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2021-06-25
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Albert Edwards: The Fed Is Trapped In An Epic Bubble, It Can Never Normalize Rates Again<blockquote>艾伯特·爱德华兹:美联储陷入了史诗般的泡沫,它永远无法再次实现利率正常化</blockquote>
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First, as Deutsche Bank's FX strategist George Saravelos said, it is aligned with the very high dollar responsiveness we have seen to even small shifts in Fed stance: huge pent-up demand for yield from investors across the planet forces a stronger dollar and a bigger disinflationary impact quicker than assumed. In other words, a low global r*<i>(remember the rest of the world still has massive current account surpluses, or excess savings)</i>pushes US r* even lower.</p><p><blockquote>这种对 r* 的非常悲观的观点,于 2015 年首次在此提出,也符合债券市场之外的市场行为。首先,正如德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)外汇策略师乔治·萨拉维洛斯(George Saravelos)所说,这与我们所看到的即使是美联储立场的微小转变的非常高的美元反应是一致的:全球投资者对收益率的巨大被压抑的需求迫使美元走强和更大的通货紧缩影响比预期更快。换句话说,低全局r*<i>(请记住,世界其他地区仍然拥有巨额经常账户盈余或过度储蓄)</i>把我们的r*推得更低。</blockquote></p><p> Second, a low r* is consistent with continued equity resilience, especially in growth stocks heavily reliant on a low medium-term discount rate. That the equity moves in the past two days were led by huge relative rotation from the Russell to the NASDAQ should not be a surprise. This, as Deutsche Bank ominously warns<u>,</u><b><u>is 2010-19 secular stagnation pricing, version 2</u></b><b>.</b></p><p><blockquote>其次,低r*与持续的股票弹性是一致的,尤其是在严重依赖低中期贴现率的成长型股票中。过去两天的股票走势是由从罗素到纳斯达克的巨大相对轮动推动的,这并不奇怪。正如德意志银行不祥警告的那样<u>,</u><b><u>is 2010-19 长期停滞定价,第 2 版</u></b><b>.</b></blockquote></p><p> Here, another, even bigger question emerged: will the US even be able to sustain positive GDP growth absent trillions in new stimulus each and every year? And even more ominous:<b>what happens to inflation if the Fed is forced to cut rates well before the inflationary burst is extinguished?</b>These are among uncomfortable questions markets will have to answer in the coming months.</p><p><blockquote>在这里,另一个更大的问题出现了:如果没有每年数万亿美元的新刺激措施,美国还能维持正的GDP增长吗?更不祥的是:<b>如果美联储在通胀爆发平息之前就被迫降息,通胀会发生什么?</b>这些都是市场在未来几个月必须回答的令人不安的问题。</blockquote></p><p> * * *</p><p><blockquote>***</blockquote></p><p> Fast forward to today when SocGen's in-house permagrouch, Albert Edwards, offered an answer to all of these critical questions posed by the Fed: according to Edwards, the market does not have to worry much about such trivial questions as<i>\"is inflation transitory or not\"</i>for the simple reason that<i><b>The Fed’s ambition to normalize rates can never be achieved.</b></i></p><p><blockquote>快进到今天,法国兴业银行的内部永久分析师阿尔伯特·爱德华兹 (Albert Edwards) 对美联储提出的所有这些关键问题给出了答案:爱德华兹表示,市场不必太担心诸如<i>“通货膨胀是否是暂时的”</i>原因很简单<i><b>美联储实现利率正常化的雄心永远无法实现。</b></i></blockquote></p><p> Picking up on the observations made by Deutsche Bank's head of FX, Edwards writes that while the global reflation trade was already in retreat, its head of lobbed off by the Fed in its surprisingly hawkish statement of intent last week, a \"retreat which quickly turned into a rout across many asset classes.\"</p><p><blockquote>爱德华兹在谈到德意志银行外汇主管的观察时写道,虽然全球再通胀交易已经在撤退,但美联储上周在其令人惊讶的鹰派意向声明中砍下了其头颅,这一“撤退很快就变成了许多资产类别的溃败。”