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2021-07-29
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Credit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称瑞士信贷未能对 Archegos 风险采取行动</blockquote>
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It also ignored staff warnings before the family investment firm’s collapse.</p><p><blockquote>周四发布的这份由瑞士信贷律师事务所编写的报告详细介绍了该银行多年来如何给予 Archegos 特殊豁免，以避免旨在保护该银行的规则。在这家家族投资公司倒闭之前，它还无视了员工的警告。</blockquote></p><p> Archegos rocked Wall Street when large, concentrated positions it held in a few stocks went sour. Banks lost more than $10 billion exiting the trades. Credit Suisse fared the worst among Archegos’s lending banks, with more than $5.5 billion in losses. Archegos managed the family fortune of Bill Hwang, a former hedge-fund manager.</p><p><blockquote>Archegos 在少数股票中持有的大量集中头寸化为乌有，震惊了华尔街。银行因退出交易而损失超过 100 亿美元。瑞士信贷在 Archegos 的贷款银行中表现最差，亏损超过 55 亿美元。Archegos 管理着前对冲基金经理 Bill Hwang 的家族财富。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse said Thursday it had lowered its overall risk appetite across the bank, adjusted its governance and is adding more people in risk management. It said all hedge-fund clients in the prime brokerage unit that traded with Archegos have been moved to a dynamic margining system—an upgrade of an earlier system that contributed to the losses.</p><p><blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，已降低全行整体风险偏好，调整了治理，并增加了更多风险管理人员。该公司表示，与 Archegos 进行交易的主要经纪部门中所有对冲基金客户都已转移到动态保证金系统——这是导致亏损的早期系统的升级。</blockquote></p><p> The Archegos losses, along with the collapse of Credit Suisse client Greensill Capital, prompted an existential rethink for the Swiss bank, which marries a giant wealth management business catering to the global rich along with a significant Wall Street presence serving corporations, hedge funds and companies. Nearly two dozen executives have left the bank.</p><p><blockquote>Archegos 的亏损，以及瑞士信贷客户 Greensill Capital 的倒闭，促使这家瑞士银行重新思考存在主义，该银行将迎合全球富人的庞大财富管理业务与服务于企业、对冲基金和公司的重要华尔街业务结合在一起。近二十多名高管已离开该银行。</blockquote></p><p> The report, produced by law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, details a dysfunctional culture around protecting the bank from risks.</p><p><blockquote>这份由 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP 律师事务所制作的报告详细描述了围绕保护银行免受风险的功能失调文化。</blockquote></p><p> “The business was focused on maximizing short-term profits and failed to rein in and, indeed, enabled Archegos’s voracious risk-taking,” the report said. “There were numerous warning signals” that Archegos’s positions posed potentially catastrophic risk” to Credit Suisse.</p><p><blockquote>“报告称：”该业务专注于实现短期利润最大化，未能控制住局面，事实上，这助长了 Archegos 的贪婪冒险行为。“有许多警告信号”表明，Archegos 的头寸对瑞士信贷构成了潜在的灾难性风险。</blockquote></p><p> The report doesn’t identify executives by name, but singles out for blame the bank’s then-head of equities and the risk managers involved in monitoring the Archegos trades. They “failed to heed these signs, despite evidence that some individuals did raise concerns appropriately.”</p><p><blockquote>报告没有指名道姓的高管，但指责该银行时任股票主管和参与监督 Archegos 交易的风险经理。他们 “没有注意到这些迹象，尽管有证据表明有些人确实提出了适当的担忧”。</blockquote></p><p> Senior executives were late to find out about the situation, according to the report. The bank’s chief executive, Thomas Gottstein, said Thursday, “I only heard about Archegos basically when it hit the news. I wasn’t aware even about the existence of Archegos.”</p><p><blockquote>报道称，高级管理人员发现这一情况太晚了。该银行首席执行官托马斯-戈特斯坦（Thomas Gottstein）周四表示：“我基本上是在 Archegos 的消息传出时才听说的。我甚至不知道 Archegos 的存在。”</blockquote></p><p> It found many of the employees involved were more focused on using superficial fixes. This included allowing Archegos to hedge its massive positions in just a few stocks with options tied to broad stock indexes. Credit risk managers questioned if those would effectively offset risks, but didn’t sufficiently challenge the move.</p><p><blockquote>它发现许多相关员工更专注于使用肤浅的修复。这包括允许 Archegos 通过与广泛股票指数挂钩的期权来对冲其在少数股票中的大量头寸。信用风险经理质疑这些措施是否能有效抵消风险，但并未对此举提出充分质疑。</blockquote></p><p> It said the bank’s prime services business, which manages trades and financing for hedge funds, had “a lackadaisical attitude towards risk and risk discipline.”</p><p><blockquote>报告称，该银行为对冲基金管理交易和融资的优质服务业务 “对风险和风险纪律态度迟钝”。</blockquote></p><p> The report details Credit Suisse’s long history with Mr. Hwang, stretching back to his days running a hedge fund called Tiger Asia Management in 2003. He specialized in trading Asian stocks, taking long and short positions.</p><p><blockquote>报告详细介绍了瑞士信贷与黄先生的悠久历史，可以追溯到2003年他经营一家名为老虎亚洲管理公司的对冲基金。