Let the too big to fail fail o_老虎社区_美港股上老虎

2021-04-01

Let the too big to fail fail or the rest of the world will be hostage.

Blain: The Market "Has 1929, 1987, 2000 Writ In Bold Blood Letters" All Over It<blockquote>布莱恩：市场“到处都是1929年、1987年、2000年的粗体血书”</blockquote>

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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"detailType":1,"isChannel":false,"data":{"magic":2,"id":357977779,"tweetId":"357977779","gmtCreate":1617236032291,"gmtModify":1634521924356,"author":{"id":3572863493313424,"idStr":"3572863493313424","authorId":3572863493313424,"authorIdStr":"3572863493313424","name":"独羽","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f5a1f0bf416fab28e8c76100cf08b36a","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":3,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>Let the too big to fail fail or the rest of the world will be hostage.</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>Let the too big to fail fail or the rest of the world will be hostage.</body></html>","text":"Let the too big to fail fail or the rest of the world will be hostage.","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/357977779","repostId":1115748452,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1115748452","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1617194837,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1115748452?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-03-31 20:47","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Blain: The Market \"Has 1929, 1987, 2000 Writ In Bold Blood Letters\" All Over It<blockquote>布莱恩：市场“到处都是1929年、1987年、2000年的粗体血书”</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1115748452","media":"zerohedge","summary":"The Tail That Wags The Dog“Daddy was a bankrobber, but he hurt nobody. He just liked to live that wa","content":"The Tail That Wags The Dog<blockquote>摇着狗的尾巴</blockquote>“Daddy was a bankrobber, but he hurt nobody. He just liked to live that way, stealing all your money”<blockquote>“爸爸是个银行抢劫犯，但他没有伤害任何人。他只是喜欢那样生活，偷你所有的钱。”</blockquote>As Greensill and Archegos roil markets and cause losses, they beg the question – who is next? Why is 2021 turning into the year the scams are unravelling? Will leverage on leverage trigger wider implosion or will it be something else, like liquidity?<blockquote>随着Greensill和Archegos扰乱市场并造成损失，他们回避了一个问题——谁是下一个？为什么2021年变成了骗局瓦解的一年？杠杆上的杠杆会引发更广泛的内爆还是会引发流动性等其他问题？</blockquote>Back in the day… Archaos was a terrifying alternative French Circus. They were brilliant and shocking – anarchy on steroids as they juggled chainsaws, played with fire on motorbikes, and ignored the conventions of gravity on the high-wire!<blockquote>在过去……Archaos是一个可怕的另类法国马戏团。他们才华横溢，令人震惊——当他们玩链锯，在摩托车上玩火，在走钢丝上无视重力的惯例时，他们是类固醇上的无政府状态！</blockquote><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc848692ac8eba0454ab758f1b034195\" tg-width=\"500\" tg-height=\"215\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">In contrast, the collapse of Archegos Capital is anything but brilliant.It seems to be a &nbsp;developing theme for 2021: the year the shysters of finance are being revealed as their get-rich-quick schemes unravel. Bill Hwang of Archegos and Lex Greensill share a common trait – being able to insert themselves seamlessly into the game. They have both been exposed – begging the question: Who hasn’t? What other shocks are still embedded in the system?<blockquote>相比之下，Archegos Capital的倒闭一点也不精彩。这似乎是2021年的一个发展中的主题：随着金融骗子的快速致富计划的瓦解，这一年他们将被揭露。Archegos的Bill Hwang和Lex Greensill有一个共同的特点——能够无缝地将自己插入游戏中。他们都被曝光了——这就引出了一个问题：谁没有？系统中还嵌入了哪些其他冲击？</blockquote>I could have started this morning’s porridge with a comment about there being“something rotten in the state of global finance”,but that would be too easy. Everyone in the financial markets is just an actor in the bigger picture, but to understand why market participants act in certain ways and their motivations, or why banks and funds are willing to provide unlimited leverage to clients in overcooked markets, or why bright young bankers enable it, you need to understand the way the institutions work.<blockquote>我本可以在今天早上的粥开始时评论一下“全球金融状况中的一些腐败现象”,但那太容易了。金融市场中的每个人都只是大局中的一个参与者，但要理解为什么市场参与者以某种方式行事及其动机，或者为什么银行和基金愿意在过度烹饪的市场中向客户提供无限的杠杆，或者为什么聪明的年轻银行家能够做到这一点，你需要了解这些机构的工作方式。</blockquote>There isn’t time for a full sociological analysis of the business, but for the last month we’ve seen a deluge of stories about how unfairly young intern bankers are treated – 100-hour weeks and no sleep, while their bosses use the company jet to holiday in the Caribbean and as a taxi back to the big house in the Hamptons. The bosses play that way because that’s what they learnt back in the 80s. They got rich on big bonuses from extracting value from the system by supplying solutions to financial problems. Everyone wants to be the boss. The interns may whine its unfair – welcome to finance.<blockquote>没有时间对该业务进行全面的社会学分析，但上个月我们看到了大量关于年轻实习银行家受到不公平待遇的故事——每周工作100小时，不睡觉，而他们的老板则使用公司飞机去加勒比海度假，并作为出租车返回汉普顿的大房子。老板们这样玩是因为这是他们在80年代学到的。他们通过提供财务问题的解决方案，从系统中榨取价值，从而获得巨额奖金。每个人都想当老板。实习生可能会抱怨这不公平——欢迎来到金融。