</blockquote></p><p> And while it was not quite in the same league as Bernanke's 2013 \"Taper Tantrum\" it clearly demonstrated the market’s sensitivity to the Fed’s intentions, fickle as they may be. The biggest surprise: after an initial selloff, the long end of the bond market rallied - in contrast to the sharp sell-off in 2013, or as Edwards echoes what we said:<i><b>Maybe the market now realizes that a Fed tightening cycle is impossible?</b></i></p><p><blockquote>虽然这与伯南克 2013 年的 “缩减规模发脾气 ”并不完全相同,但它清楚地表明了市场对美联储意图的敏感性,尽管这些意图可能变化无常。最大的惊喜:在最初的抛售之后,债券市场的长端反弹——与 2013 年的大幅抛售形成鲜明对比,或者正如爱德华兹所说:<i><b>也许市场现在意识到美联储紧缩周期是不可能的?</b></i></blockquote></p><p> Referencing aWSJ articleby the Fed's former mouthpiece, Edwards writes that according to Jon Hilsenrath there are two explanations.</p><p><blockquote>爱德华兹引用美联储前喉舌 aWSJ 的文章写道,根据乔恩·希尔森拉斯 (Jon Hilsenrath) 的说法,有两种解释。</blockquote></p><p> <ul> <li>First, the Fed has done a better job communicating its intentions this time round (personally I think not).</li> <li>Secondly and more worryingly, Hilsenrath writes that the markets could be too complacent.</li> </ul> Edwards next notes that according to Jeremy Stein who was a Fed Governor during the 2013 tantrum, the markets shouldn’t take a benign view of the extent of potential tightening as<i><b>“The Fed cannot support markets if there’s an inflation surprise.”</b></i>He said that Fed Chair Powell, his former colleague, has been adept at shifting his stance when needed. Despite the market’s tranquillity today, he said, Powell may need that nimbleness in the months ahead. Indeed, Mr. Powell said in a June 16 news conference “<i><b>We will do what we can to avoid a market reaction. But ultimately, when we achieve our macroeconomic goal, we will taper as appropriate”.</b></i></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>首先,美联储这次在传达其意图方面做得更好(我个人认为不是)。</li><li>其次,也是更令人担忧的是,希尔森拉斯写道,市场可能过于自满。</li></ul>爱德华兹接着指出,根据 2013 年发脾气期间担任美联储理事的杰里米-斯坦(Jeremy Stein)的说法,市场不应对潜在紧缩政策的程度持友好态度。<i><b>“如果出现通胀意外,美联储就无法支持市场”。</b></i>他说,他的前同事美联储主席鲍威尔善于在需要时改变立场。他说,尽管目前市场平静,但鲍威尔在未来几个月可能需要这种灵活性。事实上,鲍威尔先生在6月16日的新闻发布会上说:“<i><b>我们将尽我们所能避免市场反应。但最终,当我们实现宏观经济目标时,我们将酌情缩减规模”。</b></i></blockquote></p><p> The permacynical Edwards then explodes, and says that when he reads those sorts of statements, he \"literally laughs out loud\" and asks \"is this the same Jerome Powell who at the end of 2018, after talking tough for months about the unwinding of the Fed balance sheet being on “auto-pilot” did a 180 degree about turn when markets began to swoon at the end of that year?<b>He is indeed nimble – in retreat!</b>\"</p><p><blockquote>爱德华兹随后爆发了,他说,当他读到这类声明时,他 “真的会笑出声来”,并问道 “这是同一个杰罗姆-鲍威尔吗?在 2018 年底,他几个月来一直强硬地谈论美联储资产负债表的缩减是 “自动驾驶 ”,但当市场在当年年底开始崩溃时,他来了个 180 度的大转弯?<b>他确实很敏捷——在撤退中!</b>\"</blockquote></p><p> Perhaps Edwards is no longer alone in his uber skepticism: after all none other than Bank of America recently said that everyone knows the Fed will stop tapering assoon as the S&P drops 10%...which isn't a good sign when it comes to Powell's credibility.</p><p><blockquote>也许爱德华兹不再是唯一一个持超级怀疑态度的人:毕竟,正是美国银行最近表示,每个人都知道,一旦标准普尔下跌10%,美联储将立即停止缩减规模……这对鲍威尔的可信度来说不是一个好兆头。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> So why does Edwards think the bond market reacted inversely to its Taper Tantrum shock? \"In my opinion the bond market rallied because they know that Fed easy money comes at a heavy price.\"</p><p><blockquote>那么,为什么爱德华兹认为债券市场对其缩减发脾气的冲击反应相反呢?“在我看来,债券市场上涨是因为他们知道美联储宽松货币的代价很高。”