他专门交易亚洲股票，做多头和空头头寸。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse stuck with Mr. Hwang even after Tiger Asia settled insider trading allegations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and pleaded guilty to federal wire fraud charges in 2012.</p><p><blockquote>即使在 Tiger Asia 与美国证券交易委员会就内幕交易指控达成和解，并于 2012 年承认联邦电信欺诈指控后，瑞士信贷仍与黄先生保持联系。</blockquote></p><p> When Tiger Asia was banned from trading in Hong Kong, Credit Suisse helped Mr. Hwang move his trading activity—rechristened under the Archegos name—to New York, where he invested in U.S.-listed Asian companies, relaunching with around $500 million.</p><p><blockquote>当Tiger Asia被禁止在香港交易时，瑞士信贷帮助黄先生将他的交易活动（更名为Archegos）转移到纽约，在那里他投资了在美国上市的亚洲公司，并以约5亿美元的资金重新启动。</blockquote></p><p> “We have seen no evidence that CS applied any additional scrutiny to Tiger Asia or Hwang in response to these matters,” the report said.</p><p><blockquote>“报告称：”我们没有看到任何证据表明 CS 针对这些问题对 Tiger Asia 或 Hwang 进行了任何额外的审查。</blockquote></p><p> His assets swelled to $3.9 billion in 2016.</p><p><blockquote>他的资产在2016年膨胀到39亿美元。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse began waiving risk protections related to Mr. Hwang well before Archegos collapsed. In 2017, changes in Mr. Hwang’s trading prompted a 10% margin call, a common request by a bank to post more cash to back up positions as they became riskier. Credit Suisse waived the requirement and created a “bespoke weekly monitoring of Archegos.”</p><p><blockquote>早在 Archegos 倒闭之前，瑞士信贷就开始放弃与黄先生相关的风险保护。2017 年，黄先生交易的变化引发了 10% 的保证金看涨期权，这是银行的常见要求，要求在头寸风险增加时注入更多现金来支持头寸。瑞士信贷放弃了这一要求，并创建了 “对 Archegos 的定制每周监测”。</blockquote></p><p> Then in 2019, Archegos asked to lower its margin requirement, saying competitors were offering a better deal. The margin on the stock-linked derivatives he liked to invest in, known as total return swaps, dropped to 7.5% of the total invested from around 20%.</p><p><blockquote>然后在 2019 年，Archegos 要求降低利润率要求，称竞争对手提供了更好的交易。他喜欢投资的股票挂钩衍生品（称为总回报掉期）的利润率从投资总额的 20% 左右降至 7.5%。</blockquote></p><p> In return, Archegos agreed to give Credit Suisse more power to close out its positions with little notice. But the report says these protections were “illusory, as the business appears to have had no intention of invoking them for fear of alienating the client.”</p><p><blockquote>作为回报，Archegos 同意给予瑞士信贷更多权力，在几乎没有通知的情况下平仓。但报告称，这些保护措施 “是虚幻的，因为企业似乎无意援引这些保护措施，因为担心疏远客户”。</blockquote></p><p> Archegos’s trading took off in the spring of 2020. As its positions swelled, Archegos repeatedly breached key limits Credit Suisse risk managers had set.</p><p><blockquote>Archegos 的交易于 2020 年春季开始。随着其头寸的增加，Archegos 多次突破瑞士信贷风险经理设定的关键限额。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> One type of limit, known as “potential exposure,” or the maximum the bank was likely to lose if markets went against Archegos, was set at $20 million. In April 2020, it was more than $200 million. By August, it swelled to $530 million. Risk managers ignored the warning, figuring a change in the bank’s methodology implemented earlier in the year had thrown off the calculation.</p><p><blockquote>一种被称为 “潜在风险敞口 ”的限额，即如果市场对 Archegos 不利，银行可能损失的最高限额，被设定为 2000 万美元。2020年4月，超过2亿美元。到 8 月份，这一数字已增至 5.3 亿美元。风险经理们无视了这一警告，认为今年早些时候银行实施的方法变化打乱了计算。</blockquote></p><p> Many of the findings of the report echo reporting from a June page one article in The Wall Street Journal, which highlighted the bank’s creaky risk-management systems that left it exposed to human errors in judgment.</p><p><blockquote>报告中的许多调查结果与《华尔街日报》6 月份头版的一篇文章相呼应，该文章强调了该银行脆弱的风险管理系统，使其在判断上容易出现人为错误。</blockquote></p><p> The report described what it called a “juniorization” of staff as experienced personnel left and a lack of investment in risk technology. Poor governance meant some key staff had to perform multiple roles, and they described feeling overwhelmed by the data and information they had to digest.</p><p><blockquote>该报告描述了所谓的“初级化”，因为有经验的人员离开了，而且缺乏对风险技术的投资。治理不善意味着一些关键员工必须扮演多种角色，他们描述说，他们对必须消化的数据和信息感到不知所措。</blockquote></p><p> The problems were amplified by a geographic split between New York and London, with neither co-head of prime services in the different cities believing he was responsible for supervising the Archegos relationship, according to the report.</p><p><blockquote>报告称，纽约和伦敦之间的地理分歧加剧了这些问题，两个城市的主要服务联席负责人都不认为他负责监督Archegos的关系。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse on Thursday said it would look to reduce its use of co-headed positions and multi-hatted roles.