</blockquote>In Investment Banking – no one is listening when you scream.<blockquote>在投资银行业——当你尖叫时，没有人在听。</blockquote>These same put-upon interns today will be the salespeople and bankers of tomorrow looking for opportunities (and commensurate bonuses) from selling their firms solutions to extract value. The markets move very quickly to the next thing: the hedge funds that were once gaming bank capital, before switching into distressed assets, are now offering to provide leverage – and charging for it. In a world of 0.15% bond yields, clients need leverage to pay the bills. They’ve discovered that leverage on leverage generates returns and big pay-checks.<blockquote>这些今天被欺骗的实习生将成为明天的销售人员和银行家，他们从销售公司的解决方案中寻找机会（和相应的奖金）来获取价值。市场很快转向下一件事：在转向不良资产之前，曾经利用银行资本的对冲基金现在提出提供杠杆——并为此收费。在债券收益率为0.15%的世界里，客户需要杠杆来支付账单。他们发现杠杆上的杠杆会产生回报和丰厚的薪水。</blockquote>Unlike the Bankrobber in this morning’s quote who “hurt nobody”, the financial chicanery rife in markets causes substantial harm.The financial press is writing all about the losses suffered by the banks that didn’t dump their Archegos positions fast enough, and explaining parallels with the 1998 collapse of Long-Term-Capital-Management, but few folk are wondering how a 40% collapse in the stock price damages that firm’s long-term prospects, and blights the careers of its workers. (An opportunity to buy back stock cheaper?) Few folk are talking about the pension savers who’ve been impacted.<blockquote>不像今天早上引用的银行抢劫犯“没有伤害任何人”，市场上盛行的金融欺诈造成了实质性的损害。金融媒体报道了那些没有足够快地抛售Archegos头寸的银行所遭受的损失，并解释了与1998年长期资本管理公司倒闭的相似之处，但很少有人想知道40%的股价暴跌会损害该公司的长期前景，并损害其员工的职业生涯。（以更便宜的价格回购股票的机会？）很少有人谈论受到影响的养老金储蓄者。</blockquote>Few folk are talking about&nbsp;why&nbsp;there is an ongoing blight of complex, barely legal manipulation of complexity across financial markets.You can guarantee there are more dangers out there than just the leverage on leverage of the Archegos saga, or dressing up dull-boring-predictable supply chain finance as high-return/risk-free long-term assets by Greensill.<blockquote>很少有人谈论为什么金融市场中复杂的、几乎不合法的复杂性操纵持续存在。你可以保证，除了Archegos传奇的杠杆作用，或者Greensill将枯燥可预测的供应链金融装扮成高回报/无风险的长期资产之外，还有更多的危险。</blockquote>Apparently the largest 100 unregulated “family offices” hold over $150 billion in assets. Add that to the sheer scale of the essentially unconstrained shadow-banking system of funds, and the potential for mayhem is apparent. The ever-increasing complexity of financial regulation, the legions of risk officers and the compliance mentality encouraged across finance, was supposed to address the issues of financial players gaming the systems.<blockquote>显然，最大的100家不受监管的“家族办公室”持有超过1500亿美元的资产。再加上基本上不受约束的影子银行基金体系的庞大规模，潜在的混乱是显而易见的。金融监管的复杂性不断增加，大量的风险官员以及整个金融领域鼓励的合规心态，本应解决金融参与者在系统中博弈的问题。</blockquote>Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote>One thing trumps regulation every time. Returns.<blockquote>每次都有一件事胜过监管。回报。</blockquote>Since the last big financial crisis that began in 2007, ultra-low interest rates have been the dominant force on markets. Returns is why investment funds exist. The desperation of investors to garner any real returns is simply driving greater and greater complexity as the investment banks and other bad actors seek to profit from the insatiable demand for returns. Their apparent success and the plethora of implausibly successful investments (from EV makers, virtual art, SPACs and whatever-nexts), has sucked in more and more marks – because everyone wants to make returns.<blockquote>自2007年开始的上一次重大金融危机以来，超低利率一直是市场的主导力量。回报是投资基金存在的原因。随着投资银行和其他不良行为者试图从贪得无厌的回报需求中获利，投资者对获得任何实际回报的绝望只会导致越来越大的复杂性。他们明显的成功和大量令人难以置信的成功投资（来自电动汽车制造商、虚拟艺术、SPAC等等）吸引了越来越多的分数——因为每个人都想获得回报。</blockquote>I was talking to a fund manager y’day who told me her kid’s nanny has lost money on Bitcon – bot high and sold low. As Ben Graham might have said; “when the shoe-shine boy tells you he’s bought Ethereum and digital NFTs, its time to sell.”<blockquote>我和一位基金经理y’day交谈，她告诉我她孩子的保姆在比特币上亏了钱——机器人高又低卖。正如本·格雷厄姆可能会说的那样；”当擦鞋男孩告诉你他已经购买了以太币和数字NFT时，就该出售了。”</blockquote>The current market has got 1929, 1987, 2000 writ in bold blood red letters all across it.<blockquote>目前的市场上到处都是用醒目的血红色字母写着1929年、1987年、2000年。</blockquote>Yet, that won’t stop us gaming the market. The consensus is nothing will change until central banks let rates rise. Sure, the 10-year Treasury may be headed for 2%, (currently 1.73%), but the Central Banks aren’t going to let a sudden rise panic markets, triggering a meltdown that would crush recovery?<blockquote>然而，这不会阻止我们在市场上博弈。共识是，在央行加息之前，一切都不会改变。当然，10年期国债可能会升至2%（目前为1.73%），但各国央行不会让突然上升的恐慌市场，引发崩溃，从而摧毁复苏？</blockquote>The losses experienced by Credit Suisse, Nomura, MUFG and others from Archegos are painful, but not terminal. But what if happens again, and then again? As it threatened to do in 2008. Could we see another run on just how levered the financial system is? It’s another reason Central Banks are so anxious to avoid a meltdown.<blockquote>瑞士信贷、野村证券、三菱日联金融集团和其他机构从Archegos遭受的损失是痛苦的，但还不是最终的。但是如果再发生一次，然后再发生呢？正如它在2008年威胁要做的那样。我们能否看到金融体系杠杆率的另一轮上涨？这是央行如此急于避免崩溃的另一个原因。