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JammyJammy

JammyJammy

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2021-08-03

I think the fear of Chinese Regulators is overdone now. $BABA at bargain prices and management backing this up with increasing the share buy backs and heavily investing in future growth. Long term hold for me and will try to pick more up month on month at these levels.

Alibaba EPS beats by RMB2.27, misses on revenue<blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW每股收益超过预期人民币2.27元、营收不及预期</blockquote>

2021-06-18

I wouldn't be surprised if the hedge funds are trading this both ways. Retail traders please be careful.

AMC: Danger Signals For Investors And Speculators<blockquote>AMC：投资者和投机者的危险信号</blockquote>

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Long term hold for me and will try to pick more up month on month at these levels.","listText":"I think the fear of Chinese Regulators is overdone now. $BABA at bargain prices and management backing this up with increasing the share buy backs and heavily investing in future growth. Long term hold for me and will try to pick more up month on month at these levels.","text":"I think the fear of Chinese Regulators is overdone now. $BABA at bargain prices and management backing this up with increasing the share buy backs and heavily investing in future growth. Long term hold for me and will try to pick more up month on month at these levels.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":3,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/807360539","repostId":"1169635195","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1169635195","kind":"news","weMediaInfo":{"introduction":"Providing stock market headlines, business news, financials and earnings ","home_visible":1,"media_name":"Tiger Newspress","id":"1079075236","head_image":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8274c5b9d4c2852bfb1c4d6ce16c68ba"},"pubTimestamp":1627988246,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1169635195?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-08-03 18:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Alibaba EPS beats by RMB2.27, misses on revenue<blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW每股收益超过预期人民币2.27元、营收不及预期</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1169635195","media":"Tiger Newspress","summary":" $Alibaba$ posted financial result in premarket, which showed that:. Alibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.Alibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.Revenue was RMB205,740 million , an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million .Annual active consumersof the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached app","content":"<p>(August 3)&nbsp;<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">Alibaba</a> posted&nbsp;financial&nbsp;result&nbsp;in&nbsp;premarket,&nbsp;which&nbsp;showed&nbsp;that:</p><p><blockquote>（8月3日）<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">阿里巴巴-SW</a>盘前公布的财务业绩显示：</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度营收为人民币2057.4亿元，去年同期为人民币1537.5亿元；FactSet共识为人民币2091.1亿元。</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度调整后。每股收益为人民币16.60元，去年同期为人民币14.82元；FactSet共识人民币14.33元。</blockquote></p><p> <b>BUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS</b></p><p><blockquote><b>业务亮点</b></blockquote></p><p> <b>In the quarter ended June 30, 2021:</b></p><p><blockquote><b>截至2021年6月30日的季度：</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><b>Revenue</b>&nbsp;was RMB205,740 million (US$31,865 million), an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million (US$29,010 million).</li>  <li><b>Annual active consumers</b>of the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached approximately 1.18 billion for the twelve months ended June 30, 2021, an increase of 45 million from the twelve months ended March 31, 2021. This includes 912 million consumers in China1and 265 million consumers overseas served by Lazada, AliExpress, Trendyol and Daraz.</li>  <li><b>Income from operations</b>&nbsp;was RMB30,847 million (US$4,778 million), a decrease of 11% year-over-year.<b>Adjusted EBITDA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 5% year-over-year to RMB48,628 million (US$7,532 million).<b>Adjusted EBITA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 8% year-over-year to RMB41,731 million (US$6,463 million). The year-over-year decreases were primarily due to our investments in strategic areas to capture incremental opportunities, such as Community Marketplaces, Taobao Deals, Local Consumer Services and Lazada, as well as our increased spending on growth initiatives within China retail marketplaces, such as Idle Fish and Taobao Live, and our support to merchants.</li>  <li><b>Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders</b>&nbsp;was RMB45,141 million (US$6,991 million),and<b>net income</b>was RMB42,835 million (US$6,634 million).<b>Non-GAAP net income</b>&nbsp;was RMB43,441 million (US$6,728 million), an increase of 10% year-over-year, mainly due to an increase in share of profit of equity method investees.</li>  <li><b>Diluted earnings per ADS</b>&nbsp;was RMB16.38 (US$2.54) and<b>diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.05 (US$0.32 or HK$2.46).<b>Non-GAAP diluted earnings per ADS</b>was RMB16.60 (US$2.57), an increase of 12% year-over-year and<b>non-GAAP diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.08 (US$0.32 or HK$2.50), an increase of 12% year-over-year.</li>  <li><b>Net cashprovided by operating activities</b>&nbsp;was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million).<b>Non-GAAP free cash flow</b>was RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), a decrease compared to RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020, mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million fine levied earlier this year by China’s State Administration for Market Regulation pursuant to China’s Anti-monopoly Law (the “Anti-monopoly Fine”) and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas.</li> </ul> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/11aa08a1ccb4f80e6867c7e7631297c8\" tg-width=\"719\" tg-height=\"863\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><b>收入</b>为人民币2,057.40百万元（318.65亿美元），同比增长34%。如果不包括合并高鑫，我们的收入将同比增长22%至人民币1,873.06亿元（290.1亿美元）。</li><li><b>年度活跃消费者</b>截至2021年6月30日止十二个月，全球阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的总用户数达到约11.8亿，较截至2021年3月31日止十二个月增加4500万。这包括Lazada、全球速卖通、Trendyol和Daraz服务的中国9.12亿消费者1和海外2.65亿消费者。</li><li><b>营业收入</b>为人民币308.47亿元（47.78亿美元），同比下降11%。<b>调整后EBITDA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降5%至人民币486.28亿元（75.32亿美元）。<b>调整后EBITA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降8%至人民币417.31亿元（64.63亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于我们在战略领域的投资以捕捉增量机会，例如社区市场、淘宝交易、本地消费者服务和Lazada，以及我们在中国零售市场增长计划上的支出增加，例如闲鱼和淘宝直播，以及我们对商家的支持。</li><li><b>归属于普通股股东的净利润</b>为人民币451.41亿元（69.91亿美元），及<b>净收入</b>为人民币428.35亿元（66.34亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则净利润</b>为人民币434.41亿元（67.28亿美元），同比增长10%，主要是由于权益法被投资方利润份额增加。</li><li><b>每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.38元（2.54美元）<b>每股摊薄盈利</b>为人民币2.05元（0.32美元或2.46港元）。<b>非公认会计准则每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.60元（2.57美元），同比增长12%<b>非公认会计准则稀释每股收益</b>为人民币2.08元（0.32美元或2.50港元），同比增长12%。</li><li><b>经营活动提供的现金净额</b>为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则自由现金流</b>为人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币365.70亿元有所下降，主要是由于部分结清了今年早些时候中国国家市场监督管理总局根据中国反垄断法征收的人民币182.28亿元罚款（“反垄断法罚款”）中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元）以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p> <b>China Retail Marketplaces</b></p><p><blockquote><b>中国零售市场</b></blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, Alibaba's China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，阿里巴巴-SW中国零售市场的移动月活跃用户数为9.39亿，季度净增1400万。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cloud Computing</b></p><p><blockquote><b>云计算</b></blockquote></p><p> In the June 2021 quarter, our cloud computing revenue grew 29% year-over-year to RMB16,051 million (US$2,486 million), primarily driven by robust growth in revenue from customers in the Internet, financial services and retail industries.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月季度，我们的云计算收入同比增长29%至人民币160.51亿元（24.86亿美元），主要得益于互联网、金融服务和零售行业客户收入的强劲增长。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cash Flow from Operating Activities and Free Cash Flow</b></p><p><blockquote><b>经营活动产生的现金流量和自由现金流量</b></blockquote></p><p> In the quarter ended June 30, 2021, net cash provided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million), a decrease compared to RMB50,099 million in the same quarter of 2020. Free cash flow, a non-GAAP measurement of liquidity, decreased to RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), from RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020. The year-over-year decreases were mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million Anti-monopoly Fine and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas. A reconciliation of net cash provided by operating activities to free cash flow is included at the end of this results announcement.</p><p><blockquote>截至2021年6月30日的季度，经营活动提供的净现金为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币500.99亿元有所下降。自由现金流（衡量流动性的非公认会计准则衡量标准）从2020年同季度的人民币365.7亿元下降至人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于部分和解了人民币182.28亿元的反垄断罚款中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元），以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。经营活动提供的净现金与自由现金流的调节表包含在本业绩公告的末尾。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Increasing Share Repurchases</b></p><p><blockquote><b>增加股票回购</b></blockquote></p><p> Since April 1, 2021 and through the publication of this results announcement, we repurchased approximately 18.1 million of our ADSs (the equivalent of approximately 144.5 million of our ordinary shares) for approximately US$3,680 million under our share repurchase program. In addition, on August 2, 2021, our board of directors authorized the Company to upsize our Company's share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion. This share repurchase program will be effective through the end of 2022.</p><p><blockquote>自2021年4月1日起及透过刊发本业绩公告，我们根据股份回购计划以约36.8亿美元回购约18.1百万股美国存讬股（相当于约144.5百万股普通股）。此外，2021年8月2日，我们的董事会授权公司将我们公司的股票回购计划规模从100亿美元扩大到150亿美元。该股票回购计划将于2022年底生效。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/58bf53593de78f5f6e4fa1096d7aae94\" tg-width=\"757\" tg-height=\"793\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, our China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million. We continue to increase penetration in less-developed areas, reflecting our success in broadening product offerings to meet diverse consumer demand.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，我们的中国零售市场拥有9.39亿移动月活跃用户数，季度净增1400万。我们继续提高在欠发达地区的渗透率，反映我们在扩大产品供应以满足多样化消费者需求方面取得的成功。</blockquote></p><p> “Alibaba started the new fiscal year by delivering a healthy quarter. For the June quarter, global annual active consumers across the Alibaba Ecosystem reached 1.18 billion, an increase of 45 million from the March quarter, which includes 912 million consumers in China. Over more than twenty years of growth, we have developed a company that spans across both consumer and industrial Internet, with multiple engines driving our long-term growth,” said Daniel Zhang, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alibaba Group. “We believe in the growth of the Chinese economy and long-term value creation of Alibaba, and we will continue to strengthen our technology advantage in improving the consumer experience and helping our enterprise customers to accomplish successful digital transformations.”</p><p><blockquote>张勇集团董事长兼首席执行官阿里巴巴-SW表示：“阿里巴巴-SW以健康的季度开局新财年。在6月季度，阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的全球年度活跃消费者达到11.8亿，比3月季度增加了4500万，其中包括9.12亿中国消费者。经过二十多年的增长，我们已经发展出一家横跨消费互联网和工业互联网的公司，多个引擎推动我们的长期增长。”“我们相信中国经济的增长和阿里巴巴-SW的长期价值创造，我们将继续加强我们在改善消费者体验和帮助企业客户成功完成数字化转型方面的技术优势。”</blockquote></p><p> “We delivered strong revenue growth of 34% year-over-year. As we said in last quarter's results announcement, we are investing our excess profits and additional capital to support our merchants and invest in strategic areas to better serve customers and penetrate into new addressable markets,” said Maggie Wu, Chief Financial Officer of Alibaba Group. “We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>“我们实现了34%的强劲收入增长。正如我们在上季度业绩公告中所说，我们正在投资超额利润和额外资本来支持我们的商家，并投资于战略领域，以更好地服务客户并渗透到新的潜在市场，”阿里巴巴-SW集团首席财务官Maggie Wu表示。“我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已经回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Alibaba EPS beats by RMB2.27, misses on revenue<blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW每股收益超过预期人民币2.27元、营收不及预期</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nAlibaba EPS beats by RMB2.27, misses on revenue<blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW每股收益超过预期人民币2.27元、营收不及预期</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<a class=\"head\" href=\"https://laohu8.com/wemedia/1079075236\">\n\n<div class=\"h-thumb\" style=\"background-image:url(https://static.tigerbbs.com/8274c5b9d4c2852bfb1c4d6ce16c68ba);background-size:cover;\"></div>\n\n<div class=\"h-content\">\n<p class=\"h-name\">Tiger Newspress </p>\n<p class=\"h-time smaller\">2021-08-03 18:57</p>\n</div>\n</a>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p>(August 3)&nbsp;<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">Alibaba</a> posted&nbsp;financial&nbsp;result&nbsp;in&nbsp;premarket,&nbsp;which&nbsp;showed&nbsp;that:</p><p><blockquote>（8月3日）<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">阿里巴巴-SW</a>盘前公布的财务业绩显示：</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度营收为人民币2057.4亿元，去年同期为人民币1537.5亿元；FactSet共识为人民币2091.1亿元。</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度调整后。每股收益为人民币16.60元，去年同期为人民币14.82元；FactSet共识人民币14.33元。</blockquote></p><p> <b>BUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS</b></p><p><blockquote><b>业务亮点</b></blockquote></p><p> <b>In the quarter ended June 30, 2021:</b></p><p><blockquote><b>截至2021年6月30日的季度：</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><b>Revenue</b>&nbsp;was RMB205,740 million (US$31,865 million), an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million (US$29,010 million).</li>  <li><b>Annual active consumers</b>of the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached approximately 1.18 billion for the twelve months ended June 30, 2021, an increase of 45 million from the twelve months ended March 31, 2021. This includes 912 million consumers in China1and 265 million consumers overseas served by Lazada, AliExpress, Trendyol and Daraz.</li>  <li><b>Income from operations</b>&nbsp;was RMB30,847 million (US$4,778 million), a decrease of 11% year-over-year.<b>Adjusted EBITDA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 5% year-over-year to RMB48,628 million (US$7,532 million).<b>Adjusted EBITA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 8% year-over-year to RMB41,731 million (US$6,463 million). The year-over-year decreases were primarily due to our investments in strategic areas to capture incremental opportunities, such as Community Marketplaces, Taobao Deals, Local Consumer Services and Lazada, as well as our increased spending on growth initiatives within China retail marketplaces, such as Idle Fish and Taobao Live, and our support to merchants.</li>  <li><b>Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders</b>&nbsp;was RMB45,141 million (US$6,991 million),and<b>net income</b>was RMB42,835 million (US$6,634 million).<b>Non-GAAP net income</b>&nbsp;was RMB43,441 million (US$6,728 million), an increase of 10% year-over-year, mainly due to an increase in share of profit of equity method investees.</li>  <li><b>Diluted earnings per ADS</b>&nbsp;was RMB16.38 (US$2.54) and<b>diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.05 (US$0.32 or HK$2.46).<b>Non-GAAP diluted earnings per ADS</b>was RMB16.60 (US$2.57), an increase of 12% year-over-year and<b>non-GAAP diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.08 (US$0.32 or HK$2.50), an increase of 12% year-over-year.</li>  <li><b>Net cashprovided by operating activities</b>&nbsp;was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million).<b>Non-GAAP free cash flow</b>was RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), a decrease compared to RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020, mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million fine levied earlier this year by China’s State Administration for Market Regulation pursuant to China’s Anti-monopoly Law (the “Anti-monopoly Fine”) and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas.</li> </ul> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/11aa08a1ccb4f80e6867c7e7631297c8\" tg-width=\"719\" tg-height=\"863\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><b>收入</b>为人民币2,057.40百万元（318.65亿美元），同比增长34%。如果不包括合并高鑫，我们的收入将同比增长22%至人民币1,873.06亿元（290.1亿美元）。</li><li><b>年度活跃消费者</b>截至2021年6月30日止十二个月，全球阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的总用户数达到约11.8亿，较截至2021年3月31日止十二个月增加4500万。这包括Lazada、全球速卖通、Trendyol和Daraz服务的中国9.12亿消费者1和海外2.65亿消费者。</li><li><b>营业收入</b>为人民币308.47亿元（47.78亿美元），同比下降11%。<b>调整后EBITDA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降5%至人民币486.28亿元（75.32亿美元）。<b>调整后EBITA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降8%至人民币417.31亿元（64.63亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于我们在战略领域的投资以捕捉增量机会，例如社区市场、淘宝交易、本地消费者服务和Lazada，以及我们在中国零售市场增长计划上的支出增加，例如闲鱼和淘宝直播，以及我们对商家的支持。</li><li><b>归属于普通股股东的净利润</b>为人民币451.41亿元（69.91亿美元），及<b>净收入</b>为人民币428.35亿元（66.34亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则净利润</b>为人民币434.41亿元（67.28亿美元），同比增长10%，主要是由于权益法被投资方利润份额增加。</li><li><b>每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.38元（2.54美元）<b>每股摊薄盈利</b>为人民币2.05元（0.32美元或2.46港元）。<b>非公认会计准则每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.60元（2.57美元），同比增长12%<b>非公认会计准则稀释每股收益</b>为人民币2.08元（0.32美元或2.50港元），同比增长12%。