</p><p><blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，将寻求减少对联合领导职位和多重角色的使用。</blockquote></p><p> The report listed repeated warning signs that the bank failed to act upon.</p><p><blockquote>该报告列出了银行未能采取行动的反复警告信号。</blockquote></p><p> In September 2020, a credit risk manager escalated concerns about the trades to his supervisor. An oversight committee reviewed the positions at a meeting that month but planned actions weren’t taken, the report said.</p><p><blockquote>2020 年 9 月，一名信用风险经理向其主管提出了对这些交易的担忧。报告称，一个监督委员会在当月的一次会议上审查了这些职位，但没有采取任何计划行动。</blockquote></p><p> Early in 2021, credit risk managers cut Archegos’s internal credit rating citing the firm’s “high performance volatility, concentrated portfolio, and increased use of leverage.” By Archegos’s own estimate, according to the report, it would take between two weeks and a month to liquidate its portfolio, a dangerously long time.</p><p><blockquote>2021 年初，信用风险经理下调了 Archegos 的内部信用评级，理由是该公司 “业绩波动性高、投资组合集中、杠杆使用增加”。根据 Archegos 自己的估计，清算其投资组合需要两周到一个月的时间，这是一个危险的漫长时间。</blockquote></p><p> The credit risk managers discussed requiring more margin collateral from Archegos, estimating it needed to post around another $1 billion, but the request was never made.</p><p><blockquote>信用风险经理讨论了要求 Archegos 提供更多保证金抵押品，估计需要再提供约 10 亿美元，但这一请求从未提出。</blockquote></p><p> In March, the counterparty oversight committee again discussed Archegos, by then the prime brokerage unit’s largest client in terms of position size. The committee decided Archegos would be moved to a dynamic margining system within the next couple of weeks, and if not Credit Suisse would ask for additional margin.</p><p><blockquote>今年 3 月，交易对手监督委员会再次讨论了 Archegos，按头寸规模计算，Archegos 是当时主要经纪部门最大的客户。委员会决定，Archegos 将在未来几周内转入动态保证金系统，否则瑞士信贷将要求额外保证金。</blockquote></p><p> The dynamic margining, which incorporates more real-time data such as market volatility and position concentration into margin calculations, would have made the trades safer, according to the report. In mid-March, Credit Suisse calculated Archegos would have to put up an additional $1.4 billion margin, and told Archegos it wanted to implement the new system the next week.</p><p><blockquote>报告称，动态保证金将市场波动性和头寸集中度等更多实时数据纳入保证金计算中，将使交易更加安全。3月中旬，瑞士信贷计算出Archegos将不得不额外支付14亿美元的利润，并告诉Archegos，它希望在下周实施新系统。</blockquote></p><p> Instead, Archegos canceled calls to discuss the step, and began requesting back margin it had at the bank, since the value of the shares it invested in—including ViacomCBS,Inc. and Discovery Inc.,had skyrocketed. In a fateful decision, Credit Suisse returned $2.4 billion in margin collateral to Archegos between March 1 and March 19.</p><p><blockquote>相反，Archegos 取消了评级来讨论这一举措，并开始要求退还其在银行的保证金，因为它投资的股票（包括 ViacomCBS, Inc.）的价值。发现公司的股价暴涨。在一个决定性的决定中，瑞士信贷在3月1日至3月19日期间向Archegos返还了24亿美元的保证金抵押品。</blockquote></p><p> On March 23, Credit Suisse’s gross exposure to Archegos had grown to $27 billion.</p><p><blockquote>截至 3 月 23 日，瑞士信贷对 Archegos 的总敞口已增至 270 亿美元。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse released the Archegos report alongside its second-quarter earnings, which were worse than analysts expected and stood in contrast to a strong performance at other European banks. It reported billions in outflows from clients in Asia, which the bank attributed mainly to “proactive de-risking” to cut or reduce ties to some customers.</p><p><blockquote>瑞士信贷在发布第二季度收益的同时发布了 Archegos 报告，该报告逊于分析师预期，与其他欧洲银行的强劲表现形成鲜明对比。该银行报告称，亚洲客户流出数十亿美元，这主要归因于 “主动去风险”，以切断或减少与某些客户的联系。</blockquote></p><p> The report was commissioned by a special committee of Credit Suisse’s board, which included former longtime bank executive Richard Meddings and former JPMorgan Chase& Co. executive Blythe Masters. Paul Weiss’s Chairman Brad Karp oversaw the investigation.</p><p><blockquote>这份报告是由瑞士信贷董事会的一个特别委员会委托撰写的，该委员会成员包括该行前长期高管理查德-梅丁斯（Richard Meddings）和摩根大通前高管布莱斯-马斯特斯（Blythe Masters）。保罗-韦斯的董事长布拉德-卡普（Brad Karp）负责监督调查。</blockquote></p><p></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Credit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称瑞士信贷未能对 Archegos 风险采取行动</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nCredit Suisse Failed to Act on Archegos Risks, Report Says<blockquote>报告称瑞士信贷未能对 Archegos 风险采取行动</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">The Wall Street Journal</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-07-29 20:54</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p>Credit Suisse GroupAG knew Archegos Capital Management was a massive risk and didn’t take actions to fix it, according to an investigation the bank commissioned into the collapse of the family investment firm.