</blockquote>It now looks like the massive losses for Nomura and Credit Suisse were triggered when Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs took the decision to jump early and sell their exposures, leaving the other “prime-brokers” providing Archegos leverage on leverage holding the can. Bear in mind Wall Street is not club.&nbsp;It’s a Pack.<blockquote>现在看来，野村证券和瑞士信贷的巨额损失是由摩根士丹利和高盛决定提前抛售其风险敞口引发的，而其他为Archegos提供杠杆的“大宗经纪商”则继续持有。请记住，华尔街不是俱乐部。这是一包.</blockquote>Wounded pack members don’t last long. In 2008 my old firm Bear Stearns was first to go, snapped up by JP Morgan for pennies after the rest of Wall Street declined to support it. It was payback – in 1998, Bear made the call not to support the other investment banks caught the wrong side of the LTCM meltdown. When Lehman went down in 2008, the fact none of the Pack trusted it’s CEO, Dick Fuld, was a primary reason no-one wanted to buy it.<blockquote>受伤的狼群成员撑不了多久。2008年，我的老公司贝尔斯登率先倒闭，在华尔街其他公司拒绝支持它后，它被摩根大通以几分钱的价格收购。这是一种回报——1998年，贝尔斯登让看涨期权不支持其他在LTCM崩溃中陷入错误境地的投资银行。当雷曼兄弟在2008年倒闭时，没有人信任它的首席执行官迪克·富尔德，这是没有人想收购它的主要原因。</blockquote>Meanwhile, I wonder just how seriously a leverage crisis may morph into the next piece of the problem – a liquidity crisis.<blockquote>与此同时，我想知道杠杆危机会有多严重演变成下一个问题——流动性危机。</blockquote>Let’s return, for a moment, to the other big scam – Greensill. Its looking inevitable its demise will shortly tigger default by its main client – the Gupta owned GFC Alliance.<blockquote>让我们暂时回到另一个大骗局——格林希尔。它的消亡似乎不可避免，它的主要客户——古普塔拥有的GFC联盟——很快就会违约。</blockquote>I understand a single large UK pension fund, M&amp;G holds the entire £370 mm Lagoon Park financing, arranged by Greensill and marketed by Morgan Stanley, of the GFC Alliance’s purchase of the Lochaber Aluminium Smelter and Hydro Power station. Initially it only bought 50% of the deal, but then acquired the rest when GAM sold its portion. You may recall GAM suffered “difficulties” when a fund manager was suspended over transactions connected to Greensill, which triggered a massive run from investors demanding their money back.<blockquote>据我所知，英国一家大型养老基金M&amp;G持有GFC联盟收购Lochaber铝冶炼厂和水电站的全部3.7亿英镑泻湖公园融资，该融资由Greensill安排，由摩根士丹利营销。最初它只购买了该交易的50%，但后来当GAM出售其部分时又收购了其余部分。您可能还记得，当一位基金经理因与Greensill有关的交易而被停职时，GAM遭遇了“困难”，这引发了投资者要求退款的大规模挤兑。</blockquote>The investment management team at M&amp;G will not be unconcerned about the deal. But not because Gupta will default – but because the deal is guaranteed by the Scottish Government. They will be worried about the credit outlook for Scottish debt rated Aa3 as part of the UK if the SNP succeeds in a second independence referendum.<blockquote>M&amp;G的投资管理团队不会对这笔交易漠不关心。但不是因为古普塔会违约，而是因为该交易由苏格兰政府担保。如果苏格兰民族党在第二次独立公投中取得成功，他们将担心作为英国一部分的评级为Aa3的苏格兰债务的信用前景。</blockquote>A heavily&nbsp;redacted report by EY, (and I mean practically everything is blacklined – do read the overview of the transaction on page 7), on the Scottish Guarantee says the deal made commercial sense, but makes clear that if the smelter failed it becomes a liability of the Scottish Government.<blockquote>EY的一份经过大量编辑的关于苏格兰担保的报告（我的意思是几乎所有内容都被涂黑了——请阅读第7页的交易概述）称，该交易具有商业意义，但明确表示，如果冶炼厂失败，它将成为苏格兰政府的责任。</blockquote>The Scottish Guarantee is extraordinary – it is granted in favour of SIMEC (Sanjeev Gupta’s father’s business in Singapore) in respect of obligation by Liberty (part of GFC) to pay for energy from the hydro scheme. In the event of a default, the Scots will pay. Incidentally, I further understand Scotland has the right to borrow or guarantee £2 bln, according to my sources in London.<blockquote>苏格兰的担保非同寻常——它是以SIMEC（Sanjeev Gupta父亲在新加坡的企业）为受益人的，涉及Liberty（GFC的一部分）支付水电计划能源费用的义务。如果违约，苏格兰人将支付。顺便说一句，根据我在伦敦的消息来源，我进一步了解到苏格兰有权借款或担保20亿英镑。</blockquote>The obvious question to ask is why did Scotland guarantee the deal? Whoever thought Nicola Sturgeon and former UK Premier and Greensill employee David Cameron could be so aligned?<blockquote>显而易见的问题是，苏格兰为什么要担保这笔交易？谁会想到妮古拉·斯特金和英国前首相、格林希尔雇员大卫·卡梅隆会如此一致？</blockquote>Gupta’s promised wheel factory and jobs never materialised. The Scot’s liability to pay isn’t just the £370mm principal amount, it’s also a further 25 years of interest payments – say £500 mm in total. Well done Scotland – 25% of its borrowing limit blown already – the SNP really are financial geniuses. &nbsp;The security package backing the guarantee? A smelter in Lochaber non one except the Gupta’s were interested in.<blockquote>古普塔承诺的车轮工厂和工作从未实现。苏格兰人有责任支付的不仅仅是3.7亿英镑的本金，还有另外25年的利息支付——比如总共5亿英镑。干得好，苏格兰——25%的借款限额已经被打破——苏格兰民族党真的是金融天才。支持担保的安全包？除了古普塔一家，没有人对洛查伯的一家冶炼厂感兴趣。</blockquote>The really interesting thing about this Lagoon Park deal is how liquid these bonds are – despite the fact I suspect M&amp;G is the only holder. I am told by an external investor he believes these bonds trade regularly. According to Bloomberg, there are regular prices posted. I wonder.. could it be that brokers supportive of the deal are posting imaginary prices between themselves?<blockquote>泻湖公园交易真正有趣的是这些债券的流动性——尽管我怀疑M&amp;G是唯一的持有者。一位外部投资者告诉我，他认为这些债券交易正常。根据彭博的说法，有正常的价格张贴。我想知道..会不会是支持这笔交易的经纪人在他们之间公布了虚构的价格？