</li><li><b>经营活动提供的现金净额</b>为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则自由现金流</b>为人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币365.70亿元有所下降，主要是由于部分结清了今年早些时候中国国家市场监督管理总局根据中国反垄断法征收的人民币182.28亿元罚款（“反垄断法罚款”）中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元）以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p> <b>China Retail Marketplaces</b></p><p><blockquote><b>中国零售市场</b></blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, Alibaba's China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，阿里巴巴-SW中国零售市场的移动月活跃用户数为9.39亿，季度净增1400万。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cloud Computing</b></p><p><blockquote><b>云计算</b></blockquote></p><p> In the June 2021 quarter, our cloud computing revenue grew 29% year-over-year to RMB16,051 million (US$2,486 million), primarily driven by robust growth in revenue from customers in the Internet, financial services and retail industries.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月季度，我们的云计算收入同比增长29%至人民币160.51亿元（24.86亿美元），主要得益于互联网、金融服务和零售行业客户收入的强劲增长。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cash Flow from Operating Activities and Free Cash Flow</b></p><p><blockquote><b>经营活动产生的现金流量和自由现金流量</b></blockquote></p><p> In the quarter ended June 30, 2021, net cash provided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million), a decrease compared to RMB50,099 million in the same quarter of 2020. Free cash flow, a non-GAAP measurement of liquidity, decreased to RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), from RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020. The year-over-year decreases were mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million Anti-monopoly Fine and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas. A reconciliation of net cash provided by operating activities to free cash flow is included at the end of this results announcement.</p><p><blockquote>截至2021年6月30日的季度，经营活动提供的净现金为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币500.99亿元有所下降。自由现金流（衡量流动性的非公认会计准则衡量标准）从2020年同季度的人民币365.7亿元下降至人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于部分和解了人民币182.28亿元的反垄断罚款中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元），以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。经营活动提供的净现金与自由现金流的调节表包含在本业绩公告的末尾。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Increasing Share Repurchases</b></p><p><blockquote><b>增加股票回购</b></blockquote></p><p> Since April 1, 2021 and through the publication of this results announcement, we repurchased approximately 18.1 million of our ADSs (the equivalent of approximately 144.5 million of our ordinary shares) for approximately US$3,680 million under our share repurchase program. In addition, on August 2, 2021, our board of directors authorized the Company to upsize our Company's share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion. This share repurchase program will be effective through the end of 2022.</p><p><blockquote>自2021年4月1日起及透过刊发本业绩公告，我们根据股份回购计划以约36.8亿美元回购约18.1百万股美国存讬股（相当于约144.5百万股普通股）。此外，2021年8月2日，我们的董事会授权公司将我们公司的股票回购计划规模从100亿美元扩大到150亿美元。该股票回购计划将于2022年底生效。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/58bf53593de78f5f6e4fa1096d7aae94\" tg-width=\"757\" tg-height=\"793\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, our China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million. We continue to increase penetration in less-developed areas, reflecting our success in broadening product offerings to meet diverse consumer demand.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，我们的中国零售市场拥有9.39亿移动月活跃用户数，季度净增1400万。我们继续提高在欠发达地区的渗透率，反映我们在扩大产品供应以满足多样化消费者需求方面取得的成功。</blockquote></p><p> “Alibaba started the new fiscal year by delivering a healthy quarter. For the June quarter, global annual active consumers across the Alibaba Ecosystem reached 1.18 billion, an increase of 45 million from the March quarter, which includes 912 million consumers in China. Over more than twenty years of growth, we have developed a company that spans across both consumer and industrial Internet, with multiple engines driving our long-term growth,” said Daniel Zhang, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alibaba Group. “We believe in the growth of the Chinese economy and long-term value creation of Alibaba, and we will continue to strengthen our technology advantage in improving the consumer experience and helping our enterprise customers to accomplish successful digital transformations.”</p><p><blockquote>张勇集团董事长兼首席执行官阿里巴巴-SW表示：“阿里巴巴-SW以健康的季度开局新财年。在6月季度，阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的全球年度活跃消费者达到11.8亿，比3月季度增加了4500万，其中包括9.12亿中国消费者。经过二十多年的增长，我们已经发展出一家横跨消费互联网和工业互联网的公司，多个引擎推动我们的长期增长。”“我们相信中国经济的增长和阿里巴巴-SW的长期价值创造，我们将继续加强我们在改善消费者体验和帮助企业客户成功完成数字化转型方面的技术优势。”</blockquote></p><p> “We delivered strong revenue growth of 34% year-over-year. As we said in last quarter's results announcement, we are investing our excess profits and additional capital to support our merchants and invest in strategic areas to better serve customers and penetrate into new addressable markets,” said Maggie Wu, Chief Financial Officer of Alibaba Group. “We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>“我们实现了34%的强劲收入增长。正如我们在上季度业绩公告中所说，我们正在投资超额利润和额外资本来支持我们的商家，并投资于战略领域，以更好地服务客户并渗透到新的潜在市场，”阿里巴巴-SW集团首席财务官Maggie Wu表示。“我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已经回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p></p>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"BABA":"阿里巴巴","09988":"阿里巴巴-W"},"is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1169635195","content_text":"(August 3) Alibaba posted financial result in premarket, which showed that:\nAlibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.\nAlibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.\nBUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS\nIn the quarter ended June 30, 2021:\n\nRevenue was RMB205,740 million (US$31,865 million), an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million (US$29,010 million).\nAnnual active consumersof the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached approximately 1.18 billion for the twelve months ended June 30, 2021, an increase of 45 million from the twelve months ended March 31, 2021. This includes 912 million consumers in China1and 265 million consumers overseas served by Lazada, AliExpress, Trendyol and Daraz.\nIncome from operations was RMB30,847 million (US$4,778 million), a decrease of 11% year-over-year.Adjusted EBITDA, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 5% year-over-year to RMB48,628 million (US$7,532 million).Adjusted EBITA, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 8% year-over-year to RMB41,731 million (US$6,463 million). The year-over-year decreases were primarily due to our investments in strategic areas to capture incremental opportunities, such as Community Marketplaces, Taobao Deals, Local Consumer Services and Lazada, as well as our increased spending on growth initiatives within China retail marketplaces, such as Idle Fish and Taobao Live, and our support to merchants.\nNet income attributable to ordinary shareholders was RMB45,141 million (US$6,991 million),andnet incomewas RMB42,835 million (US$6,634 million).Non-GAAP net income was RMB43,441 million (US$6,728 million), an increase of 10% year-over-year, mainly due to an increase in share of profit of equity method investees.\nDiluted earnings per ADS was RMB16.38 (US$2.54) anddiluted earnings per sharewas RMB2.05 (US$0.32 or HK$2.46).Non-GAAP diluted earnings per ADSwas RMB16.60 (US$2.57), an increase of 12% year-over-year andnon-GAAP diluted earnings per sharewas RMB2.08 (US$0.32 or HK$2.50), an increase of 12% year-over-year.\nNet cashprovided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million).Non-GAAP free cash flowwas RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), a decrease compared to RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020, mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million fine levied earlier this year by China’s State Administration for Market Regulation pursuant to China’s Anti-monopoly Law (the “Anti-monopoly Fine”) and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas.\n\n\nChina Retail Marketplaces\nIn June 2021, Alibaba's China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million.\nCloud Computing\nIn the June 2021 quarter, our cloud computing revenue grew 29% year-over-year to RMB16,051 million (US$2,486 million), primarily driven by robust growth in revenue from customers in the Internet, financial services and retail industries.\nCash Flow from Operating Activities and Free Cash Flow\nIn the quarter ended June 30, 2021, net cash provided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million), a decrease compared to RMB50,099 million in the same quarter of 2020. Free cash flow, a non-GAAP measurement of liquidity, decreased to RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), from RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020. The year-over-year decreases were mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million Anti-monopoly Fine and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas. A reconciliation of net cash provided by operating activities to free cash flow is included at the end of this results announcement.\nIncreasing Share Repurchases\nSince April 1, 2021 and through the publication of this results announcement, we repurchased approximately 18.1 million of our ADSs (the equivalent of approximately 144.5 million of our ordinary shares) for approximately US$3,680 million under our share repurchase program. In addition, on August 2, 2021, our board of directors authorized the Company to upsize our Company's share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion. This share repurchase program will be effective through the end of 2022.\n\nWe are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”\nIn June 2021, our China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million. We continue to increase penetration in less-developed areas, reflecting our success in broadening product offerings to meet diverse consumer demand.\n“Alibaba started the new fiscal year by delivering a healthy quarter. For the June quarter, global annual active consumers across the Alibaba Ecosystem reached 1.18 billion, an increase of 45 million from the March quarter, which includes 912 million consumers in China. Over more than twenty years of growth, we have developed a company that spans across both consumer and industrial Internet, with multiple engines driving our long-term growth,” said Daniel Zhang, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alibaba Group. “We believe in the growth of the Chinese economy and long-term value creation of Alibaba, and we will continue to strengthen our technology advantage in improving the consumer experience and helping our enterprise customers to accomplish successful digital transformations.”\n“We delivered strong revenue growth of 34% year-over-year. As we said in last quarter's results announcement, we are investing our excess profits and additional capital to support our merchants and invest in strategic areas to better serve customers and penetrate into new addressable markets,” said Maggie Wu, Chief Financial Officer of Alibaba Group. “We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"BABA":0.9,"09988":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1556,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":166432260,"gmtCreate":1624021894550,"gmtModify":1624021894550,"author":{"id":"3586515948790570","authorId":"3586515948790570","name":"JammyJammy","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d7a489364a0ceb07e8294c389755b2d8","crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3586515948790570","idStr":"3586515948790570"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"I wouldn't be surprised if the hedge funds are trading this both ways. Retail traders please be careful.","listText":"I wouldn't be surprised if the hedge funds are trading this both ways. Retail traders please be careful.","text":"I wouldn't be surprised if the hedge funds are trading this both ways. Retail traders please be careful.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/166432260","repostId":"1131310015","repostType":2,"repost":{"id":"1131310015","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1623987347,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1131310015?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-18 11:35","market":"us","language":"en","title":"AMC: Danger Signals For Investors And Speculators<blockquote>AMC：投资者和投机者的危险信号</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1131310015","media":"seekingalpha","summary":"Summary\n\nI stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.\nFor investors, the gravitational pul","content":"<p><b>Summary</b></p><p><blockquote><b>总结</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li>I stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.</li>  <li>For investors, the gravitational pull of no earning prospects provides little support to the stock.</li>  <li>A century-old cautionary tale for speculators counting on a short squeeze.</li>  <li>Sell before the other speculators do.</li> </ul> <p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/dabb985556b9f549dd561bf919495d08\" tg-width=\"768\" tg-height=\"513\"><span>RgStudio/E+ via Getty Images</span></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>我站在巨人的肩膀上，在AMC上指导你。</li><li>对于投资者来说，没有盈利前景的引力对该股几乎没有支撑。</li><li>对于指望轧空的投机者来说，这是一个百年的警示故事。</li><li>在其他投机者之前卖出。</li></ul><p class=\"t-img-caption\"><span>RgStudio/E+来自Getty Images</span></p></blockquote></p><p> What are we to make of the meme stock phenomena? I tookone stab at itwith AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc.(NYSE:AMC)a few weeks ago. I’m back for more, after reading two interesting pieces. As Isaac Newton said in 1676, “<i>If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.</i>” Now I’m no Isaac Newton. For one, I’m far better looking. But like Zeke – a nickname Isaac’s friends probably never used – I too stand on the shoulders of giants. In this case the shoulders of Jason Zweig, a wonderful financial markets writer for<i>The Wall Street Journal</i>, and John Brooks, author of “<i>Business Adventures</i>”, a book recommended by Bill Gates. I will quote liberally from both in this article, then draw the line for you to AMC.</p><p><blockquote>我们如何看待模因股票现象？几周前，我与AMC院线控股公司（纽约证券交易所股票代码：AMC）一起尝试了一下。在读了两篇有趣的文章后，我回来看更多。正如艾萨克·牛顿在1676年所说，“<i>如果说我看得更远了一点，那就是站在巨人的肩膀上。</i>“现在我不是艾萨克·牛顿了。首先，我看起来好多了。但就像齐克一样——艾萨克的朋友们可能从未使用过这个昵称——我也站在巨人的肩膀上。在这种情况下，杰森·茨威格（Jason Zweig）是一位出色的金融市场作家<i>华尔街日报</i>，以及约翰·布鲁克斯，《<i>商业冒险</i>》，比尔盖茨推荐的一本书。我将在本文中大量引用两者，然后为您划清界限AMC。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Investor vs. trader vs. speculator</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投资者、交易者、投机者</b></blockquote></p><p> Jason Zweig graphically distinguished between these three types of stock buyers in hisJune 11, 2021<i>Wall Street Journal</i>column:</p><p><blockquote>Jason Zweig在他的2021年6月11日以图形方式区分了这三种类型的股票买家<i>华尔街日报</i>柱：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Whenever you buy any financial asset because you have a hunch or just for kicks, or because somebody famous is hyping the heck out of it, or everybody else seems to be buying it too, you aren’t investing.You’re definitely a trader: someone who has just bought an asset. And you may be a speculator: someone who thinks other people will pay more for it than you did.”“An investor relies on internal sources of return: earnings, income, growth in the value of assets. A speculator counts on external sources of return: primarily whether somebody else will pay more, regardless of fundamental value.”</i>  So why has AMC’s stock price been on a tear? I have one informal data source, namely the 300+ comments on my June 4 AMC article. Earnings, income, growth in the value of assets<i>never</i>came up. What did come up was “short squeeze” and stock charts. So I expect Mr. Zweig would describe AMC’s stock as driven by traders and speculators.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>每当你因为有预感或只是为了好玩而购买任何金融资产，或者因为某个名人正在大肆宣传，或者其他人似乎也在购买它，你就不是在投资。你绝对是一个交易者：刚刚购买了一项资产的人。你可能是一个投机者：认为其他人会比你支付更多的钱。”“投资者依赖内部回报来源：收益、收入、资产价值的增长。投机者依赖外部回报来源：主要是其他人是否会支付更多，而不考虑基本价值。”</i>那么为什么AMC的股价一直在上涨呢？我有一个非正式的数据来源，即我6月4日AMC文章的300多条评论。收益，收入，资产价值的增长<i>没有</i>上来了。出现的是“轧空”和股票图表。因此，我预计茨威格先生会将AMC的股票描述为由交易员和投机者推动的。</blockquote></p><p> Mr. Zweig also made me realize that my AMC article left out an earnings forecast. I gave lots of data on historic trends, which only implied a future direction. I correct that omission here.</p><p><blockquote>茨威格先生还让我意识到，我的AMC文章遗漏了盈利预测。我给出了很多关于历史趋势的数据，这些数据只是暗示了未来的方向。我在这里纠正这个遗漏。</blockquote></p><p> <b>A 2022 AMC earnings forecast</b></p><p><blockquote><b>2022年AMC盈利预测</b></blockquote></p><p> I start with the key assumptions:</p><p><blockquote>我从关键假设开始：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/3f5311cb0ff00c046d122c2c84fc3aea\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"168\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> <i>My time frame for reference</i>&nbsp;is 2017 to 2019. Earlier data is less relevant because AMC made a big acquisition in 2016, and 2020 and 2021 data is even less relevant because of COVID.</p><p><blockquote><i>我的参考时间框架</i>是2017年到2019年。早期的数据相关性较低，因为AMC在2016年进行了一项大型收购，而2020年和2021年的数据则因为新冠疫情而相关性更低。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The national box office</i>is the major assumption.My June 4 articleshows that movie attendance has been declining since 2002. What will box office be next year? The steady growth in streaming, both in subscribers and content, certainly is a headwind. And COVID logically should increase the shift from offsite (theater) entertainment to home entertainment, as it has for shopping and working. Holding movie attendance near its ’19 level would be a minor miracle. A 10%, or even a 20%, decline is far more likely. As you can see in the table above, I make 2022 AMC EPS forecasts using all three box office assumptions.