</blockquote></p><p> It's not just that: with the Fed having gone all in on reflating everything, not just the economy and stock market but the housing market too, a crash in any of the three would result in an immediate depression. That's why Edwards thinks that the bond market<b>\"just doesn’t believe the Fed can follow through on its tougher talk. Why? Because having created another huge, real-terms house price bubble, they are trapped\"...</b></p><p><blockquote>不仅如此:随着美联储全力以赴重新通胀一切,不仅是经济和股市,还有房地产市场,这三者中的任何一个崩溃都会导致立即萧条。所以爱德华兹认为债券市场<b>“我只是不相信美联储能够兑现其更强硬的言论。为什么?因为在制造了另一个巨大的、真正意义上的房价泡沫之后,他们被困住了”...</b></blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/da894f1f697890f14bbd7a2f9fd8e139\" tg-width=\"500\" tg-height=\"214\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> <b>...</b>which confirms what we have said since 2009: that \"central banks have become slaves to the bubbles that they blow – the markets quickly forcing a reversal of any tightening. This time around will be no different.\"</p><p><blockquote><b>...</b>这证实了我们自 2009 年以来所说的:“央行已经成为它们吹出的泡沫的奴隶——市场很快就会迫使任何紧缩政策逆转。这一次也不会有什么不同。”</blockquote></p><p> And speaking of blowing house price bubbles, Edwards points out that \"there isn’t even room for the Fed on the medal podium. Pointing to the chart below...</p><p><blockquote>在谈到房价泡沫时,爱德华兹指出,“美联储甚至没有登上领奖台的空间。他指着下图...</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/01eba2b10798b2941e9d408a94c428f5\" tg-width=\"800\" tg-height=\"475\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> ... Edwards concludes that '<b>this is now a global property bubble of epic proportions never before seen by man or beast and it has entrapped more CBs than just the Fed.</b>\"</p><p><blockquote>...爱德华兹总结道,<b>现在,这是一个史诗般的全球房地产泡沫,无论是人类还是野兽都从未见过,它困住了更多的哥伦比亚广播公司,而不仅仅是美联储。</b>\"</blockquote></p><p> Bottom line: any attempt to normalize will leads to an immediate bursting of one or more asset bubbles, which will immediately draw the Fed right back in, resulting in an even bigger bubble, and yes- it means that sooner or later the Fed's two most hated assets, cryptos and gold, will both trade far above $100,000 once the world realizes that thehyperinflation that even BofA sees comingis not \"transitory.\"</p><p><blockquote>底线:任何正常化的尝试都将导致一个或多个资产泡沫立即破裂,这将立即将美联储拉回来,导致更大的泡沫,是的,这意味着迟早美联储最讨厌的两种资产,加密货币和黄金,一旦世界意识到即使是美国银行也认为的恶性通货膨胀并非“暂时的”,交易价格都将远高于 10 万美元。</blockquote></p><p></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Albert Edwards: The Fed Is Trapped In An Epic Bubble, It Can Never Normalize Rates Again<blockquote>艾伯特·爱德华兹:美联储陷入了史诗般的泡沫,它永远无法再次实现利率正常化</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; 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}\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nAlbert Edwards: The Fed Is Trapped In An Epic Bubble, It Can Never Normalize Rates Again<blockquote>艾伯特·爱德华兹:美联储陷入了史诗般的泡沫,它永远无法再次实现利率正常化</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">zerohedge</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-06-25 15:42</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p>One week ago,we explained whythe Fed made a huge policy error last Wednesday when its latest dot plot showed two rate hikes: in simple terms, while market pricing for hikes in 2023 and 2024 went up, yields beyond that dropped as the market said that the best the Fed can do is less than 2-years of rate hikes.