</blockquote>It would a crying shame if it turned out that wholly illiquid bonds were being painted as liquid. I mean, what would the regulators think of a fund holding illiquid bonds that were described as liquid so they appear eligible as liquid UCITS eligible investments? A shade of Woodford? Naughty – if it was happening…. Ahem..<blockquote>如果完全没有流动性的债券被描绘成流动性的，那将是一个巨大的耻辱。我的意思是，监管机构会如何看待持有非流动性债券的基金，这些债券被描述为流动性债券，因此它们似乎有资格作为流动性UCITS合格投资？伍德福德的影子？淘气——如果真的发生了…咳咳..</blockquote>I am absolutely sure all these junk bonds and corporate debt deals held by fund managers will prove illiquid as set concrete if/when the market’s day of reckoning arrives…<blockquote>我绝对确信，如果/当市场清算日到来时，基金经理持有的所有这些垃圾债券和公司债务交易都将被证明缺乏流动性……</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Blain: The Market \"Has 1929, 1987, 2000 Writ In Bold Blood Letters\" All Over It<blockquote>布莱恩：市场“到处都是1929年、1987年、2000年的粗体血书”</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nBlain: The Market \"Has 1929, 1987, 2000 Writ In Bold Blood Letters\" All Over It<blockquote>布莱恩：市场“到处都是1929年、1987年、2000年的粗体血书”</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nzerohedge2021-03-31 20:47\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nThe Tail That Wags The Dog<blockquote>摇着狗的尾巴</blockquote>“Daddy was a bankrobber, but he hurt nobody. He just liked to live that way, stealing all your money”<blockquote>“爸爸是个银行抢劫犯，但他没有伤害任何人。他只是喜欢那样生活，偷你所有的钱。”</blockquote>As Greensill and Archegos roil markets and cause losses, they beg the question – who is next? Why is 2021 turning into the year the scams are unravelling? Will leverage on leverage trigger wider implosion or will it be something else, like liquidity?<blockquote>随着Greensill和Archegos扰乱市场并造成损失，他们回避了一个问题——谁是下一个？为什么2021年变成了骗局瓦解的一年？杠杆上的杠杆会引发更广泛的内爆还是会引发流动性等其他问题？</blockquote>Back in the day… Archaos was a terrifying alternative French Circus. They were brilliant and shocking – anarchy on steroids as they juggled chainsaws, played with fire on motorbikes, and ignored the conventions of gravity on the high-wire!<blockquote>在过去……Archaos是一个可怕的另类法国马戏团。他们才华横溢，令人震惊——当他们玩链锯，在摩托车上玩火，在走钢丝上无视重力的惯例时，他们是类固醇上的无政府状态！</blockquote><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc848692ac8eba0454ab758f1b034195\" tg-width=\"500\" tg-height=\"215\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\">In contrast, the collapse of Archegos Capital is anything but brilliant.It seems to be a &nbsp;developing theme for 2021: the year the shysters of finance are being revealed as their get-rich-quick schemes unravel. Bill Hwang of Archegos and Lex Greensill share a common trait – being able to insert themselves seamlessly into the game. They have both been exposed – begging the question: Who hasn’t? What other shocks are still embedded in the system?<blockquote>相比之下，Archegos Capital的倒闭一点也不精彩。这似乎是2021年的一个发展中的主题：随着金融骗子的快速致富计划的瓦解，这一年他们将被揭露。Archegos的Bill Hwang和Lex Greensill有一个共同的特点——能够无缝地将自己插入游戏中。他们都被曝光了——这就引出了一个问题：谁没有？系统中还嵌入了哪些其他冲击？</blockquote>I could have started this morning’s porridge with a comment about there being“something rotten in the state of global finance”,but that would be too easy. Everyone in the financial markets is just an actor in the bigger picture, but to understand why market participants act in certain ways and their motivations, or why banks and funds are willing to provide unlimited leverage to clients in overcooked markets, or why bright young bankers enable it, you need to understand the way the institutions work.<blockquote>我本可以在今天早上的粥开始时评论一下“全球金融状况中的一些腐败现象”,但那太容易了。金融市场中的每个人都只是大局中的一个参与者，但要理解为什么市场参与者以某种方式行事及其动机，或者为什么银行和基金愿意在过度烹饪的市场中向客户提供无限的杠杆，或者为什么聪明的年轻银行家能够做到这一点，你需要了解这些机构的工作方式。</blockquote>There isn’t time for a full sociological analysis of the business, but for the last month we’ve seen a deluge of stories about how unfairly young intern bankers are treated – 100-hour weeks and no sleep, while their bosses use the company jet to holiday in the Caribbean and as a taxi back to the big house in the Hamptons. The bosses play that way because that’s what they learnt back in the 80s. They got rich on big bonuses from extracting value from the system by supplying solutions to financial problems. Everyone wants to be the boss. The interns may whine its unfair – welcome to finance.<blockquote>没有时间对该业务进行全面的社会学分析，但上个月我们看到了大量关于年轻实习银行家受到不公平待遇的故事——每周工作100小时，不睡觉，而他们的老板则使用公司飞机去加勒比海度假，并作为出租车返回汉普顿的大房子。老板们这样玩是因为这是他们在80年代学到的。他们通过提供财务问题的解决方案，从系统中榨取价值，从而获得巨额奖金。每个人都想当老板。实习生可能会抱怨这不公平——欢迎来到金融。</blockquote>In Investment Banking – no one is listening when you scream.<blockquote>在投资银行业——当你尖叫时，没有人在听。</blockquote>These same put-upon interns today will be the salespeople and bankers of tomorrow looking for opportunities (and commensurate bonuses) from selling their firms solutions to extract value. The markets move very quickly to the next thing: the hedge funds that were once gaming bank capital, before switching into distressed assets, are now offering to provide leverage – and charging for it. In a world of 0.15% bond yields, clients need leverage to pay the bills. They’ve discovered that leverage on leverage generates returns and big pay-checks.<blockquote>这些今天被欺骗的实习生将成为明天的销售人员和银行家，他们从销售公司的解决方案中寻找机会（和相应的奖金）来获取价值。市场很快转向下一件事：在转向不良资产之前，曾经利用银行资本的对冲基金现在提出提供杠杆——并为此收费。