</p><p><blockquote><i>全国票房</i>是主要假设。我6月4日的文章显示，自2002年以来，电影上座率一直在下降。明年票房会是多少？流媒体在订户和内容方面的稳定增长无疑是一个阻力。从逻辑上讲，COVID应该增加从场外（剧院）娱乐到家庭娱乐的转变，就像购物和工作一样。保持电影上座率接近19年的水平将是一个小小的奇迹。下降10%，甚至20%的可能性要大得多。如上表所示，我使用所有三种票房假设对2022年AMC每股收益进行预测。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>AMC market share.</i></b>I assume a share increase from AMC’s ’17-’19 level because some competing theaters must have dropped out because of COVID financial pressures.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>AMC市场份额。</i></b>我假设AMC的份额会比17-19年的水平有所增加，因为一些竞争影院肯定因新冠疫情的财务压力而退出。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Admissions gross margin.</i></b>This is the profit from ticket sales less the cost of licensing movies from their producers. I hold AMC steady with ’17-’19, but I can also imagine that movie producers seek better terms because AMC has to bid against a growing pool of streaming services desperate for content.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>招生毛利率。</i></b>这是门票销售的利润减去制片人授权电影的成本。我认为AMC在17-19年保持稳定，但我也可以想象电影制片人会寻求更好的条款，因为AMC必须与越来越多渴望内容的流媒体服务竞标。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food expenses as a percent of sales.</i></b>I carry forward the shockingly low number. AMC, and presumably its peers, take their food and beverage costs and<i>multiply them by 7 in their pricing to us moviegoers.</i>Smuggle in your own Jujifruits and save a bundle. My best financial advice for the year.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品费用占销售额的百分比。</i></b>我继承了低得惊人的数字。AMC，大概还有它的同行，承担他们的食品和饮料成本和<i>将它们对美国电影观众的定价乘以7。</i>走私你自己的Jujifruits，省下一捆。我今年最好的理财建议。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food and beverage sales as a percent of ticket prices.</i></b>I assume that AMC’s trend of modest increases continues.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品和饮料销售额占票价的百分比。</i></b>我认为AMC小幅上涨的趋势仍在继续。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Operating expenses</i></b>are the cost of the theater personnel, utilities, etc. I assume the gradual uptrend in the operating expense ratio continues, for two reasons. One, these operating expenses are largely fixed, and revenues will be under pressure. Second, it seems logical that the current labor shortage will pressure pay levels for low-end theater jobs.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>营业费用</i></b>是剧院人员、公用事业等的成本。我认为运营费用率的逐步上升趋势仍在继续，原因有二。第一，这些运营费用基本上是固定的，收入将面临压力。其次，当前的劳动力短缺将给低端剧院工作的薪酬水平带来压力，这似乎是合乎逻辑的。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> We’re now ready for my earnings and cash flow models:</p><p><blockquote>我们现在已经为我的盈利和现金流模型做好了准备：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9b8a5ce8ad10adb3336126cdb0a5e598\" tg-width=\"537\" tg-height=\"497\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> The ’22 forecasts are set by the assumptions above through the “gross profit” line. My overhead expense forecast assumes that AMC is working hard to limit expenses through its challenging times:</p><p><blockquote>22年的预测是根据上述假设通过“毛利润”线设定的。我的管理费用预测假设AMC正在努力限制费用度过充满挑战的时期：</blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><i>Depreciation/amortization</i>is a combination of accounting expenses for real estate and acquisitions. Write-downs taken during the pandemic should have reduced these expenses.</li>  <li><i>Interest expense</i>should decline as AMC pays down some debt with the equity it has been raising.</li> </ul> <b>The gravitational pull of earnings</b></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><i>折旧/摊销</i>是房地产和收购的会计费用的组合。疫情期间进行的减记本应减少这些费用。</li><li><i>利息支出</i>随着AMC用其筹集的股权偿还部分债务，这一数字应该会下降。</li></ul><b>盈利的引力</b></blockquote></p><p> We arrive at the bottom line. The best-case scenario I can see for 2022 EPS is roughly breakeven. More likely is a modest loss. Cash flow should be somewhat worse, because the cash capital spending needed by AMC to keep its theaters attractive to a shrinking audience should exceed its non-cash depreciation/amortization expenses. If capital spending is much lower than I forecast, it is probably because AMC management is conceding that it is in a death spiral and wants to milk what cash it can.</p><p><blockquote>我们到达了底线。我能看到的2022年每股收益的最佳情况是大致盈亏平衡。更有可能的是适度的损失。现金流应该会更糟，因为AMC保持其影院对不断萎缩的观众的吸引力所需的现金资本支出应该超过其非现金折旧/摊销费用。如果资本支出远低于我的预测，可能是因为AMC管理层承认自己正处于死亡螺旋之中，并希望尽可能榨取现金。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The bottom line - no support for investors.</i>AMC’s book value is negative. It appears incapable of earning any material money post-COVID. Its business is in long-term decline due to technology changes, and its new competitors are monster companies – Netflix, Disney, Comcast, etc. – with huge resources. An investor can only look at AMC’s current $55 stock price and with a shudder say, in the immortal words of<i>Trading Places</i>, “Sell Mortimer, sell!”</p><p><blockquote><i>底线——不支持投资者。</i>AMC的账面价值为负。在COVID之后，它似乎无法赚取任何物质收入。其业务因技术变革而长期下滑，新的竞争对手是拥有巨大资源的怪兽公司——Netflix、迪士尼、康卡斯特等。投资者只能看着AMC目前55美元的股价，不寒而栗地说，用不朽的话来说<i>交易场所</i>、“卖莫蒂默，卖！”</blockquote></p><p> <b>The speculative play - a short squeeze: A historical cautionary tale</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投机游戏——轧空：历史警示</b></blockquote></p><p> Millennials did not invent the short squeeze. It has been around almost as long financial markets have existed. The book<i>Business Adventures</i>by John Brooks<i>,</i>published way back in 1969, tells a vivid tale of a short squeeze even farther back, in the early 1920s. Literally a century ago. I’m going to quote from the book to suggest how the story ends for speculations with no investor support. So pour yourself some illegal hooch (we’re heading to the Prohibition Era) and read on. This is the story of Clarence Saunders, the founder of Piggly Wiggly Stores, the first supermarket; the Amazon of his day.</p><p><blockquote>千禧一代并没有发明轧空。它几乎和金融市场存在的时间一样长。这本书<i>商业冒险</i>约翰·布鲁克斯<i>,</i>早在1969年就出版了，生动地讲述了20世纪20年代初的空头挤压故事。一个世纪前。我将引用书中的话来说明在没有投资者支持的情况下，投机的故事将如何结束。所以，给自己倒点非法烈酒（我们正走向禁酒令时代），继续读下去。这是第一家超市Piggly Wiggly Stores的创始人克拉伦斯·桑德斯的故事；他那个时代的亚马逊。</blockquote></p><p> Shorts went after Clarence’s stock in 1922, driving it from $50 to below $40. Saunders vowed revenge with a short squeeze. Here are excerpts of Mr. Brooks’ recounting of the story:</p><p><blockquote>1922年，空头追捧克拉伦斯的股票，将其从50美元推至40美元以下。桑德斯发誓要用空头挤压进行报复。以下是布鲁克斯先生讲述这个故事的摘录：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Saunders…bought 33,000 shares of Piggly Wiggly, mostly from short sellers; within a week he had brought the total to 105,000 – more than half of the 200,000 shares outstanding. The effectiveness of Saunders’ buying campaign was readily apparent; by late January of 1923 it had driven he price up over $60…</i>”  The sole short squeezer of yore has been replaced by herds of “apes” today, and the apes have been far better in driving up prices. By the way, believe it or not, a group of apes is apparently called a “shrewdness”. A group of apes is shrewd – interesting.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>桑德斯……购买了33,000股Piggly Wiggly股票，大部分来自卖空者；不到一周，他就将总数增加到了10.5万股——超过了20万股已发行股票的一半。桑德斯购买活动的有效性显而易见；到1923年1月下旬，它已将价格推高了60多美元……</i>“昔日唯一的空头挤压者如今已被成群的“猿”所取代，而猿在推高价格方面要好得多。顺便说一句，信不信由你，一群猿显然被称为“精明”。一群猿很精明——有意思。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>He had made himself a bundle and had demonstrated how a poor Southern boy could teach the city slickers a lesson.”</i>  Today we have apes sticking it to hedge funds.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>他赚了一大笔钱，证明了一个贫穷的南方男孩是如何教训城市里的狡猾分子的。”</i>今天，我们有猿类坚持对冲基金。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>One of the great hazards in the Corner was always that even though a player might defeat his opponents, he would discover that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Once the short sellers had been squeezed dry, the cornerer might find that the reams of stock he had accumulated in the process were a dead weight around his neck; by pushing it all back into the market, he would drive its price down to zero.</i>”  Something to think about. What was Saunders to do?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>角落里最大的危险之一总是，即使一个玩家可能会击败他的对手，他也会发现他赢得了一场得不偿失的胜利。一旦卖空者被榨干，卖空者可能会发现他在这个过程中积累的大量股票是他脖子上的沉重负担；通过将其全部推回市场，他会将其价格降至零。</i>“值得思考的事情。桑德斯该怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   “[  <i>Saunders’] solution was to sell his $55 shares on the installment plan. In his February advertisements, he stipulated that the public could buy shares only by paying $25 down and the balance in three $10 installments</i>.”  Pretty clever, no? No:</p><p><blockquote>“[<i>桑德斯的解决方案是出售分期付款计划中价值55美元的股票。在他二月份的广告中，他规定公众只需支付25美元的首付，余款分三期支付10美元即可购买股票</i>“很聪明，不是吗？没有：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>At the end of the third day, the total number of shares subscribed for was still under 25,000, and the sales that were made were canceled. Saunders had to admit that the drive had been a failure.”</i>  Uh oh. What now?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>在第三天结束时，认购的股份总数仍低于2.5万股，所做的卖出被取消。桑德斯不得不承认这次旅行是失败的。”</i>呃哦。现在怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   <i>“On August 22nd, the New York auction firm of Adrian H. Muller &amp; Son…knocked down 1,500 shares of Piggly Wiggly at $1 a share…The following spring Saunders went through formal bankruptcy proceedings.”</i>  Ouch.</p><p><blockquote><i>“8月22日，Adrian H.Muller&amp;Son的纽约拍卖公司……以每股1美元的价格拍卖了1,500股Piggly Wiggly股票……第二年春天，Saunders进入了正式破产程序。”</i>哎哟。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Buyers beware</b></p><p><blockquote><b>买家当心</b></blockquote></p><p> As Jason Zweig noted above, speculators depend upon finding a buyer at a higher price. Today’s holders of AMC stock certainly have made life painful for many short sellers. But are there really enough new buyers to take out current shareholders above AMC’s present $28 billion market cap? Especially with the gravity of no earnings constantly weighing on the stock?</p><p><blockquote>正如杰森·茨威格上面指出的，投机者依赖于以更高的价格找到买家。如今AMC股票的持有者无疑让许多卖空者的生活变得痛苦。但真的有足够多的新买家来收购AMC目前280亿美元市值以上的现有股东吗？尤其是在没有盈利的情况下不断给股票带来压力的情况下？</blockquote></p><p></p><p> AMC shareholders, don’t win Clarence Saunders’ Pyrrhic victory. Take your $55 a share and run. Fast. Before the other speculating holders do so first.</p><p><blockquote>AMC股东们，不要赢得克拉伦斯·桑德斯得不偿失的胜利。拿着每股55美元跑吧。快的。在其他投机持有者首先这样做之前。</blockquote></p><p></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>AMC: Danger Signals For Investors And Speculators<blockquote>AMC：投资者和投机者的危险信号</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nAMC: Danger Signals For Investors And Speculators<blockquote>AMC：投资者和投机者的危险信号</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">seekingalpha</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-06-18 11:35</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>Summary</b></p><p><blockquote><b>总结</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li>I stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.</li>  <li>For investors, the gravitational pull of no earning prospects provides little support to the stock.</li>  <li>A century-old cautionary tale for speculators counting on a short squeeze.</li>  <li>Sell before the other speculators do.</li> </ul> <p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/dabb985556b9f549dd561bf919495d08\" tg-width=\"768\" tg-height=\"513\"><span>RgStudio/E+ via Getty Images</span></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>我站在巨人的肩膀上，在AMC上指导你。</li><li>对于投资者来说，没有盈利前景的引力对该股几乎没有支撑。</li><li>对于指望轧空的投机者来说，这是一个百年的警示故事。</li><li>在其他投机者之前卖出。</li></ul><p class=\"t-img-caption\"><span>RgStudio/E+来自Getty Images</span></p></blockquote></p><p> What are we to make of the meme stock phenomena? I tookone stab at itwith AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc.(NYSE:AMC)a few weeks ago. I’m back for more, after reading two interesting pieces. As Isaac Newton said in 1676, “<i>If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.</i>” Now I’m no Isaac Newton. For one, I’m far better looking. But like Zeke – a nickname Isaac’s friends probably never used – I too stand on the shoulders of giants. In this case the shoulders of Jason Zweig, a wonderful financial markets writer for<i>The Wall Street Journal</i>, and John Brooks, author of “<i>Business Adventures</i>”, a book recommended by Bill Gates. I will quote liberally from both in this article, then draw the line for you to AMC.</p><p><blockquote>我们如何看待模因股票现象？几周前，我与AMC院线控股公司（纽约证券交易所股票代码：AMC）一起尝试了一下。在读了两篇有趣的文章后，我回来看更多。正如艾萨克·牛顿在1676年所说，“<i>如果说我看得更远了一点，那就是站在巨人的肩膀上。</i>“现在我不是艾萨克·牛顿了。首先，我看起来好多了。但就像齐克一样——艾萨克的朋友们可能从未使用过这个昵称——我也站在巨人的肩膀上。在这种情况下，杰森·茨威格（Jason Zweig）是一位出色的金融市场作家<i>华尔街日报</i>，以及约翰·布鲁克斯，《<i>商业冒险</i>》，比尔盖茨推荐的一本书。我将在本文中大量引用两者，然后为您划清界限AMC。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Investor vs. trader vs. speculator</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投资者、交易者、投机者</b></blockquote></p><p> Jason Zweig graphically distinguished between these three types of stock buyers in hisJune 11, 2021<i>Wall Street Journal</i>column:</p><p><blockquote>Jason Zweig在他的2021年6月11日以图形方式区分了这三种类型的股票买家<i>华尔街日报</i>柱：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Whenever you buy any financial asset because you have a hunch or just for kicks, or because somebody famous is hyping the heck out of it, or everybody else seems to be buying it too, you aren’t investing.You’re definitely a trader: someone who has just bought an asset. And you may be a speculator: someone who thinks other people will pay more for it than you did.”“An investor relies on internal sources of return: earnings, income, growth in the value of assets. A speculator counts on external sources of return: primarily whether somebody else will pay more, regardless of fundamental value.”</i>  So why has AMC’s stock price been on a tear? I have one informal data source, namely the 300+ comments on my June 4 AMC article. Earnings, income, growth in the value of assets<i>never</i>came up. What did come up was “short squeeze” and stock charts. So I expect Mr. Zweig would describe AMC’s stock as driven by traders and speculators.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>每当你因为有预感或只是为了好玩而购买任何金融资产，或者因为某个名人正在大肆宣传，或者其他人似乎也在购买它，你就不是在投资。你绝对是一个交易者：刚刚购买了一项资产的人。你可能是一个投机者：认为其他人会比你支付更多的钱。”“投资者依赖内部回报来源：收益、收入、资产价值的增长。投机者依赖外部回报来源：主要是其他人是否会支付更多，而不考虑基本价值。”</i>那么为什么AMC的股价一直在上涨呢？我有一个非正式的数据来源，即我6月4日AMC文章的300多条评论。收益，收入，资产价值的增长<i>没有</i>上来了。出现的是“轧空”和股票图表。因此，我预计茨威格先生会将AMC的股票描述为由交易员和投机者推动的。</blockquote></p><p> Mr. Zweig also made me realize that my AMC article left out an earnings forecast. I gave lots of data on historic trends, which only implied a future direction. I correct that omission here.</p><p><blockquote>茨威格先生还让我意识到，我的AMC文章遗漏了盈利预测。我给出了很多关于历史趋势的数据，这些数据只是暗示了未来的方向。我在这里纠正这个遗漏。</blockquote></p><p> <b>A 2022 AMC earnings forecast</b></p><p><blockquote><b>2022年AMC盈利预测</b></blockquote></p><p> I start with the key assumptions:</p><p><blockquote>我从关键假设开始：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/3f5311cb0ff00c046d122c2c84fc3aea\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"168\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> <i>My time frame for reference</i>&nbsp;is 2017 to 2019. Earlier data is less relevant because AMC made a big acquisition in 2016, and 2020 and 2021 data is even less relevant because of COVID.</p><p><blockquote><i>我的参考时间框架</i>是2017年到2019年。早期的数据相关性较低，因为AMC在2016年进行了一项大型收购，而2020年和2021年的数据则因为新冠疫情而相关性更低。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The national box office</i>is the major assumption.My June 4 articleshows that movie attendance has been declining since 2002. What will box office be next year? The steady growth in streaming, both in subscribers and content, certainly is a headwind. And COVID logically should increase the shift from offsite (theater) entertainment to home entertainment, as it has for shopping and working. Holding movie attendance near its ’19 level would be a minor miracle. A 10%, or even a 20%, decline is far more likely. As you can see in the table above, I make 2022 AMC EPS forecasts using all three box office assumptions.</p><p><blockquote><i>全国票房</i>是主要假设。我6月4日的文章显示，自2002年以来，电影上座率一直在下降。明年票房会是多少？流媒体在订户和内容方面的稳定增长无疑是一个阻力。从逻辑上讲，COVID应该增加从场外（剧院）娱乐到家庭娱乐的转变，就像购物和工作一样。保持电影上座率接近19年的水平将是一个小小的奇迹。下降10%，甚至20%的可能性要大得多。如上表所示，我使用所有三种票房假设对2022年AMC每股收益进行预测。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>AMC market share.</i></b>I assume a share increase from AMC’s ’17-’19 level because some competing theaters must have dropped out because of COVID financial pressures.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>AMC市场份额。</i></b>我假设AMC的份额会比17-19年的水平有所增加，因为一些竞争影院肯定因新冠疫情的财务压力而退出。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Admissions gross margin.</i></b>This is the profit from ticket sales less the cost of licensing movies from their producers. I hold AMC steady with ’17-’19, but I can also imagine that movie producers seek better terms because AMC has to bid against a growing pool of streaming services desperate for content.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>招生毛利率。</i></b>这是门票销售的利润减去制片人授权电影的成本。我认为AMC在17-19年保持稳定，但我也可以想象电影制片人会寻求更好的条款，因为AMC必须与越来越多渴望内容的流媒体服务竞标。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food expenses as a percent of sales.</i></b>I carry forward the shockingly low number. AMC, and presumably its peers, take their food and beverage costs and<i>multiply them by 7 in their pricing to us moviegoers.</i>Smuggle in your own Jujifruits and save a bundle. My best financial advice for the year.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品费用占销售额的百分比。</i></b>我继承了低得惊人的数字。AMC，大概还有它的同行，承担他们的食品和饮料成本和<i>将它们对美国电影观众的定价乘以7。</i>走私你自己的Jujifruits，省下一捆。我今年最好的理财建议。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food and beverage sales as a percent of ticket prices.</i></b>I assume that AMC’s trend of modest increases continues.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品和饮料销售额占票价的百分比。</i></b>我认为AMC小幅上涨的趋势仍在继续。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Operating expenses</i></b>are the cost of the theater personnel, utilities, etc. I assume the gradual uptrend in the operating expense ratio continues, for two reasons. One, these operating expenses are largely fixed, and revenues will be under pressure. Second, it seems logical that the current labor shortage will pressure pay levels for low-end theater jobs.