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Lordtrade500
·2021-10-06
really?
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5
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HeroSmurf
·2021-10-06
Time to short?
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- bernardtayet:
  Stayed invested. Ride through it and emerge victory. All depends on individual goals in stock n shares though
  2021-10-06
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財神發
·2021-10-06
Won
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HOCK
·2021-10-06
Selling my house for the dip 🚀🚀🚀🚀
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9
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bwkhoo
·2021-10-06
I don’t think Evergrande will be the catalyst for a financial crisis
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- Qwinbie:
  I don’t think so as well. If it will, it should already started. Market confident is always ahead. Seldom lagging.
  2021-10-06
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Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","kind":"news","is_publish_news":true,"is_publish_highlight":true,"is_publish_live":false,"is_publish_wemedia":null,"editions":null,"column":"","sentiment":"0","news_tag":"","news_rank":0,"symbols":[],"gpt_button":0,"need_auth":false,"code":"91000000","status":"200"},"commentList":[{"id":829519548,"gmtCreate":1633526312454,"gmtModify":1633526724321,"author":{"id":"3579259217271611","authorId":"3579259217271611","name":"CCCH","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3579259217271611","authorIdStr":"3579259217271611"},"htmlText":"Yes if China Evergrande is not supported by the Government&nbsp;","listText":"Yes if China Evergrande is not supported by the Government&nbsp;","text":"Yes if China Evergrande is not supported by the Government","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":4,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829519548","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6128049,"gmtCreate":1633654422765,"gmtModify":1634719001831,"authorId":3584006131453100,"author":{"id":3584006131453100,"idStr":"3584006131453100","authorId":3584006131453100,"name":"74rk","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/5d2cbf8ec63fa4fc1ffb7189ba15e1bc","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829519548,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Yup","text":"Yup","html":"Yup"}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829592104,"gmtCreate":1633524752112,"gmtModify":1633524752443,"author":{"id":"3551139414186896","authorId":"3551139414186896","name":"Slowdownpok","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3551139414186896","authorIdStr":"3551139414186896"},"htmlText":"I just know today 1 dollar is always 3 times biggerthan tomorrow&nbsp;","listText":"I just know today 1 dollar is always 3 times biggerthan tomorrow&nbsp;","text":"I just know today 1 dollar is always 3 times biggerthan tomorrow","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829592104","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829590673,"gmtCreate":1633524158916,"gmtModify":1633524196041,"author":{"id":"4093065514765090","authorId":"4093065514765090","name":"Qwinbie","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9fb5fbddef00b7268ea877d0ed2f1846","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"4093065514765090","authorIdStr":"4093065514765090"},"htmlText":"“Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.”It was utterly detached from reality for such a long time. But it just keep going up.It is a matter of time. That is why blue chips should be choice for long term. Not that blue chip won’t crashed but we know over time even if it crashed and after corrections. The growth trend is still gradual upward trends over long term time horizon!Good or bad time. When we need to go to market to trade we need to trade. But always buy at a good value.Good luck!","listText":"“Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.”It was utterly detached from reality for such a long time. But it just keep going up.It is a matter of time. That is why blue chips should be choice for long term. Not that blue chip won’t crashed but we know over time even if it crashed and after corrections. The growth trend is still gradual upward trends over long term time horizon!Good or bad time. When we need to go to market to trade we need to trade. But always buy at a good value.Good luck!","text":"“Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.”It was utterly detached from reality for such a long time. But it just keep going up.It is a matter of time. That is why blue chips should be choice for long term. Not that blue chip won’t crashed but we know over time even if it crashed and after corrections. The