在债券收益率为0.15%的世界里，客户需要杠杆来支付账单。他们发现杠杆上的杠杆会产生回报和丰厚的薪水。</blockquote>Unlike the Bankrobber in this morning’s quote who “hurt nobody”, the financial chicanery rife in markets causes substantial harm.The financial press is writing all about the losses suffered by the banks that didn’t dump their Archegos positions fast enough, and explaining parallels with the 1998 collapse of Long-Term-Capital-Management, but few folk are wondering how a 40% collapse in the stock price damages that firm’s long-term prospects, and blights the careers of its workers. (An opportunity to buy back stock cheaper?) Few folk are talking about the pension savers who’ve been impacted.<blockquote>不像今天早上引用的银行抢劫犯“没有伤害任何人”，市场上盛行的金融欺诈造成了实质性的损害。金融媒体报道了那些没有足够快地抛售Archegos头寸的银行所遭受的损失，并解释了与1998年长期资本管理公司倒闭的相似之处，但很少有人想知道40%的股价暴跌会损害该公司的长期前景，并损害其员工的职业生涯。（以更便宜的价格回购股票的机会？）很少有人谈论受到影响的养老金储蓄者。</blockquote>Few folk are talking about&nbsp;why&nbsp;there is an ongoing blight of complex, barely legal manipulation of complexity across financial markets.You can guarantee there are more dangers out there than just the leverage on leverage of the Archegos saga, or dressing up dull-boring-predictable supply chain finance as high-return/risk-free long-term assets by Greensill.<blockquote>很少有人谈论为什么金融市场中复杂的、几乎不合法的复杂性操纵持续存在。你可以保证，除了Archegos传奇的杠杆作用，或者Greensill将枯燥可预测的供应链金融装扮成高回报/无风险的长期资产之外，还有更多的危险。</blockquote>Apparently the largest 100 unregulated “family offices” hold over $150 billion in assets. Add that to the sheer scale of the essentially unconstrained shadow-banking system of funds, and the potential for mayhem is apparent. The ever-increasing complexity of financial regulation, the legions of risk officers and the compliance mentality encouraged across finance, was supposed to address the issues of financial players gaming the systems.<blockquote>显然，最大的100家不受监管的“家族办公室”持有超过1500亿美元的资产。再加上基本上不受约束的影子银行基金体系的庞大规模，潜在的混乱是显而易见的。金融监管的复杂性不断增加，大量的风险官员以及整个金融领域鼓励的合规心态，本应解决金融参与者在系统中博弈的问题。</blockquote>Hardly.<blockquote>几乎不。</blockquote>One thing trumps regulation every time. Returns.<blockquote>每次都有一件事胜过监管。回报。</blockquote>Since the last big financial crisis that began in 2007, ultra-low interest rates have been the dominant force on markets. Returns is why investment funds exist. The desperation of investors to garner any real returns is simply driving greater and greater complexity as the investment banks and other bad actors seek to profit from the insatiable demand for returns. Their apparent success and the plethora of implausibly successful investments (from EV makers, virtual art, SPACs and whatever-nexts), has sucked in more and more marks – because everyone wants to make returns.<blockquote>自2007年开始的上一次重大金融危机以来，超低利率一直是市场的主导力量。回报是投资基金存在的原因。随着投资银行和其他不良行为者试图从贪得无厌的回报需求中获利，投资者对获得任何实际回报的绝望只会导致越来越大的复杂性。他们明显的成功和大量令人难以置信的成功投资（来自电动汽车制造商、虚拟艺术、SPAC等等）吸引了越来越多的分数——因为每个人都想获得回报。</blockquote>I was talking to a fund manager y’day who told me her kid’s nanny has lost money on Bitcon – bot high and sold low. As Ben Graham might have said; “when the shoe-shine boy tells you he’s bought Ethereum and digital NFTs, its time to sell.”<blockquote>我和一位基金经理y’day交谈，她告诉我她孩子的保姆在比特币上亏了钱——机器人高又低卖。正如本·格雷厄姆可能会说的那样；”当擦鞋男孩告诉你他已经购买了以太币和数字NFT时，就该出售了。”</blockquote>The current market has got 1929, 1987, 2000 writ in bold blood red letters all across it.<blockquote>目前的市场上到处都是用醒目的血红色字母写着1929年、1987年、2000年。</blockquote>Yet, that won’t stop us gaming the market. The consensus is nothing will change until central banks let rates rise. Sure, the 10-year Treasury may be headed for 2%, (currently 1.73%), but the Central Banks aren’t going to let a sudden rise panic markets, triggering a meltdown that would crush recovery?<blockquote>然而，这不会阻止我们在市场上博弈。共识是，在央行加息之前，一切都不会改变。当然，10年期国债可能会升至2%（目前为1.73%），但各国央行不会让突然上升的恐慌市场，引发崩溃，从而摧毁复苏？</blockquote>The losses experienced by Credit Suisse, Nomura, MUFG and others from Archegos are painful, but not terminal. But what if happens again, and then again? As it threatened to do in 2008. Could we see another run on just how levered the financial system is? It’s another reason Central Banks are so anxious to avoid a meltdown.<blockquote>瑞士信贷、野村证券、三菱日联金融集团和其他机构从Archegos遭受的损失是痛苦的，但还不是最终的。但是如果再发生一次，然后再发生呢？正如它在2008年威胁要做的那样。我们能否看到金融体系杠杆率的另一轮上涨？这是央行如此急于避免崩溃的另一个原因。</blockquote>It now looks like the massive losses for Nomura and Credit Suisse were triggered when Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs took the decision to jump early and sell their exposures, leaving the other “prime-brokers” providing Archegos leverage on leverage holding the can. Bear in mind Wall Street is not club.&nbsp;It’s a Pack.<blockquote>现在看来，野村证券和瑞士信贷的巨额损失是由摩根士丹利和高盛决定提前抛售其风险敞口引发的，而其他为Archegos提供杠杆的“大宗经纪商”则继续持有。请记住，华尔街不是俱乐部。这是一包.</blockquote>Wounded pack members don’t last long. In 2008 my old firm Bear Stearns was first to go, snapped up by JP Morgan for pennies after the rest of Wall Street declined to support it. It was payback – in 1998, Bear made the call not to support the other investment banks caught the wrong side of the LTCM meltdown. When Lehman went down in 2008, the fact none of the Pack trusted it’s CEO, Dick Fuld, was a primary reason no-one wanted to buy it.