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>营业费用</i></b>是剧院人员、公用事业等的成本。我认为运营费用率的逐步上升趋势仍在继续，原因有二。第一，这些运营费用基本上是固定的，收入将面临压力。其次，当前的劳动力短缺将给低端剧院工作的薪酬水平带来压力，这似乎是合乎逻辑的。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> We’re now ready for my earnings and cash flow models:</p><p><blockquote>我们现在已经为我的盈利和现金流模型做好了准备：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9b8a5ce8ad10adb3336126cdb0a5e598\" tg-width=\"537\" tg-height=\"497\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> The ’22 forecasts are set by the assumptions above through the “gross profit” line. My overhead expense forecast assumes that AMC is working hard to limit expenses through its challenging times:</p><p><blockquote>22年的预测是根据上述假设通过“毛利润”线设定的。我的管理费用预测假设AMC正在努力限制费用度过充满挑战的时期：</blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><i>Depreciation/amortization</i>is a combination of accounting expenses for real estate and acquisitions. Write-downs taken during the pandemic should have reduced these expenses.</li>  <li><i>Interest expense</i>should decline as AMC pays down some debt with the equity it has been raising.</li> </ul> <b>The gravitational pull of earnings</b></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><i>折旧/摊销</i>是房地产和收购的会计费用的组合。疫情期间进行的减记本应减少这些费用。</li><li><i>利息支出</i>随着AMC用其筹集的股权偿还部分债务，这一数字应该会下降。</li></ul><b>盈利的引力</b></blockquote></p><p> We arrive at the bottom line. The best-case scenario I can see for 2022 EPS is roughly breakeven. More likely is a modest loss. Cash flow should be somewhat worse, because the cash capital spending needed by AMC to keep its theaters attractive to a shrinking audience should exceed its non-cash depreciation/amortization expenses. If capital spending is much lower than I forecast, it is probably because AMC management is conceding that it is in a death spiral and wants to milk what cash it can.</p><p><blockquote>我们到达了底线。我能看到的2022年每股收益的最佳情况是大致盈亏平衡。更有可能的是适度的损失。现金流应该会更糟，因为AMC保持其影院对不断萎缩的观众的吸引力所需的现金资本支出应该超过其非现金折旧/摊销费用。如果资本支出远低于我的预测，可能是因为AMC管理层承认自己正处于死亡螺旋之中，并希望尽可能榨取现金。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The bottom line - no support for investors.</i>AMC’s book value is negative. It appears incapable of earning any material money post-COVID. Its business is in long-term decline due to technology changes, and its new competitors are monster companies – Netflix, Disney, Comcast, etc. – with huge resources. An investor can only look at AMC’s current $55 stock price and with a shudder say, in the immortal words of<i>Trading Places</i>, “Sell Mortimer, sell!”</p><p><blockquote><i>底线——不支持投资者。</i>AMC的账面价值为负。在COVID之后，它似乎无法赚取任何物质收入。其业务因技术变革而长期下滑，新的竞争对手是拥有巨大资源的怪兽公司——Netflix、迪士尼、康卡斯特等。投资者只能看着AMC目前55美元的股价，不寒而栗地说，用不朽的话来说<i>交易场所</i>、“卖莫蒂默，卖！”</blockquote></p><p> <b>The speculative play - a short squeeze: A historical cautionary tale</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投机游戏——轧空：历史警示</b></blockquote></p><p> Millennials did not invent the short squeeze. It has been around almost as long financial markets have existed. The book<i>Business Adventures</i>by John Brooks<i>,</i>published way back in 1969, tells a vivid tale of a short squeeze even farther back, in the early 1920s. Literally a century ago. I’m going to quote from the book to suggest how the story ends for speculations with no investor support. So pour yourself some illegal hooch (we’re heading to the Prohibition Era) and read on. This is the story of Clarence Saunders, the founder of Piggly Wiggly Stores, the first supermarket; the Amazon of his day.</p><p><blockquote>千禧一代并没有发明轧空。它几乎和金融市场存在的时间一样长。这本书<i>商业冒险</i>约翰·布鲁克斯<i>,</i>早在1969年就出版了，生动地讲述了20世纪20年代初的空头挤压故事。一个世纪前。我将引用书中的话来说明在没有投资者支持的情况下，投机的故事将如何结束。所以，给自己倒点非法烈酒（我们正走向禁酒令时代），继续读下去。这是第一家超市Piggly Wiggly Stores的创始人克拉伦斯·桑德斯的故事；他那个时代的亚马逊。</blockquote></p><p> Shorts went after Clarence’s stock in 1922, driving it from $50 to below $40. Saunders vowed revenge with a short squeeze. Here are excerpts of Mr. Brooks’ recounting of the story:</p><p><blockquote>1922年，空头追捧克拉伦斯的股票，将其从50美元推至40美元以下。桑德斯发誓要用空头挤压进行报复。以下是布鲁克斯先生讲述这个故事的摘录：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Saunders…bought 33,000 shares of Piggly Wiggly, mostly from short sellers; within a week he had brought the total to 105,000 – more than half of the 200,000 shares outstanding. The effectiveness of Saunders’ buying campaign was readily apparent; by late January of 1923 it had driven he price up over $60…</i>”  The sole short squeezer of yore has been replaced by herds of “apes” today, and the apes have been far better in driving up prices. By the way, believe it or not, a group of apes is apparently called a “shrewdness”. A group of apes is shrewd – interesting.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>桑德斯……购买了33,000股Piggly Wiggly股票，大部分来自卖空者；不到一周，他就将总数增加到了10.5万股——超过了20万股已发行股票的一半。桑德斯购买活动的有效性显而易见；到1923年1月下旬，它已将价格推高了60多美元……</i>“昔日唯一的空头挤压者如今已被成群的“猿”所取代，而猿在推高价格方面要好得多。顺便说一句，信不信由你，一群猿显然被称为“精明”。一群猿很精明——有意思。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>He had made himself a bundle and had demonstrated how a poor Southern boy could teach the city slickers a lesson.”</i>  Today we have apes sticking it to hedge funds.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>他赚了一大笔钱，证明了一个贫穷的南方男孩是如何教训城市里的狡猾分子的。”</i>今天，我们有猿类坚持对冲基金。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>One of the great hazards in the Corner was always that even though a player might defeat his opponents, he would discover that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Once the short sellers had been squeezed dry, the cornerer might find that the reams of stock he had accumulated in the process were a dead weight around his neck; by pushing it all back into the market, he would drive its price down to zero.</i>”  Something to think about. What was Saunders to do?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>角落里最大的危险之一总是，即使一个玩家可能会击败他的对手，他也会发现他赢得了一场得不偿失的胜利。一旦卖空者被榨干，卖空者可能会发现他在这个过程中积累的大量股票是他脖子上的沉重负担；通过将其全部推回市场，他会将其价格降至零。</i>“值得思考的事情。桑德斯该怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   “[  <i>Saunders’] solution was to sell his $55 shares on the installment plan. In his February advertisements, he stipulated that the public could buy shares only by paying $25 down and the balance in three $10 installments</i>.”  Pretty clever, no? No:</p><p><blockquote>“[<i>桑德斯的解决方案是出售分期付款计划中价值55美元的股票。在他二月份的广告中，他规定公众只需支付25美元的首付，余款分三期支付10美元即可购买股票</i>“很聪明，不是吗？没有：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>At the end of the third day, the total number of shares subscribed for was still under 25,000, and the sales that were made were canceled. Saunders had to admit that the drive had been a failure.”</i>  Uh oh. What now?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>在第三天结束时，认购的股份总数仍低于2.5万股，所做的卖出被取消。桑德斯不得不承认这次旅行是失败的。”</i>呃哦。现在怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   <i>“On August 22nd, the New York auction firm of Adrian H. Muller &amp; Son…knocked down 1,500 shares of Piggly Wiggly at $1 a share…The following spring Saunders went through formal bankruptcy proceedings.”</i>  Ouch.</p><p><blockquote><i>“8月22日，Adrian H.Muller&amp;Son的纽约拍卖公司……以每股1美元的价格拍卖了1,500股Piggly Wiggly股票……第二年春天，Saunders进入了正式破产程序。”</i>哎哟。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Buyers beware</b></p><p><blockquote><b>买家当心</b></blockquote></p><p> As Jason Zweig noted above, speculators depend upon finding a buyer at a higher price. Today’s holders of AMC stock certainly have made life painful for many short sellers. But are there really enough new buyers to take out current shareholders above AMC’s present $28 billion market cap? Especially with the gravity of no earnings constantly weighing on the stock?</p><p><blockquote>正如杰森·茨威格上面指出的，投机者依赖于以更高的价格找到买家。如今AMC股票的持有者无疑让许多卖空者的生活变得痛苦。但真的有足够多的新买家来收购AMC目前280亿美元市值以上的现有股东吗？尤其是在没有盈利的情况下不断给股票带来压力的情况下？</blockquote></p><p></p><p> AMC shareholders, don’t win Clarence Saunders’ Pyrrhic victory. Take your $55 a share and run. Fast. Before the other speculating holders do so first.</p><p><blockquote>AMC股东们，不要赢得克拉伦斯·桑德斯得不偿失的胜利。拿着每股55美元跑吧。快的。在其他投机持有者首先这样做之前。</blockquote></p><p></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> 来源：<a href=\"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4435360-amc-stock-danger-signals-for-investors-and-speculators\">seekingalpha</a></p>\n<p>为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化</p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"AMC":"AMC院线"},"source_url":"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4435360-amc-stock-danger-signals-for-investors-and-speculators","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1131310015","content_text":"Summary\n\nI stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.\nFor investors, the gravitational pull of no earning prospects provides little support to the stock.\nA century-old cautionary tale for speculators counting on a short squeeze.\nSell before the other speculators do.\n\nRgStudio/E+ via Getty Images\nWhat are we to make of the meme stock phenomena? I tookone stab at itwith AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc.(NYSE:AMC)a few weeks ago. I’m back for more, after reading two interesting pieces. As Isaac Newton said in 1676, “If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.” Now I’m no Isaac Newton. For one, I’m far better looking. But like Zeke – a nickname Isaac’s friends probably never used – I too stand on the shoulders of giants. In this case the shoulders of Jason Zweig, a wonderful financial markets writer forThe Wall Street Journal, and John Brooks, author of “Business Adventures”, a book recommended by Bill Gates. I will quote liberally from both in this article, then draw the line for you to AMC.\nInvestor vs. trader vs. speculator\nJason Zweig graphically distinguished between these three types of stock buyers in hisJune 11, 2021Wall Street Journalcolumn:\n\n “\n Whenever you buy any financial asset because you have a hunch or just for kicks, or because somebody famous is hyping the heck out of it, or everybody else seems to be buying it too, you aren’t investing.You’re definitely a trader: someone who has just bought an asset. And you may be a speculator: someone who thinks other people will pay more for it than you did.”“An investor relies on internal sources of return: earnings, income, growth in the value of assets. A speculator counts on external sources of return: primarily whether somebody else will pay more, regardless of fundamental value.”\n\nSo why has AMC’s stock price been on a tear? I have one informal data source, namely the 300+ comments on my June 4 AMC article. Earnings, income, growth in the value of assetsnevercame up. What did come up was “short squeeze” and stock charts. So I expect Mr. Zweig would describe AMC’s stock as driven by traders and speculators.\nMr. Zweig also made me realize that my AMC article left out an earnings forecast. I gave lots of data on historic trends, which only implied a future direction. I correct that omission here.\nA 2022 AMC earnings forecast\nI start with the key assumptions:\n\nMy time frame for reference is 2017 to 2019. Earlier data is less relevant because AMC made a big acquisition in 2016, and 2020 and 2021 data is even less relevant because of COVID.\nThe national box officeis the major assumption.My June 4 articleshows that movie attendance has been declining since 2002. What will box office be next year? The steady growth in streaming, both in subscribers and content, certainly is a headwind. And COVID logically should increase the shift from offsite (theater) entertainment to home entertainment, as it has for shopping and working. Holding movie attendance near its ’19 level would be a minor miracle. A 10%, or even a 20%, decline is far more likely. As you can see in the table above, I make 2022 AMC EPS forecasts using all three box office assumptions.\nAMC market share.I assume a share increase from AMC’s ’17-’19 level because some competing theaters must have dropped out because of COVID financial pressures.\nAdmissions gross margin.This is the profit from ticket sales less the cost of licensing movies from their producers. I hold AMC steady with ’17-’19, but I can also imagine that movie producers seek better terms because AMC has to bid against a growing pool of streaming services desperate for content.\nFood expenses as a percent of sales.I carry forward the shockingly low number. AMC, and presumably its peers, take their food and beverage costs andmultiply them by 7 in their pricing to us moviegoers.Smuggle in your own Jujifruits and save a bundle. My best financial advice for the year.\nFood and beverage sales as a percent of ticket prices.I assume that AMC’s trend of modest increases continues.\nOperating expensesare the cost of the theater personnel, utilities, etc. I assume the gradual uptrend in the operating expense ratio continues, for two reasons. One, these operating expenses are largely fixed, and revenues will be under pressure. Second, it seems logical that the current labor shortage will pressure pay levels for low-end theater jobs.\nWe’re now ready for my earnings and cash flow models:\n\nThe ’22 forecasts are set by the assumptions above through the “gross profit” line. My overhead expense forecast assumes that AMC is working hard to limit expenses through its challenging times:\n\nDepreciation/amortizationis a combination of accounting expenses for real estate and acquisitions. Write-downs taken during the pandemic should have reduced these expenses.\nInterest expenseshould decline as AMC pays down some debt with the equity it has been raising.\n\nThe gravitational pull of earnings\nWe arrive at the bottom line. The best-case scenario I can see for 2022 EPS is roughly breakeven. More likely is a modest loss. Cash flow should be somewhat worse, because the cash capital spending needed by AMC to keep its theaters attractive to a shrinking audience should exceed its non-cash depreciation/amortization expenses. If capital spending is much lower than I forecast, it is probably because AMC management is conceding that it is in a death spiral and wants to milk what cash it can.\nThe bottom line - no support for investors.AMC’s book value is negative. It appears incapable of earning any material money post-COVID. Its business is in long-term decline due to technology changes, and its new competitors are monster companies – Netflix, Disney, Comcast, etc. – with huge resources. An investor can only look at AMC’s current $55 stock price and with a shudder say, in the immortal words ofTrading Places, “Sell Mortimer, sell!”\nThe speculative play - a short squeeze: A historical cautionary tale\nMillennials did not invent the short squeeze. It has been around almost as long financial markets have existed. The bookBusiness Adventuresby John Brooks,published way back in 1969, tells a vivid tale of a short squeeze even farther back, in the early 1920s. Literally a century ago. I’m going to quote from the book to suggest how the story ends for speculations with no investor support. So pour yourself some illegal hooch (we’re heading to the Prohibition Era) and read on. This is the story of Clarence Saunders, the founder of Piggly Wiggly Stores, the first supermarket; the Amazon of his day.\nShorts went after Clarence’s stock in 1922, driving it from $50 to below $40. Saunders vowed revenge with a short squeeze. Here are excerpts of Mr. Brooks’ recounting of the story:\n\n “\n Saunders…bought 33,000 shares of Piggly Wiggly, mostly from short sellers; within a week he had brought the total to 105,000 – more than half of the 200,000 shares outstanding. The effectiveness of Saunders’ buying campaign was readily apparent; by late January of 1923 it had driven he price up over $60…”\n\nThe sole short squeezer of yore has been replaced by herds of “apes” today, and the apes have been far better in driving up prices. By the way, believe it or not, a group of apes is apparently called a “shrewdness”. A group of apes is shrewd – interesting.\n\n “\n He had made himself a bundle and had demonstrated how a poor Southern boy could teach the city slickers a lesson.”\n\nToday we have apes sticking it to hedge funds.\n\n “\n One of the great hazards in the Corner was always that even though a player might defeat his opponents, he would discover that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Once the short sellers had been squeezed dry, the cornerer might find that the reams of stock he had accumulated in the process were a dead weight around his neck; by pushing it all back into the market, he would drive its price down to zero.”\n\nSomething to think about. What was Saunders to do?\n\n “[\n Saunders’] solution was to sell his $55 shares on the installment plan. In his February advertisements, he stipulated that the public could buy shares only by paying $25 down and the balance in three $10 installments.”\n\nPretty clever, no? No:\n\n “\n At the end of the third day, the total number of shares subscribed for was still under 25,000, and the sales that were made were canceled. Saunders had to admit that the drive had been a failure.”\n\nUh oh. What now?\n\n“On August 22nd, the New York auction firm of Adrian H. Muller & Son…knocked down 1,500 shares of Piggly Wiggly at $1 a share…The following spring Saunders went through formal bankruptcy proceedings.”\n\nOuch.\nBuyers beware\nAs Jason Zweig noted above, speculators depend upon finding a buyer at a higher price. Today’s holders of AMC stock certainly have made life painful for many short sellers. But are there really enough new buyers to take out current shareholders above AMC’s present $28 billion market cap? Especially with the gravity of no earnings constantly weighing on the stock?\nAMC shareholders, don’t win Clarence Saunders’ Pyrrhic victory. Take your $55 a share and run. Fast. Before the other speculating holders do so first.