</p><p><blockquote>一周前,我们解释了为什么美联储在上周三犯下了巨大的政策错误,当时其最新的点阵图显示了两次加息:简单来说,虽然市场对 2023 年和 2024 年加息的定价有所上升,但除此之外的收益率却有所下降,因为市场表示美联储能做的最好的事情就是加息不到两年。</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/553b5c9e65ffdc0b996916d81dcba85e\" tg-width=\"552\" tg-height=\"280\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> Said otherwise, if the Fed decides to hike - as first Powell hinted and then Bullard doubled down on Friday sending stocks plunging -<b>the market is saying that it won’t be able to go very far before inflation and growth hit a speed limit,</b>pushing yield expectations after the initial hike lower.</p><p><blockquote>换句话说,如果美联储决定加息——正如鲍威尔先是暗示的那样,然后布拉德周五加倍降息,导致股市暴跌——<b>市场表示,在通货膨胀和增长达到速度限制之前,市场不会走多远、</b>首次加息后推低收益率预期。</blockquote></p><p> This very pessimistic view on r*,first laid out here in 2015, is also in line with market behavior beyond the bond market. First, as Deutsche Bank's FX strategist George Saravelos said, it is aligned with the very high dollar responsiveness we have seen to even small shifts in Fed stance: huge pent-up demand for yield from investors across the planet forces a stronger dollar and a bigger disinflationary impact quicker than assumed. In other words, a low global r*<i>(remember the rest of the world still has massive current account surpluses, or excess savings)</i>pushes US r* even lower.</p><p><blockquote>这种对 r* 的非常悲观的观点,于 2015 年首次在此提出,也符合债券市场之外的市场行为。首先,正如德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)外汇策略师乔治·萨拉维洛斯(George Saravelos)所说,这与我们所看到的即使是美联储立场的微小转变的非常高的美元反应是一致的:全球投资者对收益率的巨大被压抑的需求迫使美元走强和更大的通货紧缩影响比预期更快。换句话说,低全局r*<i>(请记住,世界其他地区仍然拥有巨额经常账户盈余或过度储蓄)</i>把我们的r*推得更低。</blockquote></p><p> Second, a low r* is consistent with continued equity resilience, especially in growth stocks heavily reliant on a low medium-term discount rate. That the equity moves in the past two days were led by huge relative rotation from the Russell to the NASDAQ should not be a surprise. This, as Deutsche Bank ominously warns<u>,</u><b><u>is 2010-19 secular stagnation pricing, version 2</u></b><b>.</b></p><p><blockquote>其次,低r*与持续的股票弹性是一致的,尤其是在严重依赖低中期贴现率的成长型股票中。过去两天的股票走势是由从罗素到纳斯达克的巨大相对轮动推动的,这并不奇怪。正如德意志银行不祥警告的那样<u>,</u><b><u>is 2010-19 长期停滞定价,第 2 版</u></b><b>.</b></blockquote></p><p> Here, another, even bigger question emerged: will the US even be able to sustain positive GDP growth absent trillions in new stimulus each and every year? And even more ominous:<b>what happens to inflation if the Fed is forced to cut rates well before the inflationary burst is extinguished?</b>These are among uncomfortable questions markets will have to answer in the coming months.</p><p><blockquote>在这里,另一个更大的问题出现了:如果没有每年数万亿美元的新刺激措施,美国还能维持正的GDP增长吗?更不祥的是:<b>如果美联储在通胀爆发平息之前就被迫降息,通胀会发生什么?</b>这些都是市场在未来几个月必须回答的令人不安的问题。</blockquote></p><p> * * *</p><p><blockquote>***</blockquote></p><p> Fast forward to today when SocGen's in-house permagrouch, Albert Edwards, offered an answer to all of these critical questions posed by the Fed: according to Edwards, the market does not have to worry much about such trivial questions as<i>\"is inflation transitory or not\"</i>for the simple reason that<i><b>The Fed’s ambition to normalize rates can never be achieved.</b></i></p><p><blockquote>快进到今天,法国兴业银行的内部永久分析师阿尔伯特·爱德华兹 (Albert Edwards) 对美联储提出的所有这些关键问题给出了答案:爱德华兹表示,市场不必太担心诸如<i>“通货膨胀是否是暂时的”</i>原因很简单<i><b>美联储实现利率正常化的雄心永远无法实现。