</p><p><blockquote>根据瑞士信贷集团委托对这家家族投资公司倒闭进行的调查，瑞士信贷集团知道 Archegos Capital Management 存在巨大风险，但没有采取行动加以解决。</blockquote></p><p> The report released Thursday, prepared by a law firm for Credit Suisse, detailed how the bank for years granted Archegos special dispensation to avoid rules meant to protect the bank. It also ignored staff warnings before the family investment firm’s collapse.</p><p><blockquote>周四发布的这份由瑞士信贷律师事务所编写的报告详细介绍了该银行多年来如何给予 Archegos 特殊豁免，以避免旨在保护该银行的规则。在这家家族投资公司倒闭之前，它还无视了员工的警告。</blockquote></p><p> Archegos rocked Wall Street when large, concentrated positions it held in a few stocks went sour. Banks lost more than $10 billion exiting the trades. Credit Suisse fared the worst among Archegos’s lending banks, with more than $5.5 billion in losses. Archegos managed the family fortune of Bill Hwang, a former hedge-fund manager.</p><p><blockquote>Archegos 在少数股票中持有的大量集中头寸化为乌有，震惊了华尔街。银行因退出交易而损失超过 100 亿美元。瑞士信贷在 Archegos 的贷款银行中表现最差，亏损超过 55 亿美元。Archegos 管理着前对冲基金经理 Bill Hwang 的家族财富。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse said Thursday it had lowered its overall risk appetite across the bank, adjusted its governance and is adding more people in risk management. It said all hedge-fund clients in the prime brokerage unit that traded with Archegos have been moved to a dynamic margining system—an upgrade of an earlier system that contributed to the losses.</p><p><blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，已降低全行整体风险偏好，调整了治理，并增加了更多风险管理人员。该公司表示，与 Archegos 进行交易的主要经纪部门中所有对冲基金客户都已转移到动态保证金系统——这是导致亏损的早期系统的升级。</blockquote></p><p> The Archegos losses, along with the collapse of Credit Suisse client Greensill Capital, prompted an existential rethink for the Swiss bank, which marries a giant wealth management business catering to the global rich along with a significant Wall Street presence serving corporations, hedge funds and companies. Nearly two dozen executives have left the bank.</p><p><blockquote>Archegos 的亏损，以及瑞士信贷客户 Greensill Capital 的倒闭，促使这家瑞士银行重新思考存在主义，该银行将迎合全球富人的庞大财富管理业务与服务于企业、对冲基金和公司的重要华尔街业务结合在一起。近二十多名高管已离开该银行。</blockquote></p><p> The report, produced by law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, details a dysfunctional culture around protecting the bank from risks.</p><p><blockquote>这份由 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP 律师事务所制作的报告详细描述了围绕保护银行免受风险的功能失调文化。</blockquote></p><p> “The business was focused on maximizing short-term profits and failed to rein in and, indeed, enabled Archegos’s voracious risk-taking,” the report said. “There were numerous warning signals” that Archegos’s positions posed potentially catastrophic risk” to Credit Suisse.</p><p><blockquote>“报告称：”该业务专注于实现短期利润最大化，未能控制住局面，事实上，这助长了 Archegos 的贪婪冒险行为。“有许多警告信号”表明，Archegos 的头寸对瑞士信贷构成了潜在的灾难性风险。</blockquote></p><p> The report doesn’t identify executives by name, but singles out for blame the bank’s then-head of equities and the risk managers involved in monitoring the Archegos trades. They “failed to heed these signs, despite evidence that some individuals did raise concerns appropriately.”</p><p><blockquote>报告没有指名道姓的高管，但指责该银行时任股票主管和参与监督 Archegos 交易的风险经理。他们 “没有注意到这些迹象，尽管有证据表明有些人确实提出了适当的担忧”。</blockquote></p><p> Senior executives were late to find out about the situation, according to the report. The bank’s chief executive, Thomas Gottstein, said Thursday, “I only heard about Archegos basically when it hit the news. I wasn’t aware even about the existence of Archegos.”</p><p><blockquote>报道称，高级管理人员发现这一情况太晚了。该银行首席执行官托马斯-戈特斯坦（Thomas Gottstein）周四表示：“我基本上是在 Archegos 的消息传出时才听说的。我甚至不知道 Archegos 的存在。”</blockquote></p><p> It found many of the employees involved were more focused on using superficial fixes. This included allowing Archegos to hedge its massive positions in just a few stocks with options tied to broad stock indexes. Credit risk managers questioned if those would effectively offset risks, but didn’t sufficiently challenge the move.</p><p><blockquote>它发现许多相关员工更专注于使用肤浅的修复。这包括允许 Archegos 通过与广泛股票指数挂钩的期权来对冲其在少数股票中的大量头寸。信用风险经理质疑这些措施是否能有效抵消风险，但并未对此举提出充分质疑。</blockquote></p><p> It said the bank’s prime services business, which manages trades and financing for hedge funds, had “a lackadaisical attitude towards risk and risk discipline.”</p><p><blockquote>报告称，该银行为对冲基金管理交易和融资的优质服务业务 “对风险和风险纪律态度迟钝”。</blockquote></p><p> The report details Credit Suisse’s long history with Mr. Hwang, stretching back to his days running a hedge fund called Tiger Asia Management in 2003. He specialized in trading Asian stocks, taking long and short positions.