growth trend is still gradual upward trends over long term time horizon!Good or bad time. When we need to go to market to trade we need to trade. But always buy at a good value.Good luck!","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":12,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829590673","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829277797,"gmtCreate":1633523106615,"gmtModify":1633523107871,"author":{"id":"4088126420960140","authorId":"4088126420960140","name":"JcJc","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/3a18de000ce7013be088f3ab4082bd27","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"4088126420960140","authorIdStr":"4088126420960140"},"htmlText":"Don’t buy in first … the hard time coming soon&nbsp;","listText":"Don’t buy in first … the hard time coming soon&nbsp;","text":"Don’t buy in first … the hard time coming soon","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":4,"commentSize":2,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829277797","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6110945,"gmtCreate":1633524219433,"gmtModify":1634720423114,"authorId":4093065514765090,"author":{"id":4093065514765090,"idStr":"4093065514765090","authorId":4093065514765090,"name":"Qwinbie","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9fb5fbddef00b7268ea877d0ed2f1846","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829277797,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Soon is when? When is soon? 😆","text":"Soon is when? When is soon? 😆","html":"Soon is when? When is soon? 😆"},{"id":6112399,"gmtCreate":1633532351162,"gmtModify":1634720311122,"authorId":4091089381144950,"author":{"id":4091089381144950,"idStr":"4091089381144950","authorId":4091089381144950,"name":"滚股怪","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/b67621b4133ca0db91bff9766152a448","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829277797,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Ok good","text":"Ok good","html":"Ok good"}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829273074,"gmtCreate":1633521995671,"gmtModify":1633576959868,"author":{"id":"3585001294737518","authorId":"3585001294737518","name":"Universe宇宙","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3585001294737518","authorIdStr":"3585001294737518"},"htmlText":"<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/U/3559581955535845\">@koolgal</a>it's coming soon&nbsp;[疑问]&nbsp;","listText":"<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/U/3559581955535845\">@koolgal</a>it's coming soon&nbsp;[疑问]&nbsp;","text":"@koolgalit's coming soon [疑问]","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":2,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":7,"commentSize":12,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829273074","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6110952,"gmtCreate":1633524258235,"gmtModify":1634720422788,"authorId":4093065514765090,"author":{"id":4093065514765090,"idStr":"4093065514765090","authorId":4093065514765090,"name":"Qwinbie","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9fb5fbddef00b7268ea877d0ed2f1846","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829273074,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Hope it never! Up Up Up!\n Forever?","text":"Hope it never! Up Up Up!\n Forever?","html":"Hope it never! Up Up Up!\n Forever?"},{"id":6111513,"gmtCreate":1633527789223,"gmtModify":1634720376465,"authorId":3585001294737518,"author":{"id":3585001294737518,"idStr":"3585001294737518","authorId":3585001294737518,"name":"Universe宇宙","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829273074,"type":1,"supId":6110932,"prevId":0,"content":"nobody knows 😉👍","text":"nobody knows 😉👍","html":"nobody knows 😉👍"},{"id":6111530,"gmtCreate":1633527836054,"gmtModify":1634720375042,"authorId":3585001294737518,"author":{"id":3585001294737518,"idStr":"3585001294737518","authorId":3585001294737518,"name":"Universe宇宙","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829273074,"type":1,"supId":6110952,"prevId":0,"content":"😉👍 may also go the other way?","text":"😉👍 may also go the other way?","html":"😉👍 may also go the other way?"