</b></i></blockquote></p><p> Picking up on the observations made by Deutsche Bank's head of FX, Edwards writes that while the global reflation trade was already in retreat, its head of lobbed off by the Fed in its surprisingly hawkish statement of intent last week, a \"retreat which quickly turned into a rout across many asset classes.\"</p><p><blockquote>爱德华兹在谈到德意志银行外汇主管的观察时写道,虽然全球再通胀交易已经在撤退,但美联储上周在其令人惊讶的鹰派意向声明中砍下了其头颅,这一“撤退很快就变成了许多资产类别的溃败。”</blockquote></p><p> And while it was not quite in the same league as Bernanke's 2013 \"Taper Tantrum\" it clearly demonstrated the market’s sensitivity to the Fed’s intentions, fickle as they may be. The biggest surprise: after an initial selloff, the long end of the bond market rallied - in contrast to the sharp sell-off in 2013, or as Edwards echoes what we said:<i><b>Maybe the market now realizes that a Fed tightening cycle is impossible?</b></i></p><p><blockquote>虽然这与伯南克 2013 年的 “缩减规模发脾气 ”并不完全相同,但它清楚地表明了市场对美联储意图的敏感性,尽管这些意图可能变化无常。最大的惊喜:在最初的抛售之后,债券市场的长端反弹——与 2013 年的大幅抛售形成鲜明对比,或者正如爱德华兹所说:<i><b>也许市场现在意识到美联储紧缩周期是不可能的?</b></i></blockquote></p><p> Referencing aWSJ articleby the Fed's former mouthpiece, Edwards writes that according to Jon Hilsenrath there are two explanations.</p><p><blockquote>爱德华兹引用美联储前喉舌 aWSJ 的文章写道,根据乔恩·希尔森拉斯 (Jon Hilsenrath) 的说法,有两种解释。</blockquote></p><p> <ul> <li>First, the Fed has done a better job communicating its intentions this time round (personally I think not).</li> <li>Secondly and more worryingly, Hilsenrath writes that the markets could be too complacent.</li> </ul> Edwards next notes that according to Jeremy Stein who was a Fed Governor during the 2013 tantrum, the markets shouldn’t take a benign view of the extent of potential tightening as<i><b>“The Fed cannot support markets if there’s an inflation surprise.”</b></i>He said that Fed Chair Powell, his former colleague, has been adept at shifting his stance when needed. Despite the market’s tranquillity today, he said, Powell may need that nimbleness in the months ahead. Indeed, Mr. Powell said in a June 16 news conference “<i><b>We will do what we can to avoid a market reaction. But ultimately, when we achieve our macroeconomic goal, we will taper as appropriate”.</b></i></p><p><blockquote><ul><li>首先,美联储这次在传达其意图方面做得更好(我个人认为不是)。</li><li>其次,也是更令人担忧的是,希尔森拉斯写道,市场可能过于自满。</li></ul>爱德华兹接着指出,根据 2013 年发脾气期间担任美联储理事的杰里米-斯坦(Jeremy Stein)的说法,市场不应对潜在紧缩政策的程度持友好态度。<i><b>“如果出现通胀意外,美联储就无法支持市场”。</b></i>他说,他的前同事美联储主席鲍威尔善于在需要时改变立场。他说,尽管目前市场平静,但鲍威尔在未来几个月可能需要这种灵活性。事实上,鲍威尔先生在6月16日的新闻发布会上说:“<i><b>我们将尽我们所能避免市场反应。但最终,当我们实现宏观经济目标时,我们将酌情缩减规模”。</b></i></blockquote></p><p> The permacynical Edwards then explodes, and says that when he reads those sorts of statements, he \"literally laughs out loud\" and asks \"is this the same Jerome Powell who at the end of 2018, after talking tough for months about the unwinding of the Fed balance sheet being on “auto-pilot” did a 180 degree about turn when markets began to swoon at the end of that year?<b>He is indeed nimble – in retreat!</b>\"</p><p><blockquote>爱德华兹随后爆发了,他说,当他读到这类声明时,他 “真的会笑出声来”,并问道 “这是同一个杰罗姆-鲍威尔吗?在 2018 年底,他几个月来一直强硬地谈论美联储资产负债表的缩减是 “自动驾驶 ”,但当市场在当年年底开始崩溃时,他来了个 180 度的大转弯?<b>他确实很敏捷——在撤退中!</b>\"</blockquote></p><p> Perhaps Edwards is no longer alone in his uber skepticism: after all none other than Bank of America recently said that everyone knows the Fed will stop tapering assoon as the S&P drops 10%...which isn't a good sign when it comes to Powell's credibility.