<blockquote>受伤的狼群成员撑不了多久。2008年，我的老公司贝尔斯登率先倒闭，在华尔街其他公司拒绝支持它后，它被摩根大通以几分钱的价格收购。这是一种回报——1998年，贝尔斯登让看涨期权不支持其他在LTCM崩溃中陷入错误境地的投资银行。当雷曼兄弟在2008年倒闭时，没有人信任它的首席执行官迪克·富尔德，这是没有人想收购它的主要原因。</blockquote>Meanwhile, I wonder just how seriously a leverage crisis may morph into the next piece of the problem – a liquidity crisis.<blockquote>与此同时，我想知道杠杆危机会有多严重演变成下一个问题——流动性危机。</blockquote>Let’s return, for a moment, to the other big scam – Greensill. Its looking inevitable its demise will shortly tigger default by its main client – the Gupta owned GFC Alliance.<blockquote>让我们暂时回到另一个大骗局——格林希尔。它的消亡似乎不可避免，它的主要客户——古普塔拥有的GFC联盟——很快就会违约。</blockquote>I understand a single large UK pension fund, M&amp;G holds the entire £370 mm Lagoon Park financing, arranged by Greensill and marketed by Morgan Stanley, of the GFC Alliance’s purchase of the Lochaber Aluminium Smelter and Hydro Power station. Initially it only bought 50% of the deal, but then acquired the rest when GAM sold its portion. You may recall GAM suffered “difficulties” when a fund manager was suspended over transactions connected to Greensill, which triggered a massive run from investors demanding their money back.<blockquote>据我所知，英国一家大型养老基金M&amp;G持有GFC联盟收购Lochaber铝冶炼厂和水电站的全部3.7亿英镑泻湖公园融资，该融资由Greensill安排，由摩根士丹利营销。最初它只购买了该交易的50%，但后来当GAM出售其部分时又收购了其余部分。您可能还记得，当一位基金经理因与Greensill有关的交易而被停职时，GAM遭遇了“困难”，这引发了投资者要求退款的大规模挤兑。</blockquote>The investment management team at M&amp;G will not be unconcerned about the deal. But not because Gupta will default – but because the deal is guaranteed by the Scottish Government. They will be worried about the credit outlook for Scottish debt rated Aa3 as part of the UK if the SNP succeeds in a second independence referendum.<blockquote>M&amp;G的投资管理团队不会对这笔交易漠不关心。但不是因为古普塔会违约，而是因为该交易由苏格兰政府担保。如果苏格兰民族党在第二次独立公投中取得成功，他们将担心作为英国一部分的评级为Aa3的苏格兰债务的信用前景。</blockquote>A heavily&nbsp;redacted report by EY, (and I mean practically everything is blacklined – do read the overview of the transaction on page 7), on the Scottish Guarantee says the deal made commercial sense, but makes clear that if the smelter failed it becomes a liability of the Scottish Government.<blockquote>EY的一份经过大量编辑的关于苏格兰担保的报告（我的意思是几乎所有内容都被涂黑了——请阅读第7页的交易概述）称，该交易具有商业意义，但明确表示，如果冶炼厂失败，它将成为苏格兰政府的责任。</blockquote>The Scottish Guarantee is extraordinary – it is granted in favour of SIMEC (Sanjeev Gupta’s father’s business in Singapore) in respect of obligation by Liberty (part of GFC) to pay for energy from the hydro scheme. In the event of a default, the Scots will pay. Incidentally, I further understand Scotland has the right to borrow or guarantee £2 bln, according to my sources in London.<blockquote>苏格兰的担保非同寻常——它是以SIMEC（Sanjeev Gupta父亲在新加坡的企业）为受益人的，涉及Liberty（GFC的一部分）支付水电计划能源费用的义务。如果违约，苏格兰人将支付。顺便说一句，根据我在伦敦的消息来源，我进一步了解到苏格兰有权借款或担保20亿英镑。</blockquote>The obvious question to ask is why did Scotland guarantee the deal? Whoever thought Nicola Sturgeon and former UK Premier and Greensill employee David Cameron could be so aligned?<blockquote>显而易见的问题是，苏格兰为什么要担保这笔交易？谁会想到妮古拉·斯特金和英国前首相、格林希尔雇员大卫·卡梅隆会如此一致？</blockquote>Gupta’s promised wheel factory and jobs never materialised. The Scot’s liability to pay isn’t just the £370mm principal amount, it’s also a further 25 years of interest payments – say £500 mm in total. Well done Scotland – 25% of its borrowing limit blown already – the SNP really are financial geniuses. &nbsp;The security package backing the guarantee? A smelter in Lochaber non one except the Gupta’s were interested in.<blockquote>古普塔承诺的车轮工厂和工作从未实现。苏格兰人有责任支付的不仅仅是3.7亿英镑的本金，还有另外25年的利息支付——比如总共5亿英镑。干得好，苏格兰——25%的借款限额已经被打破——苏格兰民族党真的是金融天才。支持担保的安全包？除了古普塔一家，没有人对洛查伯的一家冶炼厂感兴趣。</blockquote>The really interesting thing about this Lagoon Park deal is how liquid these bonds are – despite the fact I suspect M&amp;G is the only holder. I am told by an external investor he believes these bonds trade regularly. According to Bloomberg, there are regular prices posted. I wonder.. could it be that brokers supportive of the deal are posting imaginary prices between themselves?<blockquote>泻湖公园交易真正有趣的是这些债券的流动性——尽管我怀疑M&amp;G是唯一的持有者。一位外部投资者告诉我，他认为这些债券交易正常。根据彭博的说法，有正常的价格张贴。我想知道..会不会是支持这笔交易的经纪人在他们之间公布了虚构的价格？</blockquote>It would a crying shame if it turned out that wholly illiquid bonds were being painted as liquid. I mean, what would the regulators think of a fund holding illiquid bonds that were described as liquid so they appear eligible as liquid UCITS eligible investments? A shade of Woodford? Naughty – if it was happening…. Ahem..<blockquote>如果完全没有流动性的债券被描绘成流动性的，那将是一个巨大的耻辱。我的意思是，监管机构会如何看待持有非流动性债券的基金，这些债券被描述为流动性债券，因此它们似乎有资格作为流动性UCITS合格投资？伍德福德的影子？淘气——如果真的发生了…咳咳..