</p><p><blockquote>报告详细介绍了瑞士信贷与黄先生的悠久历史，可以追溯到2003年他经营一家名为老虎亚洲管理公司的对冲基金。他专门交易亚洲股票，做多头和空头头寸。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse stuck with Mr. Hwang even after Tiger Asia settled insider trading allegations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and pleaded guilty to federal wire fraud charges in 2012.</p><p><blockquote>即使在 Tiger Asia 与美国证券交易委员会就内幕交易指控达成和解，并于 2012 年承认联邦电信欺诈指控后，瑞士信贷仍与黄先生保持联系。</blockquote></p><p> When Tiger Asia was banned from trading in Hong Kong, Credit Suisse helped Mr. Hwang move his trading activity—rechristened under the Archegos name—to New York, where he invested in U.S.-listed Asian companies, relaunching with around $500 million.</p><p><blockquote>当Tiger Asia被禁止在香港交易时，瑞士信贷帮助黄先生将他的交易活动（更名为Archegos）转移到纽约，在那里他投资了在美国上市的亚洲公司，并以约5亿美元的资金重新启动。</blockquote></p><p> “We have seen no evidence that CS applied any additional scrutiny to Tiger Asia or Hwang in response to these matters,” the report said.</p><p><blockquote>“报告称：”我们没有看到任何证据表明 CS 针对这些问题对 Tiger Asia 或 Hwang 进行了任何额外的审查。</blockquote></p><p> His assets swelled to $3.9 billion in 2016.</p><p><blockquote>他的资产在2016年膨胀到39亿美元。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse began waiving risk protections related to Mr. Hwang well before Archegos collapsed. In 2017, changes in Mr. Hwang’s trading prompted a 10% margin call, a common request by a bank to post more cash to back up positions as they became riskier. Credit Suisse waived the requirement and created a “bespoke weekly monitoring of Archegos.”</p><p><blockquote>早在 Archegos 倒闭之前，瑞士信贷就开始放弃与黄先生相关的风险保护。2017 年，黄先生交易的变化引发了 10% 的保证金看涨期权，这是银行的常见要求，要求在头寸风险增加时注入更多现金来支持头寸。瑞士信贷放弃了这一要求，并创建了 “对 Archegos 的定制每周监测”。</blockquote></p><p> Then in 2019, Archegos asked to lower its margin requirement, saying competitors were offering a better deal. The margin on the stock-linked derivatives he liked to invest in, known as total return swaps, dropped to 7.5% of the total invested from around 20%.</p><p><blockquote>然后在 2019 年，Archegos 要求降低利润率要求，称竞争对手提供了更好的交易。他喜欢投资的股票挂钩衍生品（称为总回报掉期）的利润率从投资总额的 20% 左右降至 7.5%。</blockquote></p><p> In return, Archegos agreed to give Credit Suisse more power to close out its positions with little notice. But the report says these protections were “illusory, as the business appears to have had no intention of invoking them for fear of alienating the client.”</p><p><blockquote>作为回报，Archegos 同意给予瑞士信贷更多权力，在几乎没有通知的情况下平仓。但报告称，这些保护措施 “是虚幻的，因为企业似乎无意援引这些保护措施，因为担心疏远客户”。</blockquote></p><p> Archegos’s trading took off in the spring of 2020. As its positions swelled, Archegos repeatedly breached key limits Credit Suisse risk managers had set.</p><p><blockquote>Archegos 的交易于 2020 年春季开始。随着其头寸的增加，Archegos 多次突破瑞士信贷风险经理设定的关键限额。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> One type of limit, known as “potential exposure,” or the maximum the bank was likely to lose if markets went against Archegos, was set at $20 million. In April 2020, it was more than $200 million. By August, it swelled to $530 million. Risk managers ignored the warning, figuring a change in the bank’s methodology implemented earlier in the year had thrown off the calculation.</p><p><blockquote>一种被称为 “潜在风险敞口 ”的限额，即如果市场对 Archegos 不利，银行可能损失的最高限额，被设定为 2000 万美元。2020年4月，超过2亿美元。到 8 月份，这一数字已增至 5.3 亿美元。风险经理们无视了这一警告，认为今年早些时候银行实施的方法变化打乱了计算。</blockquote></p><p> Many of the findings of the report echo reporting from a June page one article in The Wall Street Journal, which highlighted the bank’s creaky risk-management systems that left it exposed to human errors in judgment.</p><p><blockquote>报告中的许多调查结果与《华尔街日报》6 月份头版的一篇文章相呼应，该文章强调了该银行脆弱的风险管理系统，使其在判断上容易出现人为错误。</blockquote></p><p> The report described what it called a “juniorization” of staff as experienced personnel left and a lack of investment in risk technology. Poor governance meant some key staff had to perform multiple roles, and they described feeling overwhelmed by the data and information they had to digest.</p><p><blockquote>该报告描述了所谓的“初级化”，因为有经验的人员离开了，而且缺乏对风险技术的投资。治理不善意味着一些关键员工必须扮演多种角色，他们描述说，他们对必须消化的数据和信息感到不知所措。</blockquote></p><p> The problems were amplified by a geographic split between New York and London, with neither co-head of prime services in the different cities believing he was responsible for supervising the Archegos relationship, according to the report.</p><p><blockquote>报告称，纽约和伦敦之间的地理分歧加剧了这些问题，两个城市的主要服务联席负责人都不认为他负责监督Archegos的关系。