</p><p><blockquote>也许爱德华兹不再是唯一一个持超级怀疑态度的人:毕竟,正是美国银行最近表示,每个人都知道,一旦标准普尔下跌10%,美联储将立即停止缩减规模……这对鲍威尔的可信度来说不是一个好兆头。</blockquote></p><p></p><p> So why does Edwards think the bond market reacted inversely to its Taper Tantrum shock? \"In my opinion the bond market rallied because they know that Fed easy money comes at a heavy price.\"</p><p><blockquote>那么,为什么爱德华兹认为债券市场对其缩减发脾气的冲击反应相反呢?“在我看来,债券市场上涨是因为他们知道美联储宽松货币的代价很高。”</blockquote></p><p> It's not just that: with the Fed having gone all in on reflating everything, not just the economy and stock market but the housing market too, a crash in any of the three would result in an immediate depression. That's why Edwards thinks that the bond market<b>\"just doesn’t believe the Fed can follow through on its tougher talk. Why? Because having created another huge, real-terms house price bubble, they are trapped\"...</b></p><p><blockquote>不仅如此:随着美联储全力以赴重新通胀一切,不仅是经济和股市,还有房地产市场,这三者中的任何一个崩溃都会导致立即萧条。所以爱德华兹认为债券市场<b>“我只是不相信美联储能够兑现其更强硬的言论。为什么?因为在制造了另一个巨大的、真正意义上的房价泡沫之后,他们被困住了”...</b></blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/da894f1f697890f14bbd7a2f9fd8e139\" tg-width=\"500\" tg-height=\"214\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> <b>...</b>which confirms what we have said since 2009: that \"central banks have become slaves to the bubbles that they blow – the markets quickly forcing a reversal of any tightening. This time around will be no different.\"</p><p><blockquote><b>...</b>这证实了我们自 2009 年以来所说的:“央行已经成为它们吹出的泡沫的奴隶——市场很快就会迫使任何紧缩政策逆转。这一次也不会有什么不同。”</blockquote></p><p> And speaking of blowing house price bubbles, Edwards points out that \"there isn’t even room for the Fed on the medal podium. Pointing to the chart below...</p><p><blockquote>在谈到房价泡沫时,爱德华兹指出,“美联储甚至没有登上领奖台的空间。他指着下图...</blockquote></p><p> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/01eba2b10798b2941e9d408a94c428f5\" tg-width=\"800\" tg-height=\"475\"></p><p><blockquote></blockquote></p><p> ... Edwards concludes that '<b>this is now a global property bubble of epic proportions never before seen by man or beast and it has entrapped more CBs than just the Fed.</b>\"</p><p><blockquote>...爱德华兹总结道,<b>现在,这是一个史诗般的全球房地产泡沫,无论是人类还是野兽都从未见过,它困住了更多的哥伦比亚广播公司,而不仅仅是美联储。</b>\"</blockquote></p><p> Bottom line: any attempt to normalize will leads to an immediate bursting of one or more asset bubbles, which will immediately draw the Fed right back in, resulting in an even bigger bubble, and yes- it means that sooner or later the Fed's two most hated assets, cryptos and gold, will both trade far above $100,000 once the world realizes that thehyperinflation that even BofA sees comingis not \"transitory.\"</p><p><blockquote>底线:任何正常化的尝试都将导致一个或多个资产泡沫立即破裂,这将立即将美联储拉回来,导致更大的泡沫,是的,这意味着迟早美联储最讨厌的两种资产,加密货币和黄金,一旦世界意识到即使是美国银行也认为的恶性通货膨胀并非“暂时的”,交易价格都将远高于 10 万美元。</blockquote></p><p></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> 来源:<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/albert-edwards-fed-trapped-epic-bubble-it-can-never-normalize-rates-again\">zerohedge</a></p>\n<p>为提升您的阅读体验,我们对本页面进行了排版优化</p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite","SPY":"标普500ETF"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/albert-edwards-fed-trapped-epic-bubble-it-can-never-normalize-rates-again","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1119915886","content_text":"One week ago,we explained whythe Fed made a huge policy error last Wednesday when its latest dot plot showed two rate hikes: in simple terms, while market pricing for hikes in 2023 and 2024 went up, yields beyond that dropped as the market said that the best the Fed can do is less than 2-years of rate hikes.