},{"id":6117266,"gmtCreate":1633571411705,"gmtModify":1634719874448,"authorId":3585001294737518,"author":{"id":3585001294737518,"idStr":"3585001294737518","authorId":3585001294737518,"name":"Universe宇宙","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":3559581955535845,"repliedAuthor":{"id":3559581955535845,"idStr":"3559581955535845","authorId":3559581955535845,"name":"koolgal","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c05274d88ffc0434623e57350c52c70a","vip":2,"crmLevel":6,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"objectId":829273074,"type":1,"supId":6110932,"prevId":6116727,"content":"🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮","text":"🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮","html":"🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮🔮"},{"id":6118170,"gmtCreate":1633575797266,"gmtModify":1634719797979,"authorId":3585001294737518,"author":{"id":3585001294737518,"idStr":"3585001294737518","authorId":3585001294737518,"name":"Universe宇宙","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":3559581955535845,"repliedAuthor":{"id":3559581955535845,"idStr":"3559581955535845","authorId":3559581955535845,"name":"koolgal","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/c05274d88ffc0434623e57350c52c70a","vip":2,"crmLevel":6,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"objectId":829273074,"type":1,"supId":6110932,"prevId":6117383,"content":"🎉🎉 [笑哭] [笑哭] [笑哭] [笑哭]💐💐","text":"🎉🎉 [笑哭] [笑哭] [笑哭] [笑哭]💐💐","html":"🎉🎉 [笑哭] [笑哭] [笑哭] [笑哭]💐💐"}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829279395,"gmtCreate":1633521809852,"gmtModify":1633521810397,"author":{"id":"3581556348949722","authorId":"3581556348949722","name":"Val準凖","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc78ba8079eaf21b89d9286a3857c533","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3581556348949722","authorIdStr":"3581556348949722"},"htmlText":"So be careful…&nbsp;Don’t buy buy buy now","listText":"So be careful…&nbsp;Don’t buy buy buy now","text":"So be careful… Don’t buy buy buy now","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829279395","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829246902,"gmtCreate":1633520815195,"gmtModify":1633520815330,"author":{"id":"4094906971334360","authorId":"4094906971334360","name":"henglaw","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"4094906971334360","authorIdStr":"4094906971334360"},"htmlText":"Anyone keeps track these ‘predictions’?&nbsp;","listText":"Anyone keeps track these ‘predictions’?&nbsp;","text":"Anyone keeps track these ‘predictions’?","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":6,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829246902","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829248251,"gmtCreate":1633520757018,"gmtModify":1633520757018,"author":{"id":"3582453960379065","authorId":"3582453960379065","name":"Daveliang","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/6a7209c0950041904aa07dc915f6396a","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3582453960379065","authorIdStr":"3582453960379065"},"htmlText":"Central banks and politicians are trying to manipulate to stay on course smooth sailing.. however there are some&nbsp;waiting for black swan to rock the boat.&nbsp;","listText":"Central banks and politicians are trying to manipulate to stay on course smooth sailing.. however there are some&nbsp;waiting for black swan to rock the boat.&nbsp;","text":"Central banks and politicians are trying to manipulate to stay on course smooth sailing.. however there are some waiting for black swan to rock the boat.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":6,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829248251","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829243028,"gmtCreate":1633520179500,"gmtModify":1633520179657,"author":{"id":"4089595926650700","authorId":"4089595926650700","name":"37687d3f","avatar":"https://community-static.tradeup.com/news/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"4089595926650700","authorIdStr":"4089595926650700"},"htmlText":"Oh no!&nbsp;","listText":"Oh no!&nbsp;","text":"Oh no!","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":4,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829243028","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829257790,"gmtCreate":1633519778271,"gmtModify":1633519778575,"author":{"id":"4089499026613770","authorId":"4089499026613770","name":"JeremyChuax","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/a1f1ede120de2da723e4456d7fdcce55","vip":1,"crmLevel":3,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"4089499026613770","authorIdStr":"4089499026613770"},"htmlText":"&nbsp;Like pls&nbsp;","listText":"&nbsp;Like pls&nbsp;","text":"Like pls","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":7,"commentSize":2,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829257790","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6110821,"gmtCreate":1633523396135,"gmtModify":1634720430996,"authorId":3570360623104656,"author":{"id":3570360623104656,"idStr":"3570360623104656","authorId":3570360623104656,"name":"zhen130","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/553509e2e649eaf0d39f267a7e6de1a1","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829257790,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Sure","text":"Sure","html":"Sure"},{"id":6115056,"gmtCreate":1633563254098,"gmtModify":1634720080519,"authorId":3567307840510045,"author":{"id":3567307840510045,"idStr":"3567307840510045","authorId":3567307840510045,"name":"JeremyKok","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/01b03a485f83b6b2615fad8ac9b87bf4","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829257790,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you.","text":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you.","html":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you."