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse on Thursday said it would look to reduce its use of co-headed positions and multi-hatted roles.</p><p><blockquote>瑞士信贷周四表示，将寻求减少对联合领导职位和多重角色的使用。</blockquote></p><p> The report listed repeated warning signs that the bank failed to act upon.</p><p><blockquote>该报告列出了银行未能采取行动的反复警告信号。</blockquote></p><p> In September 2020, a credit risk manager escalated concerns about the trades to his supervisor. An oversight committee reviewed the positions at a meeting that month but planned actions weren’t taken, the report said.</p><p><blockquote>2020 年 9 月，一名信用风险经理向其主管提出了对这些交易的担忧。报告称，一个监督委员会在当月的一次会议上审查了这些职位，但没有采取任何计划行动。</blockquote></p><p> Early in 2021, credit risk managers cut Archegos’s internal credit rating citing the firm’s “high performance volatility, concentrated portfolio, and increased use of leverage.” By Archegos’s own estimate, according to the report, it would take between two weeks and a month to liquidate its portfolio, a dangerously long time.</p><p><blockquote>2021 年初，信用风险经理下调了 Archegos 的内部信用评级，理由是该公司 “业绩波动性高、投资组合集中、杠杆使用增加”。根据 Archegos 自己的估计，清算其投资组合需要两周到一个月的时间，这是一个危险的漫长时间。</blockquote></p><p> The credit risk managers discussed requiring more margin collateral from Archegos, estimating it needed to post around another $1 billion, but the request was never made.</p><p><blockquote>信用风险经理讨论了要求 Archegos 提供更多保证金抵押品，估计需要再提供约 10 亿美元，但这一请求从未提出。</blockquote></p><p> In March, the counterparty oversight committee again discussed Archegos, by then the prime brokerage unit’s largest client in terms of position size. The committee decided Archegos would be moved to a dynamic margining system within the next couple of weeks, and if not Credit Suisse would ask for additional margin.</p><p><blockquote>今年 3 月，交易对手监督委员会再次讨论了 Archegos，按头寸规模计算，Archegos 是当时主要经纪部门最大的客户。委员会决定，Archegos 将在未来几周内转入动态保证金系统，否则瑞士信贷将要求额外保证金。</blockquote></p><p> The dynamic margining, which incorporates more real-time data such as market volatility and position concentration into margin calculations, would have made the trades safer, according to the report. In mid-March, Credit Suisse calculated Archegos would have to put up an additional $1.4 billion margin, and told Archegos it wanted to implement the new system the next week.</p><p><blockquote>报告称，动态保证金将市场波动性和头寸集中度等更多实时数据纳入保证金计算中，将使交易更加安全。3月中旬，瑞士信贷计算出Archegos将不得不额外支付14亿美元的利润，并告诉Archegos，它希望在下周实施新系统。</blockquote></p><p> Instead, Archegos canceled calls to discuss the step, and began requesting back margin it had at the bank, since the value of the shares it invested in—including ViacomCBS,Inc. and Discovery Inc.,had skyrocketed. In a fateful decision, Credit Suisse returned $2.4 billion in margin collateral to Archegos between March 1 and March 19.</p><p><blockquote>相反，Archegos 取消了评级来讨论这一举措，并开始要求退还其在银行的保证金，因为它投资的股票（包括 ViacomCBS, Inc.）的价值。发现公司的股价暴涨。在一个决定性的决定中，瑞士信贷在3月1日至3月19日期间向Archegos返还了24亿美元的保证金抵押品。</blockquote></p><p> On March 23, Credit Suisse’s gross exposure to Archegos had grown to $27 billion.</p><p><blockquote>截至 3 月 23 日，瑞士信贷对 Archegos 的总敞口已增至 270 亿美元。</blockquote></p><p> Credit Suisse released the Archegos report alongside its second-quarter earnings, which were worse than analysts expected and stood in contrast to a strong performance at other European banks. It reported billions in outflows from clients in Asia, which the bank attributed mainly to “proactive de-risking” to cut or reduce ties to some customers.</p><p><blockquote>瑞士信贷在发布第二季度收益的同时发布了 Archegos 报告，该报告逊于分析师预期，与其他欧洲银行的强劲表现形成鲜明对比。该银行报告称，亚洲客户流出数十亿美元，这主要归因于 “主动去风险”，以切断或减少与某些客户的联系。</blockquote></p><p> The report was commissioned by a special committee of Credit Suisse’s board, which included former longtime bank executive Richard Meddings and former JPMorgan Chase& Co. executive Blythe Masters. Paul Weiss’s Chairman Brad Karp oversaw the investigation.</p><p><blockquote>这份报告是由瑞士信贷董事会的一个特别委员会委托撰写的，该委员会成员包括该行前长期高管理查德-梅丁斯（Richard Meddings）和摩根大通前高管布莱斯-马斯特斯（Blythe Masters）。保罗-韦斯的董事长布拉德-卡普（Brad Karp）负责监督调查。</blockquote></p><p></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> 来源：<a href=\"https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-suisse-report-pins-archegos-disaster-on-fundamental-failure-of-management-and-controls-11627537722?mod=hp_lead_pos4\">The Wall Street Journal</a></p>\n<p>为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化</p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{},"source_url":"https://www.wsj.com/articles/credit-suisse-report-pins-archegos-disaster-on-fundamental-failure-of-management-and-controls-11627537722?mod=hp_lead_pos4","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1164040651","content_text":"Credit Suisse GroupAG knew Archegos Capital Management was a massive risk and didn’t take actions to fix it, according to an investigation the bank commissioned into the collapse of the family investment firm.