\n\nSaid otherwise, if the Fed decides to hike - as first Powell hinted and then Bullard doubled down on Friday sending stocks plunging -the market is saying that it won’t be able to go very far before inflation and growth hit a speed limit,pushing yield expectations after the initial hike lower.\nThis very pessimistic view on r*,first laid out here in 2015, is also in line with market behavior beyond the bond market. First, as Deutsche Bank's FX strategist George Saravelos said, it is aligned with the very high dollar responsiveness we have seen to even small shifts in Fed stance: huge pent-up demand for yield from investors across the planet forces a stronger dollar and a bigger disinflationary impact quicker than assumed. In other words, a low global r*(remember the rest of the world still has massive current account surpluses, or excess savings)pushes US r* even lower.\nSecond, a low r* is consistent with continued equity resilience, especially in growth stocks heavily reliant on a low medium-term discount rate. That the equity moves in the past two days were led by huge relative rotation from the Russell to the NASDAQ should not be a surprise. This, as Deutsche Bank ominously warns,is 2010-19 secular stagnation pricing, version 2.\nHere, another, even bigger question emerged: will the US even be able to sustain positive GDP growth absent trillions in new stimulus each and every year? And even more ominous:what happens to inflation if the Fed is forced to cut rates well before the inflationary burst is extinguished?These are among uncomfortable questions markets will have to answer in the coming months.\n* * *\nFast forward to today when SocGen's in-house permagrouch, Albert Edwards, offered an answer to all of these critical questions posed by the Fed: according to Edwards, the market does not have to worry much about such trivial questions as\"is inflation transitory or not\"for the simple reason thatThe Fed’s ambition to normalize rates can never be achieved.\nPicking up on the observations made by Deutsche Bank's head of FX, Edwards writes that while the global reflation trade was already in retreat, its head of lobbed off by the Fed in its surprisingly hawkish statement of intent last week, a \"retreat which quickly turned into a rout across many asset classes.\"\nAnd while it was not quite in the same league as Bernanke's 2013 \"Taper Tantrum\" it clearly demonstrated the market’s sensitivity to the Fed’s intentions, fickle as they may be. The biggest surprise: after an initial selloff, the long end of the bond market rallied - in contrast to the sharp sell-off in 2013, or as Edwards echoes what we said:Maybe the market now realizes that a Fed tightening cycle is impossible?\nReferencing aWSJ articleby the Fed's former mouthpiece, Edwards writes that according to Jon Hilsenrath there are two explanations.\n\nFirst, the Fed has done a better job communicating its intentions this time round (personally I think not).