}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829254636,"gmtCreate":1633519620757,"gmtModify":1633519621221,"author":{"id":"3581623201234305","authorId":"3581623201234305","name":"Dad123","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/ac4d85018dddfaed97e09d27a019c74f","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3581623201234305","authorIdStr":"3581623201234305"},"htmlText":"Like and comment please&nbsp;","listText":"Like and comment please&nbsp;","text":"Like and comment please","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":7,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829254636","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6115055,"gmtCreate":1633563248680,"gmtModify":1634720080627,"authorId":3567307840510045,"author":{"id":3567307840510045,"idStr":"3567307840510045","authorId":3567307840510045,"name":"JeremyKok","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/01b03a485f83b6b2615fad8ac9b87bf4","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829254636,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you.","text":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you.","html":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you."}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829251977,"gmtCreate":1633518846718,"gmtModify":1633518846873,"author":{"id":"3582894720985713","authorId":"3582894720985713","name":"DQ6","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa8d37bc40959d32453f15ca0e4178b4","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3582894720985713","authorIdStr":"3582894720985713"},"htmlText":"Yea yea. Maybe we should take all our money out from Tiger Broker?&nbsp;","listText":"Yea yea. Maybe we should take all our money out from Tiger Broker?&nbsp;","text":"Yea yea. Maybe we should take all our money out from Tiger Broker?","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829251977","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829250841,"gmtCreate":1633518528622,"gmtModify":1633518528843,"author":{"id":"3578395069533223","authorId":"3578395069533223","name":"Onlyme","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3578395069533223","authorIdStr":"3578395069533223"},"htmlText":"Like plz","listText":"Like plz","text":"Like plz","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":7,"commentSize":2,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829250841","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6110234,"gmtCreate":1633518552410,"gmtModify":1634720477183,"authorId":3581681339318837,"author":{"id":3581681339318837,"idStr":"3581681339318837","authorId":3581681339318837,"name":"Mama123","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/e7f57802d09afb13f2149178c4f099b0","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829250841,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Done","text":"Done","html":"Done"},{"id":6115059,"gmtCreate":1633563263449,"gmtModify":1634720080190,"authorId":3567307840510045,"author":{"id":3567307840510045,"idStr":"3567307840510045","authorId":3567307840510045,"name":"JeremyKok","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/01b03a485f83b6b2615fad8ac9b87bf4","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829250841,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you.","text":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you.","html":"hi. please like and comment back. thank you."}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829250037,"gmtCreate":1633518494241,"gmtModify":1633518494935,"author":{"id":"3581832720375359","authorId":"3581832720375359","name":"Pixiestars","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3581832720375359","authorIdStr":"3581832720375359"},"htmlText":"One day it will really happen. But how fast is fast? 1 year, 2 years or 5years later?&nbsp;[思考]&nbsp;","listText":"One day it will really happen. But how fast is fast? 1 year, 2 years or 5years later?