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"AMC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":2043,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"hots":[{"id":807360539,"gmtCreate":1628000875721,"gmtModify":1628003119495,"author":{"id":"3586515948790570","authorId":"3586515948790570","name":"JammyJammy","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d7a489364a0ceb07e8294c389755b2d8","crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"idStr":"3586515948790570","authorIdStr":"3586515948790570"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"I think the fear of Chinese Regulators is overdone now. $BABA at bargain prices and management backing this up with increasing the share buy backs and heavily investing in future growth. Long term hold for me and will try to pick more up month on month at these levels.","listText":"I think the fear of Chinese Regulators is overdone now. $BABA at bargain prices and management backing this up with increasing the share buy backs and heavily investing in future growth. Long term hold for me and will try to pick more up month on month at these levels.","text":"I think the fear of Chinese Regulators is overdone now. $BABA at bargain prices and management backing this up with increasing the share buy backs and heavily investing in future growth. Long term hold for me and will try to pick more up month on month at these levels.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":3,"commentSize":1,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/807360539","repostId":"1169635195","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1169635195","kind":"news","weMediaInfo":{"introduction":"Providing stock market headlines, business news, financials and earnings ","home_visible":1,"media_name":"Tiger Newspress","id":"1079075236","head_image":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8274c5b9d4c2852bfb1c4d6ce16c68ba"},"pubTimestamp":1627988246,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1169635195?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-08-03 18:57","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Alibaba EPS beats by RMB2.27, misses on revenue<blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW每股收益超过预期人民币2.27元、营收不及预期</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1169635195","media":"Tiger Newspress","summary":" $Alibaba$ posted financial result in premarket, which showed that:. Alibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.Alibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.Revenue was RMB205,740 million , an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million .Annual active consumersof the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached app","content":"<p>(August 3)&nbsp;<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">Alibaba</a> posted&nbsp;financial&nbsp;result&nbsp;in&nbsp;premarket,&nbsp;which&nbsp;showed&nbsp;that:</p><p><blockquote>（8月3日）<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">阿里巴巴-SW</a>盘前公布的财务业绩显示：</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度营收为人民币2057.4亿元，去年同期为人民币1537.5亿元；FactSet共识为人民币2091.1亿元。</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度调整后。每股收益为人民币16.60元，去年同期为人民币14.82元；FactSet共识人民币14.33元。</blockquote></p><p> <b>BUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS</b></p><p><blockquote><b>业务亮点</b></blockquote></p><p> <b>In the quarter ended June 30, 2021:</b></p><p><blockquote><b>截至2021年6月30日的季度：</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><b>Revenue</b>&nbsp;was RMB205,740 million (US$31,865 million), an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million (US$29,010 million).</li>  <li><b>Annual active consumers</b>of the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached approximately 1.18 billion for the twelve months ended June 30, 2021, an increase of 45 million from the twelve months ended March 31, 2021. This includes 912 million consumers in China1and 265 million consumers overseas served by Lazada, AliExpress, Trendyol and Daraz.</li>  <li><b>Income from operations</b>&nbsp;was RMB30,847 million (US$4,778 million), a decrease of 11% year-over-year.<b>Adjusted EBITDA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 5% year-over-year to RMB48,628 million (US$7,532 million).<b>Adjusted EBITA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 8% year-over-year to RMB41,731 million (US$6,463 million). The year-over-year decreases were primarily due to our investments in strategic areas to capture incremental opportunities, such as Community Marketplaces, Taobao Deals, Local Consumer Services and Lazada, as well as our increased spending on growth initiatives within China retail marketplaces, such as Idle Fish and Taobao Live, and our support to merchants.</li>  <li><b>Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders</b>&nbsp;was RMB45,141 million (US$6,991 million),and<b>net income</b>was RMB42,835 million (US$6,634 million).<b>Non-GAAP net income</b>&nbsp;was RMB43,441 million (US$6,728 million), an increase of 10% year-over-year, mainly due to an increase in share of profit of equity method investees.</li>  <li><b>Diluted earnings per ADS</b>&nbsp;was RMB16.38 (US$2.54) and<b>diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.05 (US$0.32 or HK$2.46).<b>Non-GAAP diluted earnings per ADS</b>was RMB16.60 (US$2.57), an increase of 12% year-over-year and<b>non-GAAP diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.08 (US$0.32 or HK$2.50), an increase of 12% year-over-year.</li>  <li><b>Net cashprovided by operating activities</b>&nbsp;was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million).<b>Non-GAAP free cash flow</b>was RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), a decrease compared to RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020, mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million fine levied earlier this year by China’s State Administration for Market Regulation pursuant to China’s Anti-monopoly Law (the “Anti-monopoly Fine”) and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas.</li> </ul> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/11aa08a1ccb4f80e6867c7e7631297c8\" tg-width=\"719\" tg-height=\"863\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><b>收入</b>为人民币2,057.40百万元（318.65亿美元），同比增长34%。如果不包括合并高鑫，我们的收入将同比增长22%至人民币1,873.06亿元（290.1亿美元）。</li><li><b>年度活跃消费者</b>截至2021年6月30日止十二个月，全球阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的总用户数达到约11.8亿，较截至2021年3月31日止十二个月增加4500万。这包括Lazada、全球速卖通、Trendyol和Daraz服务的中国9.12亿消费者1和海外2.65亿消费者。</li><li><b>营业收入</b>为人民币308.47亿元（47.78亿美元），同比下降11%。<b>调整后EBITDA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降5%至人民币486.28亿元（75.32亿美元）。<b>调整后EBITA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降8%至人民币417.31亿元（64.63亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于我们在战略领域的投资以捕捉增量机会，例如社区市场、淘宝交易、本地消费者服务和Lazada，以及我们在中国零售市场增长计划上的支出增加，例如闲鱼和淘宝直播，以及我们对商家的支持。</li><li><b>归属于普通股股东的净利润</b>为人民币451.41亿元（69.91亿美元），及<b>净收入</b>为人民币428.35亿元（66.34亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则净利润</b>为人民币434.41亿元（67.28亿美元），同比增长10%，主要是由于权益法被投资方利润份额增加。</li><li><b>每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.38元（2.54美元）<b>每股摊薄盈利</b>为人民币2.05元（0.32美元或2.46港元）。<b>非公认会计准则每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.60元（2.57美元），同比增长12%<b>非公认会计准则稀释每股收益</b>为人民币2.08元（0.32美元或2.50港元），同比增长12%。</li><li><b>经营活动提供的现金净额</b>为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则自由现金流</b>为人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币365.70亿元有所下降，主要是由于部分结清了今年早些时候中国国家市场监督管理总局根据中国反垄断法征收的人民币182.28亿元罚款（“反垄断法罚款”）中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元）以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p> <b>China Retail Marketplaces</b></p><p><blockquote><b>中国零售市场</b></blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, Alibaba's China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，阿里巴巴-SW中国零售市场的移动月活跃用户数为9.39亿，季度净增1400万。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cloud Computing</b></p><p><blockquote><b>云计算</b></blockquote></p><p> In the June 2021 quarter, our cloud computing revenue grew 29% year-over-year to RMB16,051 million (US$2,486 million), primarily driven by robust growth in revenue from customers in the Internet, financial services and retail industries.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月季度，我们的云计算收入同比增长29%至人民币160.51亿元（24.86亿美元），主要得益于互联网、金融服务和零售行业客户收入的强劲增长。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cash Flow from Operating Activities and Free Cash Flow</b></p><p><blockquote><b>经营活动产生的现金流量和自由现金流量</b></blockquote></p><p> In the quarter ended June 30, 2021, net cash provided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million), a decrease compared to RMB50,099 million in the same quarter of 2020. Free cash flow, a non-GAAP measurement of liquidity, decreased to RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), from RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020. The year-over-year decreases were mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million Anti-monopoly Fine and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas. A reconciliation of net cash provided by operating activities to free cash flow is included at the end of this results announcement.</p><p><blockquote>截至2021年6月30日的季度，经营活动提供的净现金为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币500.99亿元有所下降。自由现金流（衡量流动性的非公认会计准则衡量标准）从2020年同季度的人民币365.7亿元下降至人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于部分和解了人民币182.28亿元的反垄断罚款中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元），以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。经营活动提供的净现金与自由现金流的调节表包含在本业绩公告的末尾。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Increasing Share Repurchases</b></p><p><blockquote><b>增加股票回购</b></blockquote></p><p> Since April 1, 2021 and through the publication of this results announcement, we repurchased approximately 18.1 million of our ADSs (the equivalent of approximately 144.5 million of our ordinary shares) for approximately US$3,680 million under our share repurchase program. In addition, on August 2, 2021, our board of directors authorized the Company to upsize our Company's share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion. This share repurchase program will be effective through the end of 2022.</p><p><blockquote>自2021年4月1日起及透过刊发本业绩公告，我们根据股份回购计划以约36.8亿美元回购约18.1百万股美国存讬股（相当于约144.5百万股普通股）。此外，2021年8月2日，我们的董事会授权公司将我们公司的股票回购计划规模从100亿美元扩大到150亿美元。该股票回购计划将于2022年底生效。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/58bf53593de78f5f6e4fa1096d7aae94\" tg-width=\"757\" tg-height=\"793\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, our China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million. We continue to increase penetration in less-developed areas, reflecting our success in broadening product offerings to meet diverse consumer demand.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，我们的中国零售市场拥有9.39亿移动月活跃用户数，季度净增1400万。我们继续提高在欠发达地区的渗透率，反映我们在扩大产品供应以满足多样化消费者需求方面取得的成功。</blockquote></p><p> “Alibaba started the new fiscal year by delivering a healthy quarter. For the June quarter, global annual active consumers across the Alibaba Ecosystem reached 1.18 billion, an increase of 45 million from the March quarter, which includes 912 million consumers in China. Over more than twenty years of growth, we have developed a company that spans across both consumer and industrial Internet, with multiple engines driving our long-term growth,” said Daniel Zhang, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alibaba Group. “We believe in the growth of the Chinese economy and long-term value creation of Alibaba, and we will continue to strengthen our technology advantage in improving the consumer experience and helping our enterprise customers to accomplish successful digital transformations.”</p><p><blockquote>张勇集团董事长兼首席执行官阿里巴巴-SW表示：“阿里巴巴-SW以健康的季度开局新财年。在6月季度，阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的全球年度活跃消费者达到11.8亿，比3月季度增加了4500万，其中包括9.12亿中国消费者。经过二十多年的增长，我们已经发展出一家横跨消费互联网和工业互联网的公司，多个引擎推动我们的长期增长。”“我们相信中国经济的增长和阿里巴巴-SW的长期价值创造，我们将继续加强我们在改善消费者体验和帮助企业客户成功完成数字化转型方面的技术优势。”</blockquote></p><p> “We delivered strong revenue growth of 34% year-over-year. As we said in last quarter's results announcement, we are investing our excess profits and additional capital to support our merchants and invest in strategic areas to better serve customers and penetrate into new addressable markets,” said Maggie Wu, Chief Financial Officer of Alibaba Group. “We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>“我们实现了34%的强劲收入增长。正如我们在上季度业绩公告中所说，我们正在投资超额利润和额外资本来支持我们的商家，并投资于战略领域，以更好地服务客户并渗透到新的潜在市场，”阿里巴巴-SW集团首席财务官Maggie Wu表示。“我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已经回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Alibaba EPS beats by RMB2.27, misses on revenue<blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW每股收益超过预期人民币2.27元、营收不及预期</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nAlibaba EPS beats by RMB2.27, misses on revenue<blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW每股收益超过预期人民币2.27元、营收不及预期</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<a class=\"head\" href=\"https://laohu8.com/wemedia/1079075236\">\n\n<div class=\"h-thumb\" style=\"background-image:url(https://static.tigerbbs.com/8274c5b9d4c2852bfb1c4d6ce16c68ba);background-size:cover;\"></div>\n\n<div class=\"h-content\">\n<p class=\"h-name\">Tiger Newspress </p>\n<p class=\"h-time smaller\">2021-08-03 18:57</p>\n</div>\n</a>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p>(August 3)&nbsp;<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">Alibaba</a> posted&nbsp;financial&nbsp;result&nbsp;in&nbsp;premarket,&nbsp;which&nbsp;showed&nbsp;that:</p><p><blockquote>（8月3日）<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BABA\">阿里巴巴-SW</a>盘前公布的财务业绩显示：</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度营收为人民币2057.4亿元，去年同期为人民币1537.5亿元；FactSet共识为人民币2091.1亿元。</blockquote></p><p> Alibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.</p><p><blockquote>阿里巴巴-SW第一季度调整后。每股收益为人民币16.60元，去年同期为人民币14.82元；FactSet共识人民币14.33元。</blockquote></p><p> <b>BUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS</b></p><p><blockquote><b>业务亮点</b></blockquote></p><p> <b>In the quarter ended June 30, 2021:</b></p><p><blockquote><b>截至2021年6月30日的季度：</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><b>Revenue</b>&nbsp;was RMB205,740 million (US$31,865 million), an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million (US$29,010 million).</li>  <li><b>Annual active consumers</b>of the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached approximately 1.18 billion for the twelve months ended June 30, 2021, an increase of 45 million from the twelve months ended March 31, 2021. This includes 912 million consumers in China1and 265 million consumers overseas served by Lazada, AliExpress, Trendyol and Daraz.</li>  <li><b>Income from operations</b>&nbsp;was RMB30,847 million (US$4,778 million), a decrease of 11% year-over-year.<b>Adjusted EBITDA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 5% year-over-year to RMB48,628 million (US$7,532 million).<b>Adjusted EBITA</b>, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 8% year-over-year to RMB41,731 million (US$6,463 million). The year-over-year decreases were primarily due to our investments in strategic areas to capture incremental opportunities, such as Community Marketplaces, Taobao Deals, Local Consumer Services and Lazada, as well as our increased spending on growth initiatives within China retail marketplaces, such as Idle Fish and Taobao Live, and our support to merchants.</li>  <li><b>Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders</b>&nbsp;was RMB45,141 million (US$6,991 million),and<b>net income</b>was RMB42,835 million (US$6,634 million).<b>Non-GAAP net income</b>&nbsp;was RMB43,441 million (US$6,728 million), an increase of 10% year-over-year, mainly due to an increase in share of profit of equity method investees.</li>  <li><b>Diluted earnings per ADS</b>&nbsp;was RMB16.38 (US$2.54) and<b>diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.05 (US$0.32 or HK$2.46).<b>Non-GAAP diluted earnings per ADS</b>was RMB16.60 (US$2.57), an increase of 12% year-over-year and<b>non-GAAP diluted earnings per share</b>was RMB2.08 (US$0.32 or HK$2.50), an increase of 12% year-over-year.</li>  <li><b>Net cashprovided by operating activities</b>&nbsp;was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million).<b>Non-GAAP free cash flow</b>was RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), a decrease compared to RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020, mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million fine levied earlier this year by China’s State Administration for Market Regulation pursuant to China’s Anti-monopoly Law (the “Anti-monopoly Fine”) and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas.</li> </ul> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/11aa08a1ccb4f80e6867c7e7631297c8\" tg-width=\"719\" tg-height=\"863\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><b>收入</b>为人民币2,057.40百万元（318.65亿美元），同比增长34%。如果不包括合并高鑫，我们的收入将同比增长22%至人民币1,873.06亿元（290.1亿美元）。</li><li><b>年度活跃消费者</b>截至2021年6月30日止十二个月，全球阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的总用户数达到约11.8亿，较截至2021年3月31日止十二个月增加4500万。这包括Lazada、全球速卖通、Trendyol和Daraz服务的中国9.12亿消费者1和海外2.65亿消费者。</li><li><b>营业收入</b>为人民币308.47亿元（47.78亿美元），同比下降11%。<b>调整后EBITDA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降5%至人民币486.28亿元（75.32亿美元）。<b>调整后EBITA</b>根据非公认会计准则衡量，同比下降8%至人民币417.31亿元（64.63亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于我们在战略领域的投资以捕捉增量机会，例如社区市场、淘宝交易、本地消费者服务和Lazada，以及我们在中国零售市场增长计划上的支出增加，例如闲鱼和淘宝直播，以及我们对商家的支持。</li><li><b>归属于普通股股东的净利润</b>为人民币451.41亿元（69.91亿美元），及<b>净收入</b>为人民币428.35亿元（66.34亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则净利润</b>为人民币434.41亿元（67.28亿美元），同比增长10%，主要是由于权益法被投资方利润份额增加。</li><li><b>每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.38元（2.54美元）<b>每股摊薄盈利</b>为人民币2.05元（0.32美元或2.46港元）。<b>非公认会计准则每股美国存托凭证摊薄收益</b>为人民币16.60元（2.57美元），同比增长12%<b>非公认会计准则稀释每股收益</b>为人民币2.08元（0.32美元或2.50港元），同比增长12%。</li><li><b>经营活动提供的现金净额</b>为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元）。