\nSecondly and more worryingly, Hilsenrath writes that the markets could be too complacent.\n\nEdwards next notes that according to Jeremy Stein who was a Fed Governor during the 2013 tantrum, the markets shouldn’t take a benign view of the extent of potential tightening as“The Fed cannot support markets if there’s an inflation surprise.”He said that Fed Chair Powell, his former colleague, has been adept at shifting his stance when needed. Despite the market’s tranquillity today, he said, Powell may need that nimbleness in the months ahead. Indeed, Mr. Powell said in a June 16 news conference “We will do what we can to avoid a market reaction. But ultimately, when we achieve our macroeconomic goal, we will taper as appropriate”.\nThe permacynical Edwards then explodes, and says that when he reads those sorts of statements, he \"literally laughs out loud\" and asks \"is this the same Jerome Powell who at the end of 2018, after talking tough for months about the unwinding of the Fed balance sheet being on “auto-pilot” did a 180 degree about turn when markets began to swoon at the end of that year?He is indeed nimble – in retreat!\"\nPerhaps Edwards is no longer alone in his uber skepticism: after all none other than Bank of America recently said that everyone knows the Fed will stop tapering assoon as the S&P drops 10%...which isn't a good sign when it comes to Powell's credibility.\nSo why does Edwards think the bond market reacted inversely to its Taper Tantrum shock? \"In my opinion the bond market rallied because they know that Fed easy money comes at a heavy price.\"\nIt's not just that: with the Fed having gone all in on reflating everything, not just the economy and stock market but the housing market too, a crash in any of the three would result in an immediate depression. That's why Edwards thinks that the bond market\"just doesn’t believe the Fed can follow through on its tougher talk. Why? Because having created another huge, real-terms house price bubble, they are trapped\"...\n\n...which confirms what we have said since 2009: that \"central banks have become slaves to the bubbles that they blow – the markets quickly forcing a reversal of any tightening. This time around will be no different.\"\nAnd speaking of blowing house price bubbles, Edwards points out that \"there isn’t even room for the Fed on the medal podium. Pointing to the chart below...\n\n... Edwards concludes that 'this is now a global property bubble of epic proportions never before seen by man or beast and it has entrapped more CBs than just the Fed.\"\nBottom line: any attempt to normalize will leads to an immediate bursting of one or more asset bubbles, which will immediately draw the Fed right back in, resulting in an even bigger bubble, and yes- it means that sooner or later the Fed's two most hated assets, cryptos and gold, will both trade far above $100,000 once the world realizes that thehyperinflation that even BofA sees comingis not \"transitory.\"","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".IXIC":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".DJI":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":942,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":4,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"isCommentEnd":true,"isTiger":false,"isWeiXinMini":false,"url":"/m/post/122146000"}
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