&nbsp;[思考]&nbsp;","text":"One day it will really happen. But how fast is fast? 1 year, 2 years or 5years later? [思考]","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":8,"commentSize":2,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829250037","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6111005,"gmtCreate":1633524678691,"gmtModify":1634720417861,"authorId":4093065514765090,"author":{"id":4093065514765090,"idStr":"4093065514765090","authorId":4093065514765090,"name":"Qwinbie","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9fb5fbddef00b7268ea877d0ed2f1846","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829250037,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Maybe 10 years later, we will still be saying the same. but prudent traders had already collected another buck of their gold. Some will still be waiting with zero gain.","text":"Maybe 10 years later, we will still be saying the same. but prudent traders had already collected another buck of their gold. Some will still be waiting with zero gain.","html":"Maybe 10 years later, we will still be saying the same. but prudent traders had already collected another buck of their gold. Some will still be waiting with zero gain."},{"id":6122663,"gmtCreate":1633614207391,"gmtModify":1634719463594,"authorId":3581832720375359,"author":{"id":3581832720375359,"idStr":"3581832720375359","authorId":3581832720375359,"name":"Pixiestars","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829250037,"type":1,"supId":6111005,"prevId":0,"content":"Hahaha so true. Those waiting will forever be waiting.","text":"Hahaha so true. Those waiting will forever be waiting.","html":"Hahaha so true. Those waiting will forever be waiting."}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829227371,"gmtCreate":1633518366931,"gmtModify":1633518367273,"author":{"id":"3586346457808493","authorId":"3586346457808493","name":"BokWoon","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/33c54abe9712d43f005ec31ac4eb5e90","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3586346457808493","authorIdStr":"3586346457808493"},"htmlText":"[Thinking]&nbsp;","listText":"[Thinking]&nbsp;","text":"[Thinking]","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":8,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829227371","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829224079,"gmtCreate":1633518223764,"gmtModify":1633518223885,"author":{"id":"3575706377465717","authorId":"3575706377465717","name":"Lordtrade500","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/6b7861107e1779050e58feafab7425ab","vip":1,"crmLevel":2,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3575706377465717","authorIdStr":"3575706377465717"},"htmlText":"really?&nbsp;","listText":"really?&nbsp;","text":"really?","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829224079","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829225490,"gmtCreate":1633518206545,"gmtModify":1633518206777,"author":{"id":"3585642689958579","authorId":"3585642689958579","name":"HeroSmurf","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/6015b234d96461c6ef8db8d919ac3473","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3585642689958579","authorIdStr":"3585642689958579"},"htmlText":"Time to short?","listText":"Time to short?","text":"Time to short?","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":6,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829225490","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6110502,"gmtCreate":1633520788665,"gmtModify":1634720453664,"authorId":3583377018896117,"author":{"id":3583377018896117,"idStr":"3583377018896117","authorId":3583377018896117,"name":"bernardtayet","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/43e8c1fc37a4bff2a94af98953cff267","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829225490,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"Stayed invested. Ride through it and emerge victory. All depends on individual goals in stock n shares though","text":"Stayed invested. Ride through it and emerge victory. All depends on individual goals in stock n shares though","html":"Stayed invested. Ride through it and emerge victory. All depends on individual goals in stock n shares though"}],"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829225664,"gmtCreate":1633518123764,"gmtModify":1633518124303,"author":{"id":"4088201880010570","authorId":"4088201880010570","name":"財神發","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"4088201880010570","authorIdStr":"4088201880010570"},"htmlText":"Won","listText":"Won","text":"Won","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":6,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829225664","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829225175,"gmtCreate":1633518114730,"gmtModify":1633520730696,"author":{"id":"3574326262963990","authorId":"3574326262963990","name":"HOCK","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/88799e7ae4e69750fd2f85687a24a9e3","vip":1,"crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3574326262963990","authorIdStr":"3574326262963990"},"htmlText":"Selling my