<b>非公认会计准则自由现金流</b>为人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币365.70亿元有所下降，主要是由于部分结清了今年早些时候中国国家市场监督管理总局根据中国反垄断法征收的人民币182.28亿元罚款（“反垄断法罚款”）中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元）以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。</li></ul></blockquote></p><p> <b>China Retail Marketplaces</b></p><p><blockquote><b>中国零售市场</b></blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, Alibaba's China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，阿里巴巴-SW中国零售市场的移动月活跃用户数为9.39亿，季度净增1400万。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cloud Computing</b></p><p><blockquote><b>云计算</b></blockquote></p><p> In the June 2021 quarter, our cloud computing revenue grew 29% year-over-year to RMB16,051 million (US$2,486 million), primarily driven by robust growth in revenue from customers in the Internet, financial services and retail industries.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月季度，我们的云计算收入同比增长29%至人民币160.51亿元（24.86亿美元），主要得益于互联网、金融服务和零售行业客户收入的强劲增长。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Cash Flow from Operating Activities and Free Cash Flow</b></p><p><blockquote><b>经营活动产生的现金流量和自由现金流量</b></blockquote></p><p> In the quarter ended June 30, 2021, net cash provided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million), a decrease compared to RMB50,099 million in the same quarter of 2020. Free cash flow, a non-GAAP measurement of liquidity, decreased to RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), from RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020. The year-over-year decreases were mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million Anti-monopoly Fine and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas. A reconciliation of net cash provided by operating activities to free cash flow is included at the end of this results announcement.</p><p><blockquote>截至2021年6月30日的季度，经营活动提供的净现金为人民币336.03亿元（52.04亿美元），较2020年同季度的人民币500.99亿元有所下降。自由现金流（衡量流动性的非公认会计准则衡量标准）从2020年同季度的人民币365.7亿元下降至人民币206.83亿元（32.03亿美元）。同比下降主要是由于部分和解了人民币182.28亿元的反垄断罚款中的人民币91.14亿元（14.12亿美元），以及我们在关键战略领域的投资导致利润减少。经营活动提供的净现金与自由现金流的调节表包含在本业绩公告的末尾。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Increasing Share Repurchases</b></p><p><blockquote><b>增加股票回购</b></blockquote></p><p> Since April 1, 2021 and through the publication of this results announcement, we repurchased approximately 18.1 million of our ADSs (the equivalent of approximately 144.5 million of our ordinary shares) for approximately US$3,680 million under our share repurchase program. In addition, on August 2, 2021, our board of directors authorized the Company to upsize our Company's share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion. This share repurchase program will be effective through the end of 2022.</p><p><blockquote>自2021年4月1日起及透过刊发本业绩公告，我们根据股份回购计划以约36.8亿美元回购约18.1百万股美国存讬股（相当于约144.5百万股普通股）。此外，2021年8月2日，我们的董事会授权公司将我们公司的股票回购计划规模从100亿美元扩大到150亿美元。该股票回购计划将于2022年底生效。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/58bf53593de78f5f6e4fa1096d7aae94\" tg-width=\"757\" tg-height=\"793\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p> In June 2021, our China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million. We continue to increase penetration in less-developed areas, reflecting our success in broadening product offerings to meet diverse consumer demand.</p><p><blockquote>2021年6月，我们的中国零售市场拥有9.39亿移动月活跃用户数，季度净增1400万。我们继续提高在欠发达地区的渗透率，反映我们在扩大产品供应以满足多样化消费者需求方面取得的成功。</blockquote></p><p> “Alibaba started the new fiscal year by delivering a healthy quarter. For the June quarter, global annual active consumers across the Alibaba Ecosystem reached 1.18 billion, an increase of 45 million from the March quarter, which includes 912 million consumers in China. Over more than twenty years of growth, we have developed a company that spans across both consumer and industrial Internet, with multiple engines driving our long-term growth,” said Daniel Zhang, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alibaba Group. “We believe in the growth of the Chinese economy and long-term value creation of Alibaba, and we will continue to strengthen our technology advantage in improving the consumer experience and helping our enterprise customers to accomplish successful digital transformations.”</p><p><blockquote>张勇集团董事长兼首席执行官阿里巴巴-SW表示：“阿里巴巴-SW以健康的季度开局新财年。在6月季度，阿里巴巴-SW生态系统的全球年度活跃消费者达到11.8亿，比3月季度增加了4500万，其中包括9.12亿中国消费者。经过二十多年的增长，我们已经发展出一家横跨消费互联网和工业互联网的公司，多个引擎推动我们的长期增长。”“我们相信中国经济的增长和阿里巴巴-SW的长期价值创造，我们将继续加强我们在改善消费者体验和帮助企业客户成功完成数字化转型方面的技术优势。”</blockquote></p><p> “We delivered strong revenue growth of 34% year-over-year. As we said in last quarter's results announcement, we are investing our excess profits and additional capital to support our merchants and invest in strategic areas to better serve customers and penetrate into new addressable markets,” said Maggie Wu, Chief Financial Officer of Alibaba Group. “We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”</p><p><blockquote>“我们实现了34%的强劲收入增长。正如我们在上季度业绩公告中所说，我们正在投资超额利润和额外资本来支持我们的商家，并投资于战略领域，以更好地服务客户并渗透到新的潜在市场，”阿里巴巴-SW集团首席财务官Maggie Wu表示。“我们正在将股票回购计划从100亿美元增加到150亿美元，这是公司历史上最大的股票回购计划，因为我们对我们的长期增长前景充满信心。我们的净现金状况仍然强劲，自2021年4月1日以来，我们已经回购了约37亿美元的ADS。”</blockquote></p><p></p>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"BABA":"阿里巴巴","09988":"阿里巴巴-W"},"is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1169635195","content_text":"(August 3) Alibaba posted financial result in premarket, which showed that:\nAlibaba Q1 revenue RMB205.74 bln vs. RMB153.75 bln a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB209.11 bln.\nAlibaba Q1 adj. EPS RMB16.60 vs. RMB14.82 a year ago; FactSet consensus RMB14.33.\nBUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS\nIn the quarter ended June 30, 2021:\n\nRevenue was RMB205,740 million (US$31,865 million), an increase of 34% year-over-year. Excluding the consolidation of Sun Art, our revenue would have grown 22% year-over-year to RMB187,306 million (US$29,010 million).\nAnnual active consumersof the Alibaba Ecosystem across the world reached approximately 1.18 billion for the twelve months ended June 30, 2021, an increase of 45 million from the twelve months ended March 31, 2021. This includes 912 million consumers in China1and 265 million consumers overseas served by Lazada, AliExpress, Trendyol and Daraz.\nIncome from operations was RMB30,847 million (US$4,778 million), a decrease of 11% year-over-year.Adjusted EBITDA, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 5% year-over-year to RMB48,628 million (US$7,532 million).Adjusted EBITA, a non-GAAP measurement, decreased 8% year-over-year to RMB41,731 million (US$6,463 million). The year-over-year decreases were primarily due to our investments in strategic areas to capture incremental opportunities, such as Community Marketplaces, Taobao Deals, Local Consumer Services and Lazada, as well as our increased spending on growth initiatives within China retail marketplaces, such as Idle Fish and Taobao Live, and our support to merchants.\nNet income attributable to ordinary shareholders was RMB45,141 million (US$6,991 million),andnet incomewas RMB42,835 million (US$6,634 million).Non-GAAP net income was RMB43,441 million (US$6,728 million), an increase of 10% year-over-year, mainly due to an increase in share of profit of equity method investees.\nDiluted earnings per ADS was RMB16.38 (US$2.54) anddiluted earnings per sharewas RMB2.05 (US$0.32 or HK$2.46).Non-GAAP diluted earnings per ADSwas RMB16.60 (US$2.57), an increase of 12% year-over-year andnon-GAAP diluted earnings per sharewas RMB2.08 (US$0.32 or HK$2.50), an increase of 12% year-over-year.\nNet cashprovided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million).Non-GAAP free cash flowwas RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), a decrease compared to RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020, mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million fine levied earlier this year by China’s State Administration for Market Regulation pursuant to China’s Anti-monopoly Law (the “Anti-monopoly Fine”) and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas.\n\n\nChina Retail Marketplaces\nIn June 2021, Alibaba's China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million.\nCloud Computing\nIn the June 2021 quarter, our cloud computing revenue grew 29% year-over-year to RMB16,051 million (US$2,486 million), primarily driven by robust growth in revenue from customers in the Internet, financial services and retail industries.\nCash Flow from Operating Activities and Free Cash Flow\nIn the quarter ended June 30, 2021, net cash provided by operating activities was RMB33,603 million (US$5,204 million), a decrease compared to RMB50,099 million in the same quarter of 2020. Free cash flow, a non-GAAP measurement of liquidity, decreased to RMB20,683 million (US$3,203 million), from RMB36,570 million in the same quarter of 2020. The year-over-year decreases were mainly due to the partial settlement in the amount of RMB9,114 million (US$1,412 million) of the RMB18,228 million Anti-monopoly Fine and a decrease in profit as a result of our investments in key strategic areas. A reconciliation of net cash provided by operating activities to free cash flow is included at the end of this results announcement.\nIncreasing Share Repurchases\nSince April 1, 2021 and through the publication of this results announcement, we repurchased approximately 18.1 million of our ADSs (the equivalent of approximately 144.5 million of our ordinary shares) for approximately US$3,680 million under our share repurchase program. In addition, on August 2, 2021, our board of directors authorized the Company to upsize our Company's share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion. This share repurchase program will be effective through the end of 2022.\n\nWe are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”\nIn June 2021, our China retail marketplaces had 939 million mobile MAUs, representing a quarterly net increase of 14 million. We continue to increase penetration in less-developed areas, reflecting our success in broadening product offerings to meet diverse consumer demand.\n“Alibaba started the new fiscal year by delivering a healthy quarter. For the June quarter, global annual active consumers across the Alibaba Ecosystem reached 1.18 billion, an increase of 45 million from the March quarter, which includes 912 million consumers in China. Over more than twenty years of growth, we have developed a company that spans across both consumer and industrial Internet, with multiple engines driving our long-term growth,” said Daniel Zhang, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alibaba Group. “We believe in the growth of the Chinese economy and long-term value creation of Alibaba, and we will continue to strengthen our technology advantage in improving the consumer experience and helping our enterprise customers to accomplish successful digital transformations.”\n“We delivered strong revenue growth of 34% year-over-year. As we said in last quarter's results announcement, we are investing our excess profits and additional capital to support our merchants and invest in strategic areas to better serve customers and penetrate into new addressable markets,” said Maggie Wu, Chief Financial Officer of Alibaba Group. “We are increasing our share repurchase program from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, the largest share repurchase program in the Company’s history, because we are confident of our long-term growth prospects. Our net cash position remains strong and we have repurchased approximately US$3.7 billion of our ADSs since April 1, 2021.”","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"BABA":0.9,"09988":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1556,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":166432260,"gmtCreate":1624021894550,"gmtModify":1624021894550,"author":{"id":"3586515948790570","authorId":"3586515948790570","name":"JammyJammy","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d7a489364a0ceb07e8294c389755b2d8","crmLevel":12,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"idStr":"3586515948790570","authorIdStr":"3586515948790570"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"I wouldn't be surprised if the hedge funds are trading this both ways. Retail traders please be careful.","listText":"I wouldn't be surprised if the hedge funds are trading this both ways. Retail traders please be careful.","text":"I wouldn't be surprised if the hedge funds are trading this both ways. Retail traders please be careful.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/166432260","repostId":"1131310015","repostType":2,"repost":{"id":"1131310015","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1623987347,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1131310015?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-18 11:35","market":"us","language":"en","title":"AMC: Danger Signals For Investors And Speculators<blockquote>AMC：投资者和投机者的危险信号</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1131310015","media":"seekingalpha","summary":"Summary\n\nI stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.\nFor investors, the gravitational pul","content":"<p><b>Summary</b></p><p><blockquote><b>总结</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li>I stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.</li>  <li>For investors, the gravitational pull of no earning prospects provides little support to the stock.</li>  <li>A century-old cautionary tale for speculators counting on a short squeeze.</li>  <li>Sell before the other speculators do.</li> </ul> <p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/dabb985556b9f549dd561bf919495d08\" tg-width=\"768\" tg-height=\"513\"><span>RgStudio/E+ via Getty Images</span></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>我站在巨人的肩膀上，在AMC上指导你。</li><li>对于投资者来说，没有盈利前景的引力对该股几乎没有支撑。</li><li>对于指望轧空的投机者来说，这是一个百年的警示故事。</li><li>在其他投机者之前卖出。</li></ul><p class=\"t-img-caption\"><span>RgStudio/E+来自Getty Images</span></p></blockquote></p><p> What are we to make of the meme stock phenomena? I tookone stab at itwith AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc.(NYSE:AMC)a few weeks ago. I’m back for more, after reading two interesting pieces. As Isaac Newton said in 1676, “<i>If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.</i>” Now I’m no Isaac Newton. For one, I’m far better looking. But like Zeke – a nickname Isaac’s friends probably never used – I too stand on the shoulders of giants. In this case the shoulders of Jason Zweig, a wonderful financial markets writer for<i>The Wall Street Journal</i>, and John Brooks, author of “<i>Business Adventures</i>”, a book recommended by Bill Gates. I will quote liberally from both in this article, then draw the line for you to AMC.</p><p><blockquote>我们如何看待模因股票现象？几周前，我与AMC院线控股公司（纽约证券交易所股票代码：AMC）一起尝试了一下。在读了两篇有趣的文章后，我回来看更多。正如艾萨克·牛顿在1676年所说，“<i>如果说我看得更远了一点，那就是站在巨人的肩膀上。</i>“现在我不是艾萨克·牛顿了。首先，我看起来好多了。但就像齐克一样——艾萨克的朋友们可能从未使用过这个昵称——我也站在巨人的肩膀上。在这种情况下，杰森·茨威格（Jason Zweig）是一位出色的金融市场作家<i>华尔街日报</i>，以及约翰·布鲁克斯，《<i>商业冒险</i>》，比尔盖茨推荐的一本书。我将在本文中大量引用两者，然后为您划清界限AMC。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Investor vs. trader vs. speculator</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投资者、交易者、投机者</b></blockquote></p><p> Jason Zweig graphically distinguished between these three types of stock buyers in hisJune 11, 2021<i>Wall Street Journal</i>column:</p><p><blockquote>Jason Zweig在他的2021年6月11日以图形方式区分了这三种类型的股票买家<i>华尔街日报</i>柱：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Whenever you buy any financial asset because you have a hunch or just for kicks, or because somebody famous is hyping the heck out of it, or everybody else seems to be buying it too, you aren’t investing.You’re definitely a trader: someone who has just bought an asset. And you may be a speculator: someone who thinks other people will pay more for it than you did.”“An investor relies on internal sources of return: earnings, income, growth in the value of assets. A speculator counts on external sources of return: primarily whether somebody else will pay more, regardless of fundamental value.”</i>  So why has AMC’s stock price been on a tear? I have one informal data source, namely the 300+ comments on my June 4 AMC article. Earnings, income, growth in the value of assets<i>never</i>came up. What did come up was “short squeeze” and stock charts. So I expect Mr. Zweig would describe AMC’s stock as driven by traders and speculators.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>每当你因为有预感或只是为了好玩而购买任何金融资产，或者因为某个名人正在大肆宣传，或者其他人似乎也在购买它，你就不是在投资。你绝对是一个交易者：刚刚购买了一项资产的人。你可能是一个投机者：认为其他人会比你支付更多的钱。”“投资者依赖内部回报来源：收益、收入、资产价值的增长。投机者依赖外部回报来源：主要是其他人是否会支付更多，而不考虑基本价值。”</i>那么为什么AMC的股价一直在上涨呢？我有一个非正式的数据来源，即我6月4日AMC文章的300多条评论。收益，收入，资产价值的增长<i>没有</i>上来了。出现的是“轧空”和股票图表。因此，我预计茨威格先生会将AMC的股票描述为由交易员和投机者推动的。</blockquote></p><p> Mr. Zweig also made me realize that my AMC article left out an earnings forecast. I gave lots of data on historic trends, which only implied a future direction. I correct that omission here.</p><p><blockquote>茨威格先生还让我意识到，我的AMC文章遗漏了盈利预测。我给出了很多关于历史趋势的数据，这些数据只是暗示了未来的方向。我在这里纠正这个遗漏。</blockquote></p><p> <b>A 2022 AMC earnings forecast</b></p><p><blockquote><b>2022年AMC盈利预测</b></blockquote></p><p> I start with the key assumptions:</p><p><blockquote>我从关键假设开始：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/3f5311cb0ff00c046d122c2c84fc3aea\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"168\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> <i>My time frame for reference</i>&nbsp;is 2017 to 2019. Earlier data is less relevant because AMC made a big acquisition in 2016, and 2020 and 2021 data is even less relevant because of COVID.</p><p><blockquote><i>我的参考时间框架</i>是2017年到2019年。早期的数据相关性较低，因为AMC在2016年进行了一项大型收购，而2020年和2021年的数据则因为新冠疫情而相关性更低。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The national box office</i>is the major assumption.My June 4 articleshows that movie attendance has been declining since 2002. What will box office be next year? The steady growth in streaming, both in subscribers and content, certainly is a headwind. And COVID logically should increase the shift from offsite (theater) entertainment to home entertainment, as it has for shopping and working. Holding movie attendance near its ’19 level would be a minor miracle. A 10%, or even a 20%, decline is far more likely. As you can see in the table above, I make 2022 AMC EPS forecasts using all three box office assumptions.