</blockquote>I am absolutely sure all these junk bonds and corporate debt deals held by fund managers will prove illiquid as set concrete if/when the market’s day of reckoning arrives…<blockquote>我绝对确信，如果/当市场清算日到来时，基金经理持有的所有这些垃圾债券和公司债务交易都将被证明缺乏流动性……</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/blain-market-has-1929-1987-2000-writ-bold-blood-letters-all-over-it\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc848692ac8eba0454ab758f1b034195","relate_stocks":{},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/blain-market-has-1929-1987-2000-writ-bold-blood-letters-all-over-it","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1115748452","content_text":"The Tail That Wags The Dog“Daddy was a bankrobber, but he hurt nobody. He just liked to live that way, stealing all your money”As Greensill and Archegos roil markets and cause losses, they beg the question – who is next? Why is 2021 turning into the year the scams are unravelling? Will leverage on leverage trigger wider implosion or will it be something else, like liquidity?Back in the day… Archaos was a terrifying alternative French Circus. They were brilliant and shocking – anarchy on steroids as they juggled chainsaws, played with fire on motorbikes, and ignored the conventions of gravity on the high-wire!In contrast, the collapse of Archegos Capital is anything but brilliant.It seems to be a  developing theme for 2021: the year the shysters of finance are being revealed as their get-rich-quick schemes unravel. Bill Hwang of Archegos and Lex Greensill share a common trait – being able to insert themselves seamlessly into the game. They have both been exposed – begging the question: Who hasn’t? What other shocks are still embedded in the system?I could have started this morning’s porridge with a comment about there being“something rotten in the state of global finance”,but that would be too easy. Everyone in the financial markets is just an actor in the bigger picture, but to understand why market participants act in certain ways and their motivations, or why banks and funds are willing to provide unlimited leverage to clients in overcooked markets, or why bright young bankers enable it, you need to understand the way the institutions work.There isn’t time for a full sociological analysis of the business, but for the last month we’ve seen a deluge of stories about how unfairly young intern bankers are treated – 100-hour weeks and no sleep, while their bosses use the company jet to holiday in the Caribbean and as a taxi back to the big house in the Hamptons. The bosses play that way because that’s what they learnt back in the 80s. They got rich on big bonuses from extracting value from the system by supplying solutions to financial problems. Everyone wants to be the boss. The interns may whine its unfair – welcome to finance.In Investment Banking – no one is listening when you scream.These same put-upon interns today will be the salespeople and bankers of tomorrow looking for opportunities (and commensurate bonuses) from selling their firms solutions to extract value. The markets move very quickly to the next thing: the hedge funds that were once gaming bank capital, before switching into distressed assets, are now offering to provide leverage – and charging for it. In a world of 0.15% bond yields, clients need leverage to pay the bills. They’ve discovered that leverage on leverage generates returns and big pay-checks.Unlike the Bankrobber in this morning’s quote who “hurt nobody”, the financial chicanery rife in markets causes substantial harm.The financial press is writing all about the losses suffered by the banks that didn’t dump their Archegos positions fast enough, and explaining parallels with the 1998 collapse of Long-Term-Capital-Management, but few folk are wondering how a 40% collapse in the stock price damages that firm’s long-term prospects, and blights the careers of its workers. (An opportunity to buy back stock cheaper?) Few folk are talking about the pension savers who’ve been impacted.Few folk are talking about why there is an ongoing blight of complex, barely legal manipulation of complexity across financial markets.You can guarantee there are more dangers out there than just the leverage on leverage of the Archegos saga, or dressing up dull-boring-predictable supply chain finance as high-return/risk-free long-term assets by Greensill.Apparently the largest 100 unregulated “family offices” hold over $150 billion in assets. Add that to the sheer scale of the essentially unconstrained shadow-banking system of funds, and the potential for mayhem is apparent. The ever-increasing complexity of financial regulation, the legions of risk officers and the compliance mentality encouraged across finance, was supposed to address the issues of financial players gaming the systems.Hardly.One thing trumps regulation every time. Returns.Since the last big financial crisis that began in 2007, ultra-low interest rates have been the dominant force on markets. Returns is why investment funds exist. The desperation of investors to garner any real returns is simply driving greater and greater complexity as the investment banks and other bad actors seek to profit from the insatiable demand for returns. Their apparent success and the plethora of implausibly successful investments (from EV makers, virtual art, SPACs and whatever-nexts), has sucked in more and more marks – because everyone wants to make returns.I was talking to a fund manager y’day who told me her kid’s nanny has lost money on Bitcon – bot high and sold low. As Ben Graham might have said; “when the shoe-shine boy tells you he’s bought Ethereum and digital NFTs, its time to sell.”The current market has got 1929, 1987, 2000 writ in bold blood red letters all across it.Yet, that won’t stop us gaming the market. The consensus is nothing will change until central banks let rates rise. Sure, the 10-year Treasury may be headed for 2%, (currently 1.73%), but the Central Banks aren’t going to let a sudden rise panic markets, triggering a meltdown that would crush recovery?The losses experienced by Credit Suisse, Nomura, MUFG and others from Archegos are painful, but not terminal. But what if happens again, and then again? As it threatened to do in 2008. Could we see another run on just how levered the financial system is? It’s another reason Central Banks are so anxious to avoid a meltdown.It now looks like the massive losses for Nomura and Credit Suisse were triggered when Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs took the decision to jump early and sell their exposures, leaving the other “prime-brokers” providing Archegos leverage on leverage holding the can. Bear in mind Wall Street is not club. It’s a Pack.Wounded pack members don’t last long. In 2008 my old firm Bear Stearns was first to go, snapped up by JP Morgan for pennies after the rest of Wall Street declined to support it. It was payback – in 1998, Bear made the call not to support the other investment banks caught the wrong side of the LTCM meltdown. When Lehman went down in 2008, the fact none of the Pack trusted it’s CEO, Dick Fuld, was a primary reason no-one wanted to buy it.Meanwhile, I wonder just how seriously a leverage crisis may morph into the next piece of the problem – a liquidity crisis.Let’s return, for a moment, to the other big scam – Greensill. Its looking inevitable its demise will shortly tigger default by its main client – the Gupta owned GFC Alliance.I understand a single large UK pension fund, M&G holds the entire £370 mm Lagoon Park financing, arranged by Greensill and marketed by Morgan Stanley, of the GFC Alliance’s purchase of the Lochaber Aluminium Smelter and Hydro Power station. Initially it only bought 50% of the deal, but then acquired the rest when GAM sold its portion. You may recall GAM suffered “difficulties” when a fund manager was suspended over transactions connected to Greensill, which triggered a massive run from investors demanding their money back.The investment management team at M&G will not be unconcerned about the deal. But not because Gupta will default – but because the deal is guaranteed by the Scottish Government. They will be worried about the credit outlook for Scottish debt rated Aa3 as part of the UK if the SNP succeeds in a second independence referendum.A heavily redacted report by EY, (and I mean practically everything is blacklined – do read the overview of the transaction on page 7), on the Scottish Guarantee says the deal made commercial sense, but makes clear that if the smelter failed it becomes a liability of the Scottish Government.The Scottish Guarantee is extraordinary – it is granted in favour of SIMEC (Sanjeev Gupta’s father’s business in Singapore) in respect of obligation by Liberty (part of GFC) to pay for energy from the hydro scheme. In the event of a default, the Scots will pay. Incidentally, I further understand Scotland has the right to borrow or guarantee £2 bln, according to my sources in London.The obvious question to ask is why did Scotland guarantee the deal? Whoever thought Nicola Sturgeon and former UK Premier and Greensill employee David Cameron could be so aligned?Gupta’s promised wheel factory and jobs never materialised. The Scot’s liability to pay isn’t just the £370mm principal amount, it’s also a further 25 years of interest payments – say £500 mm in total. Well done Scotland – 25% of its borrowing limit blown already – the SNP really are financial geniuses.  The security package backing the guarantee? A smelter in Lochaber non one except the Gupta’s were interested in.The really interesting thing about this Lagoon Park deal is how liquid these bonds are – despite the fact I suspect M&G is the only holder. I am told by an external investor he believes these bonds trade regularly. According to Bloomberg, there are regular prices posted. I wonder.. could it be that brokers supportive of the deal are posting imaginary prices between themselves?It would a crying shame if it turned out that wholly illiquid bonds were being painted as liquid. I mean, what would the regulators think of a fund holding illiquid bonds that were described as liquid so they appear eligible as liquid UCITS eligible investments? A shade of Woodford? Naughty – if it was happening…. Ahem..I am absolutely sure all these junk bonds and corporate debt deals held by fund managers will prove illiquid as set concrete if/when the market’s day of reckoning arrives…","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1324,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":55,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/357977779"}