house for the dip 🚀🚀🚀🚀","listText":"Selling my house for the dip 🚀🚀🚀🚀","text":"Selling my house for the dip 🚀🚀🚀🚀","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":9,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829225175","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"langContent":"CN"},{"id":829225914,"gmtCreate":1633518095174,"gmtModify":1633518095875,"author":{"id":"3576444918223783","authorId":"3576444918223783","name":"bwkhoo","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/62d6e46769c7f3e2599cb62434f5f5c3","vip":1,"crmLevel":4,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"idStr":"3576444918223783","authorIdStr":"3576444918223783"},"htmlText":"I don’t think Evergrande will be the catalyst for a financial crisis&nbsp;&nbsp;","listText":"I don’t think Evergrande will be the catalyst for a financial crisis&nbsp;&nbsp;","text":"I don’t think Evergrande will be the catalyst for a financial crisis","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/829225914","repostId":1140605265,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1140605265","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1633514236,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1140605265?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-10-06 17:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1140605265","media":"MarketWatch","summary":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while lev","content":" Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>","source":"lsy1603348471595","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe next financial crisis is fast approaching<blockquote>下一次金融危机即将来临</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nMarketWatch2021-10-06 17:57\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments. NEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.<blockquote>各国央行需要做好准备，因为全球股市和房地产被高估，而家庭、企业、银行和政府的杠杆率接近创纪录水平。纽约（Project Syndicate）——自2020年初以来，发达经济体的央行不得不在追求金融稳定、低通胀（通常为2%）或实体经济活动之间做出选择。无一例外，他们都选择了金融稳定，其次是实体经济活动，最后是通货膨胀。</blockquote> As a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which&nbsp;lifted&nbsp;its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has&nbsp;hinted&nbsp;that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.<blockquote>因此，自COVID-19大流行开始以来唯一加息的发达经济体央行是挪威央行，该央行于9月24日将政策利率从零上调至0.25%。尽管它暗示可能会在12月进一步加息，并且其政策利率可能在2024年底达到1.7%，但这只是更多证据表明货币政策制定者极其不愿意实施所需的加息持续实现2%的通胀目标。</blockquote> Today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality. Central banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.<blockquote>今天的风险资产估值完全脱离现实。各国央行极不愿意推行与其通胀目标相适应的利率和资产负债表政策，这并不奇怪。在20世纪80年代中期大缓和开始到2007-08年金融危机之间的几年里，发达经济体的央行未能对金融稳定给予足够的重视。一个典型的例子是英格兰银行在1997年获得运营独立性时失去了所有监督和监管权力。</blockquote> Prioritize financial stability over inflation<blockquote>将金融稳定置于通胀之上</blockquote> The result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.<blockquote>结果是一场金融灾难和严重的周期性衰退。各国央行随后通过采取前所未有的激进政策来确保金融稳定，从而证实了“一劳永逸”的逻辑。但他们也远远超出了要求，用尽了所有政策来支持实体经济活动。</blockquote> Central banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.<blockquote>各国央行将金融稳定置于价格稳定之上是正确的，因为金融稳定本身是可持续价格稳定的先决条件（对于一些央行的另一个目标，即充分就业）。金融危机的经济和社会成本，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。显然，必须避免非常高的通货膨胀率，因为它们也可能成为金融不稳定的根源；但如果防止金融灾难需要几年的高个位数通胀，那么这个代价是非常值得的。</blockquote> There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. I hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent&nbsp;study&nbsp;by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.<blockquote>非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。我希望（并期待）如果美国联邦政府在10月18日或前后突破“债务上限”，各国央行——尤其是美联储——准备好做出适当反应。穆迪分析公司（Moody’s Analytics）的马克·赞迪（Mark Zandi）最近的一项研究得出结论，美国主权债务违约可能会摧毁多达600万个美国工作岗位，并抹去多达15万亿美元的私人财富。这个估计让我觉得很乐观。如果主权违约长期化，成本可能会高得多。</blockquote> In any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.<blockquote>无论如何，美国主权违约也将产生巨大和毁灭性的全球影响，困扰发达经济体以及新兴和发展中市场。美国主权债务TTMUBMUSD10Y, 1.551%在全球范围内被广泛持有，美元BUXX, 0.43%仍然是世界的高级储备货币。</blockquote> Vulnerable to financial shocks<blockquote>易受金融冲击</blockquote> Even without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.<blockquote>即使没有国会未能提高或暂停债务上限等自我造成的创伤，金融脆弱性如今也很普遍。家庭、企业、金融和政府的资产负债表已增长至本世纪的历史新高，使所有四个部门更容易受到金融冲击的影响。</blockquote> The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Central banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.<blockquote>经济和社会成本金融危机，尤其是在私人和公共杠杆率如此之高的情况下，将使持续超过通胀目标的成本相形见绌。央行是唯一有能力解决融资和市场流动性危机的经济参与者，这些危机现在已成为新常态的一部分。非央行资产负债表没有足够的弹性来应对不良资产的抛售或持有流动负债和非流动资产的商业银行或其他具有系统重要性的金融机构的挤兑。这在中国是真实的，在美国、欧元区、日本和英国也是如此。</blockquote> China’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.<blockquote>中国的房地产泡沫——以及以此为抵押的家庭债务——可能迟早会破裂。负债累累的房地产开发商恒大很可能成为催化剂。但即使中国当局设法阻止了全面的金融崩溃，深度和持续的经济衰退也是不可避免的。再加上中国潜在增长率的显著下降（由于人口结构和反企业政策），世界经济将失去一个引擎。