</p><p><blockquote><i>全国票房</i>是主要假设。我6月4日的文章显示，自2002年以来，电影上座率一直在下降。明年票房会是多少？流媒体在订户和内容方面的稳定增长无疑是一个阻力。从逻辑上讲，COVID应该增加从场外（剧院）娱乐到家庭娱乐的转变，就像购物和工作一样。保持电影上座率接近19年的水平将是一个小小的奇迹。下降10%，甚至20%的可能性要大得多。如上表所示，我使用所有三种票房假设对2022年AMC每股收益进行预测。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>AMC market share.</i></b>I assume a share increase from AMC’s ’17-’19 level because some competing theaters must have dropped out because of COVID financial pressures.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>AMC市场份额。</i></b>我假设AMC的份额会比17-19年的水平有所增加，因为一些竞争影院肯定因新冠疫情的财务压力而退出。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Admissions gross margin.</i></b>This is the profit from ticket sales less the cost of licensing movies from their producers. I hold AMC steady with ’17-’19, but I can also imagine that movie producers seek better terms because AMC has to bid against a growing pool of streaming services desperate for content.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>招生毛利率。</i></b>这是门票销售的利润减去制片人授权电影的成本。我认为AMC在17-19年保持稳定，但我也可以想象电影制片人会寻求更好的条款，因为AMC必须与越来越多渴望内容的流媒体服务竞标。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food expenses as a percent of sales.</i></b>I carry forward the shockingly low number. AMC, and presumably its peers, take their food and beverage costs and<i>multiply them by 7 in their pricing to us moviegoers.</i>Smuggle in your own Jujifruits and save a bundle. My best financial advice for the year.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品费用占销售额的百分比。</i></b>我继承了低得惊人的数字。AMC，大概还有它的同行，承担他们的食品和饮料成本和<i>将它们对美国电影观众的定价乘以7。</i>走私你自己的Jujifruits，省下一捆。我今年最好的理财建议。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food and beverage sales as a percent of ticket prices.</i></b>I assume that AMC’s trend of modest increases continues.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品和饮料销售额占票价的百分比。</i></b>我认为AMC小幅上涨的趋势仍在继续。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Operating expenses</i></b>are the cost of the theater personnel, utilities, etc. I assume the gradual uptrend in the operating expense ratio continues, for two reasons. One, these operating expenses are largely fixed, and revenues will be under pressure. Second, it seems logical that the current labor shortage will pressure pay levels for low-end theater jobs.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>营业费用</i></b>是剧院人员、公用事业等的成本。我认为运营费用率的逐步上升趋势仍在继续，原因有二。第一，这些运营费用基本上是固定的，收入将面临压力。其次，当前的劳动力短缺将给低端剧院工作的薪酬水平带来压力，这似乎是合乎逻辑的。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> We’re now ready for my earnings and cash flow models:</p><p><blockquote>我们现在已经为我的盈利和现金流模型做好了准备：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9b8a5ce8ad10adb3336126cdb0a5e598\" tg-width=\"537\" tg-height=\"497\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> The ’22 forecasts are set by the assumptions above through the “gross profit” line. My overhead expense forecast assumes that AMC is working hard to limit expenses through its challenging times:</p><p><blockquote>22年的预测是根据上述假设通过“毛利润”线设定的。我的管理费用预测假设AMC正在努力限制费用度过充满挑战的时期：</blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><i>Depreciation/amortization</i>is a combination of accounting expenses for real estate and acquisitions. Write-downs taken during the pandemic should have reduced these expenses.</li>  <li><i>Interest expense</i>should decline as AMC pays down some debt with the equity it has been raising.</li> </ul> <b>The gravitational pull of earnings</b></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><i>折旧/摊销</i>是房地产和收购的会计费用的组合。疫情期间进行的减记本应减少这些费用。</li><li><i>利息支出</i>随着AMC用其筹集的股权偿还部分债务，这一数字应该会下降。</li></ul><b>盈利的引力</b></blockquote></p><p> We arrive at the bottom line. The best-case scenario I can see for 2022 EPS is roughly breakeven. More likely is a modest loss. Cash flow should be somewhat worse, because the cash capital spending needed by AMC to keep its theaters attractive to a shrinking audience should exceed its non-cash depreciation/amortization expenses. If capital spending is much lower than I forecast, it is probably because AMC management is conceding that it is in a death spiral and wants to milk what cash it can.</p><p><blockquote>我们到达了底线。我能看到的2022年每股收益的最佳情况是大致盈亏平衡。更有可能的是适度的损失。现金流应该会更糟，因为AMC保持其影院对不断萎缩的观众的吸引力所需的现金资本支出应该超过其非现金折旧/摊销费用。如果资本支出远低于我的预测，可能是因为AMC管理层承认自己正处于死亡螺旋之中，并希望尽可能榨取现金。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The bottom line - no support for investors.</i>AMC’s book value is negative. It appears incapable of earning any material money post-COVID. Its business is in long-term decline due to technology changes, and its new competitors are monster companies – Netflix, Disney, Comcast, etc. – with huge resources. An investor can only look at AMC’s current $55 stock price and with a shudder say, in the immortal words of<i>Trading Places</i>, “Sell Mortimer, sell!”</p><p><blockquote><i>底线——不支持投资者。</i>AMC的账面价值为负。在COVID之后，它似乎无法赚取任何物质收入。其业务因技术变革而长期下滑，新的竞争对手是拥有巨大资源的怪兽公司——Netflix、迪士尼、康卡斯特等。投资者只能看着AMC目前55美元的股价，不寒而栗地说，用不朽的话来说<i>交易场所</i>、“卖莫蒂默，卖！”</blockquote></p><p> <b>The speculative play - a short squeeze: A historical cautionary tale</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投机游戏——轧空：历史警示</b></blockquote></p><p> Millennials did not invent the short squeeze. It has been around almost as long financial markets have existed. The book<i>Business Adventures</i>by John Brooks<i>,</i>published way back in 1969, tells a vivid tale of a short squeeze even farther back, in the early 1920s. Literally a century ago. I’m going to quote from the book to suggest how the story ends for speculations with no investor support. So pour yourself some illegal hooch (we’re heading to the Prohibition Era) and read on. This is the story of Clarence Saunders, the founder of Piggly Wiggly Stores, the first supermarket; the Amazon of his day.</p><p><blockquote>千禧一代并没有发明轧空。它几乎和金融市场存在的时间一样长。这本书<i>商业冒险</i>约翰·布鲁克斯<i>,</i>早在1969年就出版了，生动地讲述了20世纪20年代初的空头挤压故事。一个世纪前。我将引用书中的话来说明在没有投资者支持的情况下，投机的故事将如何结束。所以，给自己倒点非法烈酒（我们正走向禁酒令时代），继续读下去。这是第一家超市Piggly Wiggly Stores的创始人克拉伦斯·桑德斯的故事；他那个时代的亚马逊。</blockquote></p><p> Shorts went after Clarence’s stock in 1922, driving it from $50 to below $40. Saunders vowed revenge with a short squeeze. Here are excerpts of Mr. Brooks’ recounting of the story:</p><p><blockquote>1922年，空头追捧克拉伦斯的股票，将其从50美元推至40美元以下。桑德斯发誓要用空头挤压进行报复。以下是布鲁克斯先生讲述这个故事的摘录：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Saunders…bought 33,000 shares of Piggly Wiggly, mostly from short sellers; within a week he had brought the total to 105,000 – more than half of the 200,000 shares outstanding. The effectiveness of Saunders’ buying campaign was readily apparent; by late January of 1923 it had driven he price up over $60…</i>”  The sole short squeezer of yore has been replaced by herds of “apes” today, and the apes have been far better in driving up prices. By the way, believe it or not, a group of apes is apparently called a “shrewdness”. A group of apes is shrewd – interesting.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>桑德斯……购买了33,000股Piggly Wiggly股票，大部分来自卖空者；不到一周，他就将总数增加到了10.5万股——超过了20万股已发行股票的一半。桑德斯购买活动的有效性显而易见；到1923年1月下旬，它已将价格推高了60多美元……</i>“昔日唯一的空头挤压者如今已被成群的“猿”所取代，而猿在推高价格方面要好得多。顺便说一句，信不信由你，一群猿显然被称为“精明”。一群猿很精明——有意思。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>He had made himself a bundle and had demonstrated how a poor Southern boy could teach the city slickers a lesson.”</i>  Today we have apes sticking it to hedge funds.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>他赚了一大笔钱，证明了一个贫穷的南方男孩是如何教训城市里的狡猾分子的。”</i>今天，我们有猿类坚持对冲基金。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>One of the great hazards in the Corner was always that even though a player might defeat his opponents, he would discover that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Once the short sellers had been squeezed dry, the cornerer might find that the reams of stock he had accumulated in the process were a dead weight around his neck; by pushing it all back into the market, he would drive its price down to zero.</i>”  Something to think about. What was Saunders to do?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>角落里最大的危险之一总是，即使一个玩家可能会击败他的对手，他也会发现他赢得了一场得不偿失的胜利。一旦卖空者被榨干，卖空者可能会发现他在这个过程中积累的大量股票是他脖子上的沉重负担；通过将其全部推回市场，他会将其价格降至零。</i>“值得思考的事情。桑德斯该怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   “[  <i>Saunders’] solution was to sell his $55 shares on the installment plan. In his February advertisements, he stipulated that the public could buy shares only by paying $25 down and the balance in three $10 installments</i>.”  Pretty clever, no? No:</p><p><blockquote>“[<i>桑德斯的解决方案是出售分期付款计划中价值55美元的股票。在他二月份的广告中，他规定公众只需支付25美元的首付，余款分三期支付10美元即可购买股票</i>“很聪明，不是吗？没有：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>At the end of the third day, the total number of shares subscribed for was still under 25,000, and the sales that were made were canceled. Saunders had to admit that the drive had been a failure.”</i>  Uh oh. What now?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>在第三天结束时，认购的股份总数仍低于2.5万股，所做的卖出被取消。桑德斯不得不承认这次旅行是失败的。”</i>呃哦。现在怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   <i>“On August 22nd, the New York auction firm of Adrian H. Muller &amp; Son…knocked down 1,500 shares of Piggly Wiggly at $1 a share…The following spring Saunders went through formal bankruptcy proceedings.”</i>  Ouch.</p><p><blockquote><i>“8月22日，Adrian H.Muller&amp;Son的纽约拍卖公司……以每股1美元的价格拍卖了1,500股Piggly Wiggly股票……第二年春天，Saunders进入了正式破产程序。”</i>哎哟。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Buyers beware</b></p><p><blockquote><b>买家当心</b></blockquote></p><p> As Jason Zweig noted above, speculators depend upon finding a buyer at a higher price. Today’s holders of AMC stock certainly have made life painful for many short sellers. But are there really enough new buyers to take out current shareholders above AMC’s present $28 billion market cap? Especially with the gravity of no earnings constantly weighing on the stock?</p><p><blockquote>正如杰森·茨威格上面指出的，投机者依赖于以更高的价格找到买家。如今AMC股票的持有者无疑让许多卖空者的生活变得痛苦。但真的有足够多的新买家来收购AMC目前280亿美元市值以上的现有股东吗？尤其是在没有盈利的情况下不断给股票带来压力的情况下？</blockquote></p><p></p><p> AMC shareholders, don’t win Clarence Saunders’ Pyrrhic victory. Take your $55 a share and run. Fast. Before the other speculating holders do so first.</p><p><blockquote>AMC股东们，不要赢得克拉伦斯·桑德斯得不偿失的胜利。拿着每股55美元跑吧。快的。在其他投机持有者首先这样做之前。</blockquote></p><p></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>AMC: Danger Signals For Investors And Speculators<blockquote>AMC：投资者和投机者的危险信号</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nAMC: Danger Signals For Investors And Speculators<blockquote>AMC：投资者和投机者的危险信号</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">seekingalpha</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-06-18 11:35</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>Summary</b></p><p><blockquote><b>总结</b></blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li>I stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.</li>  <li>For investors, the gravitational pull of no earning prospects provides little support to the stock.</li>  <li>A century-old cautionary tale for speculators counting on a short squeeze.</li>  <li>Sell before the other speculators do.</li> </ul> <p class=\"t-img-caption\"><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/dabb985556b9f549dd561bf919495d08\" tg-width=\"768\" tg-height=\"513\"><span>RgStudio/E+ via Getty Images</span></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>我站在巨人的肩膀上，在AMC上指导你。</li><li>对于投资者来说，没有盈利前景的引力对该股几乎没有支撑。</li><li>对于指望轧空的投机者来说，这是一个百年的警示故事。</li><li>在其他投机者之前卖出。</li></ul><p class=\"t-img-caption\"><span>RgStudio/E+来自Getty Images</span></p></blockquote></p><p> What are we to make of the meme stock phenomena? I tookone stab at itwith AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc.(NYSE:AMC)a few weeks ago. I’m back for more, after reading two interesting pieces. As Isaac Newton said in 1676, “<i>If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.</i>” Now I’m no Isaac Newton. For one, I’m far better looking. But like Zeke – a nickname Isaac’s friends probably never used – I too stand on the shoulders of giants. In this case the shoulders of Jason Zweig, a wonderful financial markets writer for<i>The Wall Street Journal</i>, and John Brooks, author of “<i>Business Adventures</i>”, a book recommended by Bill Gates. I will quote liberally from both in this article, then draw the line for you to AMC.</p><p><blockquote>我们如何看待模因股票现象？几周前，我与AMC院线控股公司（纽约证券交易所股票代码：AMC）一起尝试了一下。在读了两篇有趣的文章后，我回来看更多。正如艾萨克·牛顿在1676年所说，“<i>如果说我看得更远了一点，那就是站在巨人的肩膀上。</i>“现在我不是艾萨克·牛顿了。首先，我看起来好多了。但就像齐克一样——艾萨克的朋友们可能从未使用过这个昵称——我也站在巨人的肩膀上。在这种情况下，杰森·茨威格（Jason Zweig）是一位出色的金融市场作家<i>华尔街日报</i>，以及约翰·布鲁克斯，《<i>商业冒险</i>》，比尔盖茨推荐的一本书。我将在本文中大量引用两者，然后为您划清界限AMC。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Investor vs. trader vs. speculator</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投资者、交易者、投机者</b></blockquote></p><p> Jason Zweig graphically distinguished between these three types of stock buyers in hisJune 11, 2021<i>Wall Street Journal</i>column:</p><p><blockquote>Jason Zweig在他的2021年6月11日以图形方式区分了这三种类型的股票买家<i>华尔街日报</i>柱：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Whenever you buy any financial asset because you have a hunch or just for kicks, or because somebody famous is hyping the heck out of it, or everybody else seems to be buying it too, you aren’t investing.You’re definitely a trader: someone who has just bought an asset. And you may be a speculator: someone who thinks other people will pay more for it than you did.”“An investor relies on internal sources of return: earnings, income, growth in the value of assets. A speculator counts on external sources of return: primarily whether somebody else will pay more, regardless of fundamental value.”</i>  So why has AMC’s stock price been on a tear? I have one informal data source, namely the 300+ comments on my June 4 AMC article. Earnings, income, growth in the value of assets<i>never</i>came up. What did come up was “short squeeze” and stock charts. So I expect Mr. Zweig would describe AMC’s stock as driven by traders and speculators.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>每当你因为有预感或只是为了好玩而购买任何金融资产，或者因为某个名人正在大肆宣传，或者其他人似乎也在购买它，你就不是在投资。你绝对是一个交易者：刚刚购买了一项资产的人。你可能是一个投机者：认为其他人会比你支付更多的钱。”“投资者依赖内部回报来源：收益、收入、资产价值的增长。投机者依赖外部回报来源：主要是其他人是否会支付更多，而不考虑基本价值。”</i>那么为什么AMC的股价一直在上涨呢？我有一个非正式的数据来源，即我6月4日AMC文章的300多条评论。收益，收入，资产价值的增长<i>没有</i>上来了。出现的是“轧空”和股票图表。因此，我预计茨威格先生会将AMC的股票描述为由交易员和投机者推动的。</blockquote></p><p> Mr. Zweig also made me realize that my AMC article left out an earnings forecast. I gave lots of data on historic trends, which only implied a future direction. I correct that omission here.</p><p><blockquote>茨威格先生还让我意识到，我的AMC文章遗漏了盈利预测。我给出了很多关于历史趋势的数据，这些数据只是暗示了未来的方向。我在这里纠正这个遗漏。</blockquote></p><p> <b>A 2022 AMC earnings forecast</b></p><p><blockquote><b>2022年AMC盈利预测</b></blockquote></p><p> I start with the key assumptions:</p><p><blockquote>我从关键假设开始：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/3f5311cb0ff00c046d122c2c84fc3aea\" tg-width=\"640\" tg-height=\"168\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> <i>My time frame for reference</i>&nbsp;is 2017 to 2019. Earlier data is less relevant because AMC made a big acquisition in 2016, and 2020 and 2021 data is even less relevant because of COVID.</p><p><blockquote><i>我的参考时间框架</i>是2017年到2019年。早期的数据相关性较低，因为AMC在2016年进行了一项大型收购，而2020年和2021年的数据则因为新冠疫情而相关性更低。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The national box office</i>is the major assumption.My June 4 articleshows that movie attendance has been declining since 2002. What will box office be next year? The steady growth in streaming, both in subscribers and content, certainly is a headwind. And COVID logically should increase the shift from offsite (theater) entertainment to home entertainment, as it has for shopping and working. Holding movie attendance near its ’19 level would be a minor miracle. A 10%, or even a 20%, decline is far more likely. As you can see in the table above, I make 2022 AMC EPS forecasts using all three box office assumptions.</p><p><blockquote><i>全国票房</i>是主要假设。我6月4日的文章显示，自2002年以来，电影上座率一直在下降。明年票房会是多少？流媒体在订户和内容方面的稳定增长无疑是一个阻力。从逻辑上讲，COVID应该增加从场外（剧院）娱乐到家庭娱乐的转变，就像购物和工作一样。保持电影上座率接近19年的水平将是一个小小的奇迹。下降10%，甚至20%的可能性要大得多。如上表所示，我使用所有三种票房假设对2022年AMC每股收益进行预测。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>AMC market share.</i></b>I assume a share increase from AMC’s ’17-’19 level because some competing theaters must have dropped out because of COVID financial pressures.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>AMC市场份额。</i></b>我假设AMC的份额会比17-19年的水平有所增加，因为一些竞争影院肯定因新冠疫情的财务压力而退出。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Admissions gross margin.</i></b>This is the profit from ticket sales less the cost of licensing movies from their producers. I hold AMC steady with ’17-’19, but I can also imagine that movie producers seek better terms because AMC has to bid against a growing pool of streaming services desperate for content.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>招生毛利率。</i></b>这是门票销售的利润减去制片人授权电影的成本。我认为AMC在17-19年保持稳定，但我也可以想象电影制片人会寻求更好的条款，因为AMC必须与越来越多渴望内容的流媒体服务竞标。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food expenses as a percent of sales.</i></b>I carry forward the shockingly low number. AMC, and presumably its peers, take their food and beverage costs and<i>multiply them by 7 in their pricing to us moviegoers.</i>Smuggle in your own Jujifruits and save a bundle. My best financial advice for the year.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品费用占销售额的百分比。</i></b>我继承了低得惊人的数字。AMC，大概还有它的同行，承担他们的食品和饮料成本和<i>将它们对美国电影观众的定价乘以7。</i>走私你自己的Jujifruits，省下一捆。我今年最好的理财建议。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Food and beverage sales as a percent of ticket prices.</i></b>I assume that AMC’s trend of modest increases continues.