\nThe report released Thursday, prepared by a law firm for Credit Suisse, detailed how the bank for years granted Archegos special dispensation to avoid rules meant to protect the bank. It also ignored staff warnings before the family investment firm’s collapse.\nArchegos rocked Wall Street when large, concentrated positions it held in a few stocks went sour. Banks lost more than $10 billion exiting the trades. Credit Suisse fared the worst among Archegos’s lending banks, with more than $5.5 billion in losses. Archegos managed the family fortune of Bill Hwang, a former hedge-fund manager.\nCredit Suisse said Thursday it had lowered its overall risk appetite across the bank, adjusted its governance and is adding more people in risk management. It said all hedge-fund clients in the prime brokerage unit that traded with Archegos have been moved to a dynamic margining system—an upgrade of an earlier system that contributed to the losses.\nThe Archegos losses, along with the collapse of Credit Suisse client Greensill Capital, prompted an existential rethink for the Swiss bank, which marries a giant wealth management business catering to the global rich along with a significant Wall Street presence serving corporations, hedge funds and companies. Nearly two dozen executives have left the bank.\nThe report, produced by law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, details a dysfunctional culture around protecting the bank from risks.\n“The business was focused on maximizing short-term profits and failed to rein in and, indeed, enabled Archegos’s voracious risk-taking,” the report said. “There were numerous warning signals” that Archegos’s positions posed potentially catastrophic risk” to Credit Suisse.\nThe report doesn’t identify executives by name, but singles out for blame the bank’s then-head of equities and the risk managers involved in monitoring the Archegos trades. They “failed to heed these signs, despite evidence that some individuals did raise concerns appropriately.”\nSenior executives were late to find out about the situation, according to the report. The bank’s chief executive, Thomas Gottstein, said Thursday, “I only heard about Archegos basically when it hit the news. I wasn’t aware even about the existence of Archegos.”\nIt found many of the employees involved were more focused on using superficial fixes. This included allowing Archegos to hedge its massive positions in just a few stocks with options tied to broad stock indexes. Credit risk managers questioned if those would effectively offset risks, but didn’t sufficiently challenge the move.\nIt said the bank’s prime services business, which manages trades and financing for hedge funds, had “a lackadaisical attitude towards risk and risk discipline.”\nThe report details Credit Suisse’s long history with Mr. Hwang, stretching back to his days running a hedge fund called Tiger Asia Management in 2003. He specialized in trading Asian stocks, taking long and short positions.\nCredit Suisse stuck with Mr. Hwang even after Tiger Asia settled insider trading allegations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and pleaded guilty to federal wire fraud charges in 2012.\nWhen Tiger Asia was banned from trading in Hong Kong, Credit Suisse helped Mr. Hwang move his trading activity—rechristened under the Archegos name—to New York, where he invested in U.S.-listed Asian companies, relaunching with around $500 million.\n“We have seen no evidence that CS applied any additional scrutiny to Tiger Asia or Hwang in response to these matters,” the report said.\nHis assets swelled to $3.9 billion in 2016.\nCredit Suisse began waiving risk protections related to Mr. Hwang well before Archegos collapsed. In 2017, changes in Mr. Hwang’s trading prompted a 10% margin call, a common request by a bank to post more cash to back up positions as they became riskier. Credit Suisse waived the requirement and created a “bespoke weekly monitoring of Archegos.”\nThen in 2019, Archegos asked to lower its margin requirement, saying competitors were offering a better deal. The margin on the stock-linked derivatives he liked to invest in, known as total return swaps, dropped to 7.5% of the total invested from around 20%.