</blockquote> Distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles<blockquote>扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫</blockquote> Across the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.<blockquote>在整个发达经济体（以及许多新兴市场），风险资产，特别是股票SPX、+1.05%GDOW、0.04%道琼斯、+0.92%和房地产，似乎被严重高估，尽管最近略有调整。避免这一结论的唯一方法是相信今天的长期实际利率（在许多情况下为负）处于或接近其基本值。我怀疑长期实际安全利率和各种风险溢价分别被扭曲的信念和持久的泡沫人为压低。如果是这样的话，今天的风险资产估值就完全脱离了现实。</blockquote> The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Whenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.<blockquote>2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。每当不可避免的价格调整成为现实时，央行、监管者和监管者都需要与财政部密切合作，以限制对实体经济的损害。所有四个部门（家庭、非金融企业、金融机构和政府）都有必要大幅去杠杆化，以降低金融脆弱性和增强弹性。有序的债务重组，包括几个高度脆弱的发展中国家的主权债务重组，将需要成为迟来的恢复财政可持续性的一部分。</blockquote> Central banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.<blockquote>作为最后贷款人（LLR）和最后做市商（MMLR）的央行将再次成为一系列混乱事件的关键。它们对全球金融稳定的贡献从未像现在这样重要。2%通胀和最大就业的目标可以等待，但金融稳定不能。由于LLR和MMLR操作是在流动性不足和破产之间的边缘地带进行的，这些央行活动具有明显的准财政特征。因此，即将到来的危机将不可避免地削弱央行的独立性。</blockquote> Willem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.<blockquote>威廉·H·比特是哥伦比亚大学国际和公共事务兼职教授。2010年至2018年任花旗集团全球首席经济学家.</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2\">MarketWatch</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"SPY":"标普500ETF",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-next-financial-crisis-is-fast-approaching-11633447555?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1140605265","content_text":"Central banks need to prepare because global stock markets and real estate are overvalued, while leverage is near record levels for households, corporations, banks and governments.\n\nNEW YORK (Project Syndicate)— Since early 2020, central banks across the advanced economies have had to choose between pursuing financial stability, low (typically 2%) inflation, or real economic activity. Without exception, they have opted in favor of financial stability, followed by real economic activity, with inflation last.\nAs a result, the only advanced-economy central bank to raise interest rates since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has been Norway’s Norges Bank, which lifted its policy rate from zero to 0.25% on Sept. 24. While it has hinted that an additional rate increase is likely in December, and that its policy rate could reach 1.7% toward the end of 2024, that is merely more evidence of monetary policy makers’ extreme reluctance to implement the kind of rate increases that are required to achieve a 2% inflation target consistently.\n\nToday’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nCentral banks’ overwhelming reluctance to pursue interest-rate and balance-sheet policies compatible with their inflation targets should come as no surprise. In the years between the start of the Great Moderation in the mid-1980s and the 2007-08 financial crisis, advanced-economy central banks failed to give sufficient weight to financial stability. A prime example was the Bank of England’s loss of all supervisory and regulatory powers when it was granted operational independence in 1997.\nPrioritize financial stability over inflation\nThe result was a financial disaster and a severe cyclical downturn. Confirming the logic of “once bitten, twice shy,” central banks then responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by pursuing unprecedentedly aggressive policies to ensure financial stability. But they also went far beyond what was required, pulling out all the policy stops to support real economic activity.\nCentral banks were right to prioritize financial stability over price stability, considering that financial stability itself is a prerequisite for sustainable price stability (and for some central banks’ other target, full employment). The economic and social cost of a financial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target. Obviously, very high inflation rates must be avoided, because they, too, can become a source of financial instability; but if preventing a financial calamity requires a few years of high single-digit inflation, the price is well worth it.\n\nThere is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets.\n\nI hope (and expect) that central banks—not least the Federal Reserve—are ready to respond appropriately if the U.S. federal government breaches its “debt ceiling” on or around Oct. 18. A recent study by Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics concludes that a U.S. sovereign debt default could destroy up to 6 million U.S. jobs and wipe out as much as $15 trillion in private wealth. This estimate strikes me as optimistic. If the sovereign default were to be protracted, the costs would probably be much higher.\nIn any case, a U.S. sovereign default would also have a dramatic and devastating global impact, afflicting both advanced economies and emerging and developing markets. U.S. sovereign debtTMUBMUSD10Y,1.551%is widely held globally, and the U.S. dollarBUXX,0.43%remains the world’s senior reserve currency.