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>食品和饮料销售额占票价的百分比。</i></b>我认为AMC小幅上涨的趋势仍在继续。</blockquote></p><p> <b><i>Operating expenses</i></b>are the cost of the theater personnel, utilities, etc. I assume the gradual uptrend in the operating expense ratio continues, for two reasons. One, these operating expenses are largely fixed, and revenues will be under pressure. Second, it seems logical that the current labor shortage will pressure pay levels for low-end theater jobs.</p><p><blockquote><b><i>营业费用</i></b>是剧院人员、公用事业等的成本。我认为运营费用率的逐步上升趋势仍在继续，原因有二。第一，这些运营费用基本上是固定的，收入将面临压力。其次，当前的劳动力短缺将给低端剧院工作的薪酬水平带来压力，这似乎是合乎逻辑的。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> We’re now ready for my earnings and cash flow models:</p><p><blockquote>我们现在已经为我的盈利和现金流模型做好了准备：</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9b8a5ce8ad10adb3336126cdb0a5e598\" tg-width=\"537\" tg-height=\"497\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> The ’22 forecasts are set by the assumptions above through the “gross profit” line. My overhead expense forecast assumes that AMC is working hard to limit expenses through its challenging times:</p><p><blockquote>22年的预测是根据上述假设通过“毛利润”线设定的。我的管理费用预测假设AMC正在努力限制费用度过充满挑战的时期：</blockquote></p><p> <ul>  <li><i>Depreciation/amortization</i>is a combination of accounting expenses for real estate and acquisitions. Write-downs taken during the pandemic should have reduced these expenses.</li>  <li><i>Interest expense</i>should decline as AMC pays down some debt with the equity it has been raising.</li> </ul> <b>The gravitational pull of earnings</b></p><p><blockquote><ul><li><i>折旧/摊销</i>是房地产和收购的会计费用的组合。疫情期间进行的减记本应减少这些费用。</li><li><i>利息支出</i>随着AMC用其筹集的股权偿还部分债务，这一数字应该会下降。</li></ul><b>盈利的引力</b></blockquote></p><p> We arrive at the bottom line. The best-case scenario I can see for 2022 EPS is roughly breakeven. More likely is a modest loss. Cash flow should be somewhat worse, because the cash capital spending needed by AMC to keep its theaters attractive to a shrinking audience should exceed its non-cash depreciation/amortization expenses. If capital spending is much lower than I forecast, it is probably because AMC management is conceding that it is in a death spiral and wants to milk what cash it can.</p><p><blockquote>我们到达了底线。我能看到的2022年每股收益的最佳情况是大致盈亏平衡。更有可能的是适度的损失。现金流应该会更糟，因为AMC保持其影院对不断萎缩的观众的吸引力所需的现金资本支出应该超过其非现金折旧/摊销费用。如果资本支出远低于我的预测，可能是因为AMC管理层承认自己正处于死亡螺旋之中，并希望尽可能榨取现金。</blockquote></p><p> <i>The bottom line - no support for investors.</i>AMC’s book value is negative. It appears incapable of earning any material money post-COVID. Its business is in long-term decline due to technology changes, and its new competitors are monster companies – Netflix, Disney, Comcast, etc. – with huge resources. An investor can only look at AMC’s current $55 stock price and with a shudder say, in the immortal words of<i>Trading Places</i>, “Sell Mortimer, sell!”</p><p><blockquote><i>底线——不支持投资者。</i>AMC的账面价值为负。在COVID之后，它似乎无法赚取任何物质收入。其业务因技术变革而长期下滑，新的竞争对手是拥有巨大资源的怪兽公司——Netflix、迪士尼、康卡斯特等。投资者只能看着AMC目前55美元的股价，不寒而栗地说，用不朽的话来说<i>交易场所</i>、“卖莫蒂默，卖！”</blockquote></p><p> <b>The speculative play - a short squeeze: A historical cautionary tale</b></p><p><blockquote><b>投机游戏——轧空：历史警示</b></blockquote></p><p> Millennials did not invent the short squeeze. It has been around almost as long financial markets have existed. The book<i>Business Adventures</i>by John Brooks<i>,</i>published way back in 1969, tells a vivid tale of a short squeeze even farther back, in the early 1920s. Literally a century ago. I’m going to quote from the book to suggest how the story ends for speculations with no investor support. So pour yourself some illegal hooch (we’re heading to the Prohibition Era) and read on. This is the story of Clarence Saunders, the founder of Piggly Wiggly Stores, the first supermarket; the Amazon of his day.</p><p><blockquote>千禧一代并没有发明轧空。它几乎和金融市场存在的时间一样长。这本书<i>商业冒险</i>约翰·布鲁克斯<i>,</i>早在1969年就出版了，生动地讲述了20世纪20年代初的空头挤压故事。一个世纪前。我将引用书中的话来说明在没有投资者支持的情况下，投机的故事将如何结束。所以，给自己倒点非法烈酒（我们正走向禁酒令时代），继续读下去。这是第一家超市Piggly Wiggly Stores的创始人克拉伦斯·桑德斯的故事；他那个时代的亚马逊。</blockquote></p><p> Shorts went after Clarence’s stock in 1922, driving it from $50 to below $40. Saunders vowed revenge with a short squeeze. Here are excerpts of Mr. Brooks’ recounting of the story:</p><p><blockquote>1922年，空头追捧克拉伦斯的股票，将其从50美元推至40美元以下。桑德斯发誓要用空头挤压进行报复。以下是布鲁克斯先生讲述这个故事的摘录：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>Saunders…bought 33,000 shares of Piggly Wiggly, mostly from short sellers; within a week he had brought the total to 105,000 – more than half of the 200,000 shares outstanding. The effectiveness of Saunders’ buying campaign was readily apparent; by late January of 1923 it had driven he price up over $60…</i>”  The sole short squeezer of yore has been replaced by herds of “apes” today, and the apes have been far better in driving up prices. By the way, believe it or not, a group of apes is apparently called a “shrewdness”. A group of apes is shrewd – interesting.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>桑德斯……购买了33,000股Piggly Wiggly股票，大部分来自卖空者；不到一周，他就将总数增加到了10.5万股——超过了20万股已发行股票的一半。桑德斯购买活动的有效性显而易见；到1923年1月下旬，它已将价格推高了60多美元……</i>“昔日唯一的空头挤压者如今已被成群的“猿”所取代，而猿在推高价格方面要好得多。顺便说一句，信不信由你，一群猿显然被称为“精明”。一群猿很精明——有意思。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>He had made himself a bundle and had demonstrated how a poor Southern boy could teach the city slickers a lesson.”</i>  Today we have apes sticking it to hedge funds.</p><p><blockquote>“<i>他赚了一大笔钱，证明了一个贫穷的南方男孩是如何教训城市里的狡猾分子的。”</i>今天，我们有猿类坚持对冲基金。</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>One of the great hazards in the Corner was always that even though a player might defeat his opponents, he would discover that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Once the short sellers had been squeezed dry, the cornerer might find that the reams of stock he had accumulated in the process were a dead weight around his neck; by pushing it all back into the market, he would drive its price down to zero.</i>”  Something to think about. What was Saunders to do?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>角落里最大的危险之一总是，即使一个玩家可能会击败他的对手，他也会发现他赢得了一场得不偿失的胜利。一旦卖空者被榨干，卖空者可能会发现他在这个过程中积累的大量股票是他脖子上的沉重负担；通过将其全部推回市场，他会将其价格降至零。</i>“值得思考的事情。桑德斯该怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   “[  <i>Saunders’] solution was to sell his $55 shares on the installment plan. In his February advertisements, he stipulated that the public could buy shares only by paying $25 down and the balance in three $10 installments</i>.”  Pretty clever, no? No:</p><p><blockquote>“[<i>桑德斯的解决方案是出售分期付款计划中价值55美元的股票。在他二月份的广告中，他规定公众只需支付25美元的首付，余款分三期支付10美元即可购买股票</i>“很聪明，不是吗？没有：</blockquote></p><p>   “  <i>At the end of the third day, the total number of shares subscribed for was still under 25,000, and the sales that were made were canceled. Saunders had to admit that the drive had been a failure.”</i>  Uh oh. What now?</p><p><blockquote>“<i>在第三天结束时，认购的股份总数仍低于2.5万股，所做的卖出被取消。桑德斯不得不承认这次旅行是失败的。”</i>呃哦。现在怎么办？</blockquote></p><p>   <i>“On August 22nd, the New York auction firm of Adrian H. Muller &amp; Son…knocked down 1,500 shares of Piggly Wiggly at $1 a share…The following spring Saunders went through formal bankruptcy proceedings.”</i>  Ouch.</p><p><blockquote><i>“8月22日，Adrian H.Muller&amp;Son的纽约拍卖公司……以每股1美元的价格拍卖了1,500股Piggly Wiggly股票……第二年春天，Saunders进入了正式破产程序。”</i>哎哟。</blockquote></p><p> <b>Buyers beware</b></p><p><blockquote><b>买家当心</b></blockquote></p><p> As Jason Zweig noted above, speculators depend upon finding a buyer at a higher price. Today’s holders of AMC stock certainly have made life painful for many short sellers. But are there really enough new buyers to take out current shareholders above AMC’s present $28 billion market cap? Especially with the gravity of no earnings constantly weighing on the stock?</p><p><blockquote>正如杰森·茨威格上面指出的，投机者依赖于以更高的价格找到买家。如今AMC股票的持有者无疑让许多卖空者的生活变得痛苦。但真的有足够多的新买家来收购AMC目前280亿美元市值以上的现有股东吗？尤其是在没有盈利的情况下不断给股票带来压力的情况下？</blockquote></p><p></p><p> AMC shareholders, don’t win Clarence Saunders’ Pyrrhic victory. Take your $55 a share and run. Fast. Before the other speculating holders do so first.</p><p><blockquote>AMC股东们，不要赢得克拉伦斯·桑德斯得不偿失的胜利。拿着每股55美元跑吧。快的。在其他投机持有者首先这样做之前。</blockquote></p><p></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> 来源：<a href=\"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4435360-amc-stock-danger-signals-for-investors-and-speculators\">seekingalpha</a></p>\n<p>为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化</p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{"AMC":"AMC院线"},"source_url":"https://seekingalpha.com/article/4435360-amc-stock-danger-signals-for-investors-and-speculators","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1131310015","content_text":"Summary\n\nI stand on the shoulder of giants to guide you on AMC.\nFor investors, the gravitational pull of no earning prospects provides little support to the stock.\nA century-old cautionary tale for speculators counting on a short squeeze.\nSell before the other speculators do.\n\nRgStudio/E+ via Getty Images\nWhat are we to make of the meme stock phenomena? I tookone stab at itwith AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc.(NYSE:AMC)a few weeks ago. I’m back for more, after reading two interesting pieces. As Isaac Newton said in 1676, “If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants.” Now I’m no Isaac Newton. For one, I’m far better looking. But like Zeke – a nickname Isaac’s friends probably never used – I too stand on the shoulders of giants. In this case the shoulders of Jason Zweig, a wonderful financial markets writer forThe Wall Street Journal, and John Brooks, author of “Business Adventures”, a book recommended by Bill Gates. I will quote liberally from both in this article, then draw the line for you to AMC.\nInvestor vs. trader vs. speculator\nJason Zweig graphically distinguished between these three types of stock buyers in hisJune 11, 2021Wall Street Journalcolumn:\n\n “\n Whenever you buy any financial asset because you have a hunch or just for kicks, or because somebody famous is hyping the heck out of it, or everybody else seems to be buying it too, you aren’t investing.You’re definitely a trader: someone who has just bought an asset. And you may be a speculator: someone who thinks other people will pay more for it than you did.”“An investor relies on internal sources of return: earnings, income, growth in the value of assets. A speculator counts on external sources of return: primarily whether somebody else will pay more, regardless of fundamental value.”\n\nSo why has AMC’s stock price been on a tear? I have one informal data source, namely the 300+ comments on my June 4 AMC article. Earnings, income, growth in the value of assetsnevercame up. What did come up was “short squeeze” and stock charts. So I expect Mr. Zweig would describe AMC’s stock as driven by traders and speculators.\nMr. Zweig also made me realize that my AMC article left out an earnings forecast. I gave lots of data on historic trends, which only implied a future direction. I correct that omission here.\nA 2022 AMC earnings forecast\nI start with the key assumptions:\n\nMy time frame for reference is 2017 to 2019. Earlier data is less relevant because AMC made a big acquisition in 2016, and 2020 and 2021 data is even less relevant because of COVID.\nThe national box officeis the major assumption.My June 4 articleshows that movie attendance has been declining since 2002. What will box office be next year? The steady growth in streaming, both in subscribers and content, certainly is a headwind. And COVID logically should increase the shift from offsite (theater) entertainment to home entertainment, as it has for shopping and working. Holding movie attendance near its ’19 level would be a minor miracle. A 10%, or even a 20%, decline is far more likely. As you can see in the table above, I make 2022 AMC EPS forecasts using all three box office assumptions.\nAMC market share.I assume a share increase from AMC’s ’17-’19 level because some competing theaters must have dropped out because of COVID financial pressures.\nAdmissions gross margin.This is the profit from ticket sales less the cost of licensing movies from their producers. I hold AMC steady with ’17-’19, but I can also imagine that movie producers seek better terms because AMC has to bid against a growing pool of streaming services desperate for content.\nFood expenses as a percent of sales.I carry forward the shockingly low number. AMC, and presumably its peers, take their food and beverage costs andmultiply them by 7 in their pricing to us moviegoers.Smuggle in your own Jujifruits and save a bundle. My best financial advice for the year.\nFood and beverage sales as a percent of ticket prices.I assume that AMC’s trend of modest increases continues.\nOperating expensesare the cost of the theater personnel, utilities, etc. I assume the gradual uptrend in the operating expense ratio continues, for two reasons. One, these operating expenses are largely fixed, and revenues will be under pressure. Second, it seems logical that the current labor shortage will pressure pay levels for low-end theater jobs.\nWe’re now ready for my earnings and cash flow models:\n\nThe ’22 forecasts are set by the assumptions above through the “gross profit” line. My overhead expense forecast assumes that AMC is working hard to limit expenses through its challenging times:\n\nDepreciation/amortizationis a combination of accounting expenses for real estate and acquisitions. Write-downs taken during the pandemic should have reduced these expenses.\nInterest expenseshould decline as AMC pays down some debt with the equity it has been raising.\n\nThe gravitational pull of earnings\nWe arrive at the bottom line. The best-case scenario I can see for 2022 EPS is roughly breakeven. More likely is a modest loss. Cash flow should be somewhat worse, because the cash capital spending needed by AMC to keep its theaters attractive to a shrinking audience should exceed its non-cash depreciation/amortization expenses. If capital spending is much lower than I forecast, it is probably because AMC management is conceding that it is in a death spiral and wants to milk what cash it can.\nThe bottom line - no support for investors.AMC’s book value is negative. It appears incapable of earning any material money post-COVID. Its business is in long-term decline due to technology changes, and its new competitors are monster companies – Netflix, Disney, Comcast, etc. – with huge resources. An investor can only look at AMC’s current $55 stock price and with a shudder say, in the immortal words ofTrading Places, “Sell Mortimer, sell!”\nThe speculative play - a short squeeze: A historical cautionary tale\nMillennials did not invent the short squeeze. It has been around almost as long financial markets have existed. The bookBusiness Adventuresby John Brooks,published way back in 1969, tells a vivid tale of a short squeeze even farther back, in the early 1920s. Literally a century ago. I’m going to quote from the book to suggest how the story ends for speculations with no investor support. So pour yourself some illegal hooch (we’re heading to the Prohibition Era) and read on. This is the story of Clarence Saunders, the founder of Piggly Wiggly Stores, the first supermarket; the Amazon of his day.\nShorts went after Clarence’s stock in 1922, driving it from $50 to below $40. Saunders vowed revenge with a short squeeze. Here are excerpts of Mr. Brooks’ recounting of the story:\n\n “\n Saunders…bought 33,000 shares of Piggly Wiggly, mostly from short sellers; within a week he had brought the total to 105,000 – more than half of the 200,000 shares outstanding. The effectiveness of Saunders’ buying campaign was readily apparent; by late January of 1923 it had driven he price up over $60…”\n\nThe sole short squeezer of yore has been replaced by herds of “apes” today, and the apes have been far better in driving up prices. By the way, believe it or not, a group of apes is apparently called a “shrewdness”. A group of apes is shrewd – interesting.\n\n “\n He had made himself a bundle and had demonstrated how a poor Southern boy could teach the city slickers a lesson.”\n\nToday we have apes sticking it to hedge funds.\n\n “\n One of the great hazards in the Corner was always that even though a player might defeat his opponents, he would discover that he had won a Pyrrhic victory. Once the short sellers had been squeezed dry, the cornerer might find that the reams of stock he had accumulated in the process were a dead weight around his neck; by pushing it all back into the market, he would drive its price down to zero.”\n\nSomething to think about. What was Saunders to do?\n\n “[\n Saunders’] solution was to sell his $55 shares on the installment plan. In his February advertisements, he stipulated that the public could buy shares only by paying $25 down and the balance in three $10 installments.”\n\nPretty clever, no? No:\n\n “\n At the end of the third day, the total number of shares subscribed for was still under 25,000, and the sales that were made were canceled. Saunders had to admit that the drive had been a failure.”\n\nUh oh. What now?\n\n“On August 22nd, the New York auction firm of Adrian H. Muller & Son…knocked down 1,500 shares of Piggly Wiggly at $1 a share…The following spring Saunders went through formal bankruptcy proceedings.”\n\nOuch.\nBuyers beware\nAs Jason Zweig noted above, speculators depend upon finding a buyer at a higher price. Today’s holders of AMC stock certainly have made life painful for many short sellers. But are there really enough new buyers to take out current shareholders above AMC’s present $28 billion market cap? Especially with the gravity of no earnings constantly weighing on the stock?\nAMC shareholders, don’t win Clarence Saunders’ Pyrrhic victory. Take your $55 a share and run. Fast. Before the other speculating holders do so first.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"AMC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":2043,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"lives":[]}