\nIn return, Archegos agreed to give Credit Suisse more power to close out its positions with little notice. But the report says these protections were “illusory, as the business appears to have had no intention of invoking them for fear of alienating the client.”\nArchegos’s trading took off in the spring of 2020. As its positions swelled, Archegos repeatedly breached key limits Credit Suisse risk managers had set.\nOne type of limit, known as “potential exposure,” or the maximum the bank was likely to lose if markets went against Archegos, was set at $20 million. In April 2020, it was more than $200 million. By August, it swelled to $530 million. Risk managers ignored the warning, figuring a change in the bank’s methodology implemented earlier in the year had thrown off the calculation.\nMany of the findings of the report echo reporting from a June page one article in The Wall Street Journal, which highlighted the bank’s creaky risk-management systems that left it exposed to human errors in judgment.\nThe report described what it called a “juniorization” of staff as experienced personnel left and a lack of investment in risk technology. Poor governance meant some key staff had to perform multiple roles, and they described feeling overwhelmed by the data and information they had to digest.\nThe problems were amplified by a geographic split between New York and London, with neither co-head of prime services in the different cities believing he was responsible for supervising the Archegos relationship, according to the report.\nCredit Suisse on Thursday said it would look to reduce its use of co-headed positions and multi-hatted roles.\nThe report listed repeated warning signs that the bank failed to act upon.\nIn September 2020, a credit risk manager escalated concerns about the trades to his supervisor. An oversight committee reviewed the positions at a meeting that month but planned actions weren’t taken, the report said.\nEarly in 2021, credit risk managers cut Archegos’s internal credit rating citing the firm’s “high performance volatility, concentrated portfolio, and increased use of leverage.” By Archegos’s own estimate, according to the report, it would take between two weeks and a month to liquidate its portfolio, a dangerously long time.\nThe credit risk managers discussed requiring more margin collateral from Archegos, estimating it needed to post around another $1 billion, but the request was never made.\nIn March, the counterparty oversight committee again discussed Archegos, by then the prime brokerage unit’s largest client in terms of position size. The committee decided Archegos would be moved to a dynamic margining system within the next couple of weeks, and if not Credit Suisse would ask for additional margin.\nThe dynamic margining, which incorporates more real-time data such as market volatility and position concentration into margin calculations, would have made the trades safer, according to the report. In mid-March, Credit Suisse calculated Archegos would have to put up an additional $1.4 billion margin, and told Archegos it wanted to implement the new system the next week.\nInstead, Archegos canceled calls to discuss the step, and began requesting back margin it had at the bank, since the value of the shares it invested in—including ViacomCBS,Inc. and Discovery Inc.,had skyrocketed. In a fateful decision, Credit Suisse returned $2.4 billion in margin collateral to Archegos between March 1 and March 19.\nOn March 23, Credit Suisse’s gross exposure to Archegos had grown to $27 billion.\nCredit Suisse released the Archegos report alongside its second-quarter earnings, which were worse than analysts expected and stood in contrast to a strong performance at other European banks. It reported billions in outflows from clients in Asia, which the bank attributed mainly to “proactive de-risking” to cut or reduce ties to some customers.\nThe report was commissioned by a special committee of Credit Suisse’s board, which included former longtime bank executive Richard Meddings and former JPMorgan Chase& Co. executive Blythe Masters. Paul Weiss’s Chairman Brad Karp oversaw the investigation.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"CS":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":2375,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":5,"subscribersOnly":false,"subscribersOnlyAccessible":false,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/808133325"}
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