\nVulnerable to financial shocks\nEven without a self-inflicted wound like a congressional failure to raise or suspend the debt ceiling, financial fragility is rife nowadays. Household, corporate, financial, and government balance sheets have grown to record highs this century, rendering all four sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks.\n\nThe economic and social cost of a\nfinancial crisis, especially with private and public leverage as high as it is today, would dwarf the cost of persistently overshooting the inflation target.\n\nCentral banks are the only economic actors capable of addressing the funding and market-liquidity crises that are now part of the new normal. There is not enough resilience in non-central bank balance sheets to address a fire sale of distressed assets or a run on commercial banks or other systemically important financial institutions that hold liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. This is as true in China as it is in the U.S., the eurozone, Japan, and the United Kingdom.\nChina’s real-estate bubble—and the household debt secured against it—is likely to implode sooner or later. The dangerously indebted property developer Evergrande could well be the catalyst. But even if Chinese authorities manage to prevent a full-fledged financial meltdown, a deep and persistent economic slump would be unavoidable. Add to that a marked decline in China’s potential growth rate (owing to demographics and enterprise-hostile policies), and the world economy will have lost one of its engines.\nDistorted beliefs and enduring bubbles\nAcross the advanced economies (and in many emerging markets), risk assets, notably equitySPX,+1.05%GDOW,0.04%DJIA,+0.92%and real estate, appear to be materially overvalued, despite recent minor corrections. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to believe that long-run real interest rates today (which are negative in many cases) are at or close to their fundamental values. I suspect that both the long-run real safe interest rate and assorted risk premiums are being artificially depressed by distorted beliefs and enduring bubbles, respectively. If so, today’s risk-asset valuations are utterly detached from reality.\n\nThe goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot.\n\nWhenever the inevitable price corrections materialize, central banks, supervisors, and regulators will need to work closely with finance ministries to limit the damage to the real economy. Significant deleveraging by all four sectors (households, nonfinancial corporates, financial institutions, and governments) will be necessary to reduce financial vulnerability and boost resilience. Orderly debt restructuring, including sovereign debt restructuring in several highly vulnerable developing countries, will need to be part of the overdue restoration of financial sustainability.\nCentral banks, acting as lenders of last resort (LLR) and market makers of last resort (MMLR), will once again be the linchpins in what is sure to be a chaotic sequence of events. Their contributions to global financial stability have never been more important. The goals of 2% inflation and maximum employment can wait, but financial stability cannot. Since LLR and MMLR operations are conducted in the twilight zone between illiquidity and insolvency, these central-bank activities have marked quasi-fiscal characteristics. Thus, the crisis now waiting in the wings will inevitably diminish central bank independence.\nWillem H. Buiter is an adjunct professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University.He was global chief economist at Citigroup from 2010 to 2018.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"tweetType":1,"comments":[{"id":6111029,"gmtCreate":1633524901204,"gmtModify":1634720415892,"authorId":4093065514765090,"author":{"id":4093065514765090,"idStr":"4093065514765090","authorId":4093065514765090,"name":"Qwinbie","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9fb5fbddef00b7268ea877d0ed2f1846","vip":1,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[]},"repliedAuthorId":0,"objectId":829225914,"type":1,"supId":0,"prevId":0,"content":"I don’t think so as well. If it will, it should already started. Market confident is always ahead. Seldom lagging. ","text":"I don’t think so as well. If it will, it should already started. Market confident is always ahead. Seldom lagging. ","html":"I don’t think so as well. If it will, it should already started. Market confident is always ahead. Seldom lagging. "}],"langContent":"CN"}],"hasMoreComments":true,"newsSizeData